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Banks perform the essential economic task of collecting funds from net savers (such as
households) and lending funds to net borrowers (such as firms). In doing so, banks trans-
form assets with respect to size, maturity, and risk. For savers this transformation implies
several reasons to deposit money with a bank instead of lending directly to borrowers.
As shown by Bryant (1980) and Diamond & Dybvig (1983) banks provide liquidity
insurance to depositors. They offer deposit contracts that allow depositors with uncertain
liquidity needs to withdraw their funds at different points in time. In contrast, direct
investment in firms is often illiquid or related with liquidation cost. Another advantage of
banks shows when informational asymmetries are considered and the quality of a borrower’s
project is not necessarily observable. Depositors can delegate the monitoring of investment
projects to banks whose cost of monitoring decrease in the number of projects (Diamond
1984, Leland & Pyle 1977).
In this way banks can prevent market failure in the sense that more firms with projects
worth financing receive funds. However, due to the nature of their tasks, banks’ are exposed
to several risks. Freixas & Rochet (2008) distinguish between four kinds of risks: credit
risk, liquidity risk, interest rate risk, and market risk. Credit risk results from the fact
that the bank does not necessarily obtain the promised return on a loan if the borrower’s
project fails. Important determinants of credit risk are the probability of a default and
the recovery rate, i.e., the amount repaid to the bank in case of a default. Liquidity risk is
present because the amount of funds withdrawals is uncertain at any time. Since banks
invest funds in projects that are illiquid or related with liquidation cost, depositors cannot
necessarily be fully repaid if the amount of withdrawals exceeds the bank’s reserves. In
contrast to credit risk, liquidity risk affects the liability side and not the asset side of the
bank’s balance sheet. Interest rate risk stems from fluctuations in interest rates over time.
These fluctuations affect the value of banks’ portfolios because banks engage in maturity
transformation. Market risk arises due to fluctuations in market prices for a bank’s assets
or liabilities.
This thesis is concerned with particular aspects of liquidity risk and credit risk. The main
body consists of two parts, each comprising two chapters, that have a different thematic
focus. A detailed introduction into the topics is provided in each part separately.
In the first part of the thesis it is examined how banks themselves deal with liquidity
risk and credit risk. More precisely, the first part concentrates on interbank lending. If
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a bank faces large withdrawals that exceed liquid reserves, the bank can borrow at the
interbank market from a bank with excess liquidity. In this way, interbank markets provide
insurance against liquidity risk (Bhattacharya & Gale 1987). Moreover, instead of granting
a loan to a firm, a bank can grant a loan at the interbank market. In this way, depending
on the characteristics of the interbank loan, interbank lending can decrease credit risk.
Nevertheless, interbank lending can also increase credit risk as follows. If a bank defaults
on an interbank loan, the lender’s probability of default increases, too. Since many banks
are lenders and borrowers at the interbank market at the same time, contagion can spread
through the interbank market (Allen & Gale 2000, Freixas et al. 2000). Here, the structure
of the interbank market plays an important role because different structures show a different
resilience with respect to shocks and contagion (Castiglionesi & Navarro 2008, Georg 2013).
Chapter 1 explores network formation in interbank markets or, more precisely, banks’
choice of their interbank market partners given banks’ exposure to credit risk and infor-
mation between banks. It is shown that information between banks, their transparency,
and their efficiency in monitoring play a crucial role to explain banks’ lending behavior.
Additionally, heterogeneity in information is necessary to explain the formation of network
structures that are observed in reality.
Chapter 2 examines more closely how banks deal with liquidity risk. In particular, the
focus is on the determinants of the amount of liquid reserves, i.e., the share of funds that is
not invested in illiquid projects, held by banks. Furthermore, the conditions under which
interbank lending takes place are analyzed. It is shown how liquid reserves and interbank
lending depend on banks’ credit risk and monetary policy rates.
While the first part focuses on bank’s management of risks, the second part analyzes how
regulators deal with bank risk. Regulatory tools, like capital requirements or resolution,
affect bank behavior. From a regulator’s point of view bank behavior in absence of regulation
is often not optimal due to conflicts of interests between bank managers, stockholders,
bondholders, and depositors. For example, Jensen & Meckling (1976) show that depositors
prefer a less risky investment policy than bank owners. Generally speaking, bank managers
may not account for all parties affected by the bank’s behavior. The disadvantage of
neglected parties may be compensated by regulatory actions. In the second part, apart from
a deposit insurance, there is another regulatory instrument. The regulator can monitor
banks and resolve them if their investments are considered too risky. When deciding on
resolution, the regulator does not only account for the banks point of view but also for the
deposit insurance’s and hence the depositor’s point of view.
As additional difficulty internationally active banks are considered. Multinational banks
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distribute their activity among different countries and choose their behavior to escape tight
national regulations (Karolyi & Taboada 2015). This is possible because national regulators
only consider effects of multinational bank activity on their country and do not account
for the effects on other countries (Allen et al. 2011). Since multinational banks are active
in more than one country, it is implied that regulation in one country also effects other
countries. Hence, there are regulatory external effects.
In chapter 3 the gains and losses of a banking union are discussed. In a banking union
a single supranational regulator is in charge of supervision and resolution of banks in all
countries that are part of the banking union. In contrast to national regulators, a suprana-
tional regulator accounts for the effects of multinational banking in all countries. In other
words, the supranational regulator internalizes regulatory external effects. Consequently, a
change from national to supranational regulation is beneficial from an aggregate point of
view, however, it may not be beneficial from the point of view of a single country. Therefore,
a single country may object against entering a banking union. In chapter 3 it is shown how
a country’s incentive to join a banking union depends on the banking sectors’ structure or,
more precisely, on the number, size, and activity level of domestic and foreign banks in the
considered countries.
Chapter 3 concentrates on regulation and abstracts from bank behavior. In particular, it
is assumed that banks do not react to changes in regulation. This assumption is relaxed
in chapter 4. There are two immediate consequences. On the one hand, bank behavior
depends on regulation. On the other hand, regulation is chosen in consideration of bank
behavior which implies that bank behavior also effects regulation. Chapter 4 studies this
mutual interdependence. Without internalizing external effects a “race to the top” in
regulatory standards results.





Financial markets can be classified according to several characteristics (European Central
Bank 2011b, Mishkin 1992). A first distinction can be made between primary and secondary
markets. On primary markets trade takes place between the issuer of a financial instrument
and the initial buyer. On secondary markets financial instruments that have been issued
previously can be resold.
A second characteristic of a financial market concerns its organization. A distinction
is made between exchanges, where trade is conducted in a central location, and over-
the-counter markets, where trade takes place at different locations and on a bilateral
basis.
Third, financial markets can be distinguished based on the maturity of financial instru-
ments. On money markets agents trade instruments with maturity less than one year. If
financial instruments are characterized by a maturity greater than one year, the financial
market is referred to as a capital market.
Finally, a financial market can be classified based on the form of the financial instrument
that is traded.
Interbank markets represent a special type of financial market where banks trade financial
instruments. Interbank markets are usually secondary markets which are organized over-
the-counter. The maturity of interbank loans varies. According to Bluhm et al. (2016)
interbank loans in the German interbank market have an average maturity that exceeds one
year. Nevertheless, overnight interbank lending (with maturity of one day) is an important
part which constitutes around 4% of the aggregate bank balance sheet volume. The types
of financial instruments that are traded vary.
A major distinction is made between collateralized and uncollateralized interbank lending.
In case of collateralized lending, the promise of the borrower to repay a certain amount
or to repurchase a certain asset is backed with collateral that remains with the lender if
the borrower defaults. In this way, collateralization can decrease counterparty risk. The
formation of an interbank loan contract which includes collateral then depends less on
the credit risk of the borrower and more on the availability and quality of collateral. The
models in the following two chapters concentrate on uncollateralized interbank markets.
The importance of interbank markets varies across countries. For example in 2009 bank
loans to financial corporations in the euro area as well as in Japan totaled roughly 95%
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of GDP, while in the United States it is only 34% of GDP (European Central Bank 2011b).
The importance of interbank lending in the euro area, above all relative to the United
States, also shows when banks’ balance sheets are considered. While the average share of
interbank lending in total assets between 2002 and 2015 in the euro area lies between 18%
and 21%, interbank activity in the United States amounts only 1-3% (Bluhm et al. 2016).
Interbank markets perform different functions. First, banks can also obtain funding
for investment projects from the interbank market. Thereby, interbank markets channel
funds from banks with less profitable investment possibilities to banks with more profitable
investment possibilities. Second, interbank markets support banks’ management of their
term structure risk resulting from maturity transformation (Bluhm et al. 2016, Moore
2011). For the first two functions the longer-term segment of the interbank market plays
a more important role than the short-term segment. The functions which are mainly
performed by the short-term segment of the interbank market are presented in the following.
Third, interbank markets support banks’ liquidity management. Since banks face deposit
withdrawals of unknown size at any time, they may face liquidity shortages. At the interbank
market banks can obtain liquidity and thereby reduce liquidity risk. For example, Calomiris
(1993) shows that the risk of bank runs can be reduced when banks form networks and
enter into voluntary coinsurance. Finally, interbank markets constitute an important part
of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy (European Central Bank 2011b, Mishkin
1992).
Monetary policy decisions affect economic conditions and the overall economic perfor-
mance through various channels. For a proper presentation of these channels the reader
is referred to European Central Bank (2011b). In the following, a description of those
channels that work through the banking system is given.
Monetary policy affects short-term interest rates. First, there is a bank lending channel.
If the interest rate on loans goes up, then risk-taking by borrowers increases, the probability
of default on some loans increases, and the bank grants fewer loans. Second, the balance
sheet channel takes into account that an increase in the interest rate on loans decreases the
value of collateral. As a consequence, banks again grant fewer loans. Third, a risk taking
channel exists. According to this channel a decreasing interest rate affects bank risk taking
in two ways. On the one hand, the value of collateral increases and thus the bank is willing
to accept higher risks. On the other hand, riskier investments are more attractive because
agents search for higher yields when interest rates are low.
There can be different objectives of monetary policy. For example, in the United States
the Federal Reserve mentions six basic goals: high employment, economic growth, price
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stability, interest rate stability, stability in financial markets, and stability in the foreign
exchange markets (Mishkin 1992). In the euro area the goal of monetary policy is price
stability which contributes to broader economic goals such as higher standards of living,
high levels of economic activity, and better employment prospects (European Central Bank
2011b). In many countries central banks set specific monetary policy targets, such as
inflation, or operational targets, such as the interest rate on interbank markets. Central
banks have different tools to achieve monetary policy goals. For an overview of targets
and instruments of monetary policy in different countries around the world the reader is
referred to Bank for International Settlements (2009).
The instruments of central banks mainly comprise open market operations, standing
facilities, and minimum reserves (European Central Bank 2011b, Mishkin 1992). With the
help of open market operations, central banks can control the monetary base and absorb
liquidity or provide liquidity to banks. The volume of open market operations is chosen
by the central bank. The standing facilities consists of a marginal lending facility and a
deposit facility.1 At given interest rates and maturity (usually overnight) banks can borrow
liquidity by using the marginal lending facility or deposit their excess reserves by using
the deposit facility. The interest rates, i.e., the marginal lending rate and the deposit rate,
are set by the central bank. Normally, these interest rates provide a ceiling and a floor
for the interbank market rate which implies that using the standing facilities is usually
unattractive.2 Minimum reserves help banks to smooth out fluctuations in liquidity demand
and thereby stabilizes short-term interest rates.
Monetary policy instruments take effect on economic conditions through different chan-
nels as described above. Since banks are part of the transmission mechanism of monetary
policy, not only banks but also central banks are interested in a smooth functioning of
interbank markets. To sum up, interbank markets play an important role for banks’ funding,
for their management of term structure risk, for liquidity management and for monetary
policy transmission. These points demonstrate the advantages of functioning interbank
markets. However, there can also be negative effects. The default of one bank can increase
the default risk of other banks through interbank exposures. Thereby, interbank markets
may also decrease financial stability.
1We use the terms that are used by the European Central Bank. For example, the U.S. Federal Reserve uses
the term “discount window” instead of “lending facility”.
2There are observations that banks borrow from the interbank market at a higher interest rate than they
could obtain from the central bank. A common explanation is a “stigma” attached to the lending facility
– using the central bank’s standing facility is considered a sign of weakness and financial troubles. For
empirical evidence see Armantier et al. (2015) or Furfine (2001); for a theoretical model see Ennis &
Weinberg (2013).
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The 2007/2008 financial crisis demonstrated the negative effects that result if interbank
markets do not function properly. During the crisis the functioning of interbank markets
was severely impaired. Banks drastically shortened the maturity of their term interbank
loans leading to a substantial decrease in transaction volumes (Cassola et al. 2010, Gabrieli
& Georg 2017). At the same time there was a shift from unsecured to secured lending
(di Filippo et al. 2016). Both developments led to large and volatile spreads between
overnight interbank rates and longer-term interbank rates as well as between rates at
unsecured markets (such as overnight interbank markets) and rates at secured markets.
Additionally, banks’ use of the standing facilities rose sharply. The central bank reacted by
increasing the money supply and decreasing policy rates. However, this did not lead to a
recovery of interbank markets. Instead, banks increased their liquidity holding (European
Central Bank 2011a, Angelini et al. 2011, Taylor & Williams 2009).
In the analysis of the functioning of interbank markets and of financial stability the
structure of interbank markets plays a crucial role. The first chapter provides a model on
banks’ choice of interbank partners, i.e, on network formation in interbank markets. A
special emphasis is placed on the role of information between banks. Due to bank opacity,
there are informational frictions in the sense that not all actions of a bank can be observed
by other market participants. To collect more information, banks can establish costly
relationships to other banks and thereby increase the expected benefit of an interbank
transaction. The cost of such a link reveals the quality of information between banks, a
bank’s transparency and monitoring efficiency. The chapter aims at identifying network
structures that satisfy efficiency or unilateral stability. In particular, the conditions under
which core-periphery networks are efficient or unilaterally stable are examined.
The second chapter focuses on the question how interbank lending is influenced by
monetary policy. The focus is on standing facilities. The central bank’s policy rates, i.e., the
marginal lending rate and the deposit rate, determine the attractiveness of the standing
facilities compared with the interbank market. Therefore, by choosing the policy rates the
central bank affects the number of banks using the standing facilities and the number of
banks using the interbank market. There is also a second channel. The policy rates may
influence bank liquidity holding and thus the chances that interbank lending occurs. To
address both channels, bank liquidity holding is endogenous in the presented model. The
results show that liquidity is not held to insure against idiosyncratic risk but to lend to
the interbank market in case counterparty risk is not too high. If banks expect interbank
lending to be sufficiently likely and profitable, a smooth liquidity transfer at the interbank
market is guaranteed. The central bank can create such a situation under the constraint that
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counterparty risk is moderate and counterparty risk perceptions are not too distorted. If,
however, counterparty risk is perceived to be too large, this may result in liquidity hoarding.
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1. Core-Periphery Formation in Interbank Markets
1. Core-Periphery Formation in Interbank Markets
1.1. Introduction
Interbank markets are fundamentally important for banks’ liquidity management, for the
transmission of monetary policy, and for financial stability. In order to discuss issues of
financial stability, the connectedness of banks and the structure of interbank markets plays
a crucial role.3 Empirical research has found that interbank markets often have a core-
periphery structure. In core-periphery networks there are two categories of banks: the
core and the periphery. Periphery banks are scarcely connected and mainly lend to or
borrow from core banks which are highly interconnected. Core banks are also referred to
as intermediaries because they are at the same time lenders and borrowers at the interbank
market and thus act as brokers for periphery banks. Evidence for core-periphery structures
has been found in the German (Craig & von Peter 2014), the Dutch (in’t Veld & van Lelyveld
2014), and the British interbank market (Langfield et al. 2014), the e-Mid trading platform
(Iori et al. 2008, Fricke & Lux 2015), the US federal funds market (Bech & Atalay 2010),
and the US fedwire system (Soramäki et al. 2007).
Remarkably, the core-periphery structure appears to be very persistent, i.e., over time
there are few changes in the set of core banks and the set of periphery banks. Additionally, it
is observed that over time banks rely on the same partners at the interbank market. In other
words, banks establish persistent relationships through which they prefer to lend (Cocco
et al. (2009), Bräuning & Fecht (2016)). These findings raise questions about the motives
that induce banks to establish lending relationships and form core-periphery networks.
While liquidity management in the short term and profitable investment of funds in the
long term are major reasons for banks to engage in interbank lending, they cannot compose
the sole reason for core-periphery formation. Banks frequently change their position from
borrower to lender, however, the interbank structure is observed to be persistent. A recurring
conjecture is that private information among banks and peer monitoring constitute a key
element. Blasques et al. (2015) show that a model including monitoring and counterparty
risk uncertainty performs better in matching the topology of the interbank market than
a model without monitoring. Cocco et al. (2009) and Bräuning & Fecht (2016) find that
banks can obtain better loan conditions by trading through relationships and that especially
opaque banks prefer to trade through relationships. These findings are interpreted in the
way that banks have private information about other banks’ credit risk and that lending
relationships help overcoming monitoring and default risk problems. Furfine (2001)
3See for example Georg (2013). He shows that different network structures react differently to shocks.
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1.1. Introduction
shows that interest rates on interbank transactions reflect differences in credit risk across
borrowers and concludes that banks are efficient monitors. The view that banks posses
private information about other banks’ credit risk and that peer monitoring plays a key role
in unsecured interbank markets is also supported by the European Central Bank (see Cœuré
(2012)). Theoretical support comes from Glode & Opp (2016) showing that intermediation
chains can help to overcome informational asymmetries and improve the efficiency of
trade. Babus & Hu (2017) show that intermediaries may sustain unsecured trade where
the intermediary is better informed about the borrower than the lender. Rochet & Tirole
(1996) emphasize the role of peer monitoring to prevent moral hazard and excessive risk
taking.
The model presented in this chapter is based on these findings and examines the role
of banks’ information and of the efficiency in acquiring information about other banks
for the interbank market structure and core-periphery formation. Due to bank opacity
and complexity there is an informational friction in the sense that a bank’s action is not
necessarily observed by all market participants. Thus, if two banks decide to invest in a
joint project, there is a moral hazard problem: the bank receiving funds can invest the
funds in a gambling asset and increase the own benefit from the project. Since there is an
informational friction, this action is not observable but only project success or failure. The
total expected benefit of the project decreases if the funds are invested in a gambling asset
instead of a sound project.
To overcome the informational friction, a bank can invest in costly relationships or links
to other banks. Here, a relationship between two banks implies that these banks are fully
informed about the other bank’s actions. In this way, if two banks that have established a
relationship decide to invest in a joint project, the funds are not invested into the gambling
asset. Thus, the total expected benefit of the project increases relative to the case that
there is no relationship. Overcoming the informational friction can also be realized by
using intermediaries. If two banks want to invest in a joint project and do not share a
relationship but are connected via one or more other banks having relationships, then
information can be acquired through those banks. In this case, the two banks do not lend
directly to each other, instead, the first bank lends to an intermediary bank that lends to
the next intermediary bank and so on till the funds reach the second bank. Since using
intermediaries increases the total expected benefit of the project, intermediaries demand a
fee. Intermediation fees are determined by Nash bargaining.
When deciding to establish relationships, a bank thus faces the following trade-off: On
the one hand, relationships increase the expected benefit from investment projects and
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increase (decrease) the probability of receiving (paying) intermediation fees. On the other
hand, establishing relationships is costly. The outcome of the process of link formation
therefore substantially depends on the link costs or said differently on the distribution of
information between banks and the banks’ efficiency in acquiring information about other
banks.
Depending on the link costs and the benefit of relationships, the number of links in the
resulting network varies: An empty network (i.e., all banks decide against establishing
relationships) as well as a complete network (i.e., every pair of banks decides to form a
relationship) can be unilaterally stable. We show that under the assumption of homogeneity
core-periphery structures cannot be unilaterally stable. If banks are equally informed and
equally efficient in acquiring information, banks can profitably add or remove links in a
core-periphery network. More precisely, if there are no unused links it is either profitable for
a pair of periphery banks to add a link or for a core bank to remove links. The partition of
all banks in core banks and periphery banks is not sustainable – either intermediation fees
are too high such that periphery banks establish additional relationships to avoid paying
fees or intermediation fees are too small such that intermediation is not profitable and core
banks end relationships with periphery banks or other core banks.
However, under heterogeneous information core-periphery networks are unilaterally
stable if there is a group of banks that is sufficiently better informed or more efficient in
acquiring information than the remaining banks. Efficient and well informed banks then
are the core banks. Periphery banks choose to establish the relationship with a core bank
that is least costly. Although core-periphery networks can be unilaterally stable under the
assumption of heterogeneity, they are not efficient for any distribution of link costs if the
size of the core is larger than two. In core-periphery networks the core is too connected,
i.e., the aggregated profit increases if a link between two core banks is removed.
These results suggest that heterogeneity is crucial to explain the core-periphery structure
of interbank markets. Moreover, we agree with the literature saying that peer monitoring
and informational frictions belong to the key factors that explain the banks’ behavior in
interbank markets (Blasques et al. (2015), Babus & Hu (2017), Glode & Opp (2016)).
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: In the next section related literature and
the chapter’s contribution is discussed. The model setup is explained in section 1.3. Section
1.4 introduces basic network structures and concepts that are important for the following
analysis. In section 1.5 the banks’ behavior at the interbank market in an arbitrary but
fixed network is considered. The network structure is endogenized in section 1.6. Section
1.7 summarizes.
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1.2. Related literature and contribution
There is a growing interest in the structure of financial markets beginning with the work
of Allen & Gale (2000). A comprehensive survey of the literature on interbank networks
is presented by Hüser (2016). As already mentioned, there are several empirical studies
on this topic. Most of the existing theoretical literature concentrates on issues of financial
stability and contagion. This includes several studies on how different network structures
respond to bank breakdowns or various kinds of shocks (see for example Castiglionesi &
Navarro (2008), Freixas et al. (2000) or Georg (2013)). However, the underlying network
structure mainly remains exogenous. Understanding the network formation process is
important, as changes in regulations or other characteristics defining a bank’s environment
may cause a rearrangement of connections between banks and lead to undesired results
such as a market freeze or a higher risk of contagion.
There is literature on network formation that is not specialized on financial markets.
Here, many characteristic factors of financial markets are not included. For an overview
see for example Goyal (2007). The literature on network formation in financial markets
mainly developed in the last three years. Leitner (2005) rationalizes linkages between
banks by including the possibility of private sector bailouts. Glode & Opp (2016) show that
intermediation chains may serve to overcome information asymmetry. Since agents differ
with respect to their information, using intermediaries can improve the efficiency of trade.
Babus & Hu (2017) find that trading through a network essentially supports unsecured
trade in a model with many periods. Here, efficiency gains are higher in a star network. The
model of de Faria e Castro (2015) shows that limited liability induces banks to endogenously
expose to counterparties that default in the same state of the world. In contrast, Aymanns
& Georg (2015) show that endogenously formed networks can counteract contagious
synchronization. This strand of the literature partly accounts for the role of information
but does not aim at explaining core-periphery formation in interbank markets.
Some recent studies also deal with core-periphery formation. The model of van der Leij
et al. (2016) shows that core-periphery networks can be unilaterally stable if banks are
heterogeneous in size. Bigger banks form the core, while smaller banks are in the periphery.
Aldasoro et al. (2015) and Farboodi (2014) show that a core-periphery structure results in a
model where banks are subject to random liquidity shocks. In contrast, the model presented
in this chapter intentionally abstracts from banks’ heterogeneity in liquidity shocks because
this cannot constitute the sole reason for core-periphery formation as discussed above.
Instead, the model contributes to the literature by examining the role that peer monitoring
and informational frictions between banks plays in explaining core-periphery formation in
13
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interbank markets.
1.3. Model setup
Consider an environment with 2N banks, N ∈ N, indexed by i ∈ {1,2, . . . , 2N} =: N .
Banks have a surplus of funds of 12 that is invested in risky projects. They are assumed to
be risk neutral and to maximize (expected) profits.
A risky project consists of several assets that return eitherR > 1 or zero per unit invested.
The risky project returns R with probability p and zero with probability 1− p. The success
probability and the return depends on the composition of assets in the risky project and
can take different values, p ∈ {pl , pm, ph} and R ∈ {r, R} with pl r < pmR< phR. The assets
that are disposable for investment differ among banks. Thus, if the bank only invests in
its own assets, we assume that the expected return of the resulting investment project is
pl r. However, banks can search for an investment partner at the interbank market. The
expected return pl r represents a bank’s outside option from using the interbank market.
So, for example this could be the bank’s benefit from depositing funds at the central bank
or borrowing from the central bank to avoid liquidating a long term project. For simplicity,
the return from the outside option is the same for all banks. By using the interbank market,
banks can realize a higher expected return.
Consider two banks i, j ∈ N that decide to interact at the interbank market and invest
in a joint project. Bank i can lend to bank j and in this way also invest in assets that are
disposable to bank j. Analogously, bank j can lend to bank i. The investment project of
both banks has the volume one and we assume that the expected return rises to pmR or
phR.
4 Since each bank invests 12 , every bank receives half of the return of the investment
project, i.e., zero if the project fails and R2 if the project is successful.
5
The success probability of a joint project of two banks depends on the behavior of both
banks. The bank that receives funds is subject to moral hazard. It can invest in a prudent
asset with expected return phR or a gambling asset with expected return pmR but a non-
verifiable benefit B. The action is not observable for the other bank due to bank opacity
and complexity. Both of the two partners that interact at the interbank market are equally
likely to get the opportunity to invest in the gambling asset. With probability 12 a bank
4The process of finding the best investment strategy is not considered. Instead, it is assumed that banks
choose the profit-maximizing risky project.
5This can be rationalized by Nash bargaining: Threat points are given by pl
r
2 . Outcomes in case of agreement
are equal to psR and p (1− s)R, where p ∈ {pm, ph} holds and s ∈ [0,1], 1− s denote the shares of the





p (1− s)R− pl r2

which is solved by s∗ = 12 .
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lends to (borrows from) the partner at the interbank market.
The idea behind this aspect of the model is the following: The bank which has an
investment opportunity knows the success probability p ∈ {pm, ph} as well as the return
of the project in case of success. The (uninformed) lending bank can neither verify the
success probability nor the project’s return but observes whether the project is successful
or not. Due to this informational friction, the borrower bank can invest unobserved in a
gambling project with a success probability pm lower than ph and a return higher than R
in case of success. If the gambling project is successful, the borrower bank can pay the
promised return to the lender bank and realizes a higher return than from investing in the
prudent asset. This (expected) benefit from investing in the gambling asset is denoted by
B. Investing in the gambling asset is what we call for short “cheating”.6








Individual rationality says that a bank’s benefit from the project is higher if the bank decides
to cheat. Thus, a bank cheats if it obtains the possibility. Furthermore, it is assumed that
cheating is not efficient from a welfare point of view, formally
pmR+B< phR. (1.2)
This condition states that the joint benefit of both banks is higher if there is no cheating.
To overcome the informational friction, banks can establish relationships or links. These
relationships can be thought of as a mutual agreement to be more transparent and to grant
easier access to relevant information.7 It is assumed that two banks in a relationship can
perfectly observe the other bank’s actions. Thus, cheating is prevented if the two banks
that invest in a joint project are in a relationship. A link between two banks i, j ∈ N costs
both banks ci j > 0. The cost of a link depends on the basic quality of information between
the two banks and the banks’ efficiency in acquiring information. Thus, if ci j ≥ cim for some
banks i, j, m ∈ N , then bank i is more opaque for bank j than for bank m, i.e., bank j has
less relevant information about bank i than bank m or bank m can monitor bank i more
efficiently relative to bank j, i.e., bank m has a better monitoring technology. It is assumed
that ci j = c ji and cii = 0 holds.
6Note that the model intentionally abstracts from differences of banks in profitability (R,B) and in project
size or frequency of investment opportunities (each bank invests a surplus of funds of 12 ). In this way the
role of information and peer monitoring can be analyzed.
7Evidence for this kind of relationships is provided by Cocco et al. (2009) among others.
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Figure 1.1: Example for an informational network
If the two banks i, j decide to form a link, the link is denoted by i j. Links are undirected,
i.e., i j = ji. The set of links is denoted by L . We do not consider the 2N trivial links ii,
i ∈ N . The terminology is as follows:
• Two banks i 6= j are linked directly if i j ∈ L .
• Two banks i 6= j are linked indirectly if there is a sequence of banks i = i0, i1, i2, . . . ,
in = j for some n> 1 with im−1im ∈ L for all 1≤ m≤ n. The sequence i0, i1, . . . , in is
called a path from i to j.
• the informational network is specified by the graph g = (N ,L ).
For illustration consider Figure 1.1. There are eleven banks represented by circles. A direct
link between two banks is indicated by a straight line between the two corresponding
circles. For example, i = 1 is directly linked to i = 2. The banks i = 0 and i = 4 are not
directly linked. However, they are linked indirectly through the path 0,1, 2,3, 4.
If two banks invest in a joint project there are three possibilities: The two banks are
(i) neither directly nor indirectly linked (e.g., i = 3 and i = 5 in Figure 1.1). Then, there is
no possibility to obtain perfect information and the borrower cheats.
(ii) directly linked (e.g., i = 1 and i = 2 in Figure 1.1). Consequently, there is perfect
information between the two banks and cheating is prevented.
(iii) linked indirectly but not directly (e.g., i = 0 and i = 4 in Figure 1.1). In this
case, cheating can still be prevented. If banks i and j invest in a joint project and
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• banks bargain about
intermediation fees
• fees are paid and
funds are invested
t = 2




Figure 1.2: Time structure of the model
i = i0, i1. . . . , in−1, in = j is a path from i to j, banks i1, . . . , in−1 can function as inter-
mediaries. This means that the borrower, say bank i, lends to the first intermediary i1,
bank i1 lends to the next intermediary i2 and so on until the funds reach the lender,
bank j. However, intermediaries demand a fee. Thus, using intermediaries is costly
but profitable for a bank that does not invest in a joint project with a directly linked
bank. The details are discussed in section 1.5.
The timing is summarized in Figure 1.2. At t = 0 banks simultaneously form informational
links. At t = 1 banks search for a directly linked investment partner or, if this is not
successful, for intermediaries at the interbank market. If intermediaries are involved in an
interaction at the interbank market, banks bargain about their fees. Still at t = 1 fees are
paid and banks invest in risky projects. At t = 2 the return of the risky projects realizes.
1.4. Basic network structures and concepts
There are certain network structures that are of a special importance for the following
analysis.
• In the empty network there are no links at all, i.e., L = ;.
• In the complete network every pair of banks is directly connected, i.e., i j ∈ L for all
i, j ∈ N , i 6= j.
• A network is called a matching if every bank is linked to exactly one bank.
17
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• In a star network there is one bank, the center of the star, that is connected to every
other bank. There are no other links. Formally, there exists a bank c ∈ N such that
for all i, j ∈ N \ {c} , i 6= j,
i j
∈ L if i = c or j = c6∈ L if i, j 6= c.
• In a core-periphery network every bank either belongs to the set of core banks or the
set of periphery banks. Every pair of core banks is directly linked, while there is no
direct link between any pair of periphery banks. Every core bank is directly linked to
at least one periphery bank, every periphery bank is directly linked to at least one
core bank. The definition can be formalized in the following way:
Definition 1.1. A network g = (N ,L ) is a core-periphery network if there is a partition
N = C ∪˙P with C,P 6= ; such that
• for all i, j ∈ C, i 6= j, we have i j ∈ L and for all i, j ∈P, i 6= j, we have i j 6∈ L ,
• for every i ∈ C there exists a j ∈P such that i j ∈ L and for every i ∈P there exists
a j ∈ C such that i j ∈ L .
Figure 1.3 shows a star network with 2N = 8 banks at the left and a core-periphery network
with three core banks and five periphery banks at the right. The core banks are represented
by a square, the periphery banks by a circle. In particular, a star network with 2N banks
is a core-periphery network with exactly one core bank and 2N − 1 periphery banks. The
complete network can also be considered a core-periphery network with 2N − 1 core
banks and one periphery bank. However, in the following neither the star network nor the
complete network is referred to as core-periphery network. Furthermore, when speaking
about core-periphery networks, it is assumed that there are more than two banks.
Networks can be examined with respect to several properties.8 We concentrate on the
following two properties that are called efficiency and unilateral stability:
Definition 1.2. A network g e = (N ,L e) is called efficient if for every other network






8For an overview see for example Jackson (2005).
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Figure 1.3: A star network and a core-periphery network
Here, Πi (g) denotes the expected profit of bank i at t = 0 that results from the network
structure g. We use the notation Πi if there is no danger of confusion. In other words,
a network is efficient if there is no other network that induces a higher sum of expected
profits.
The second property that is useful for our analysis is unilateral stability.9 A network
is called unilaterally stable if it is not profitable or not feasible for any bank to change
its position in the network by adding or removing links. If a bank wants to add a link
to another bank, this proposal needs to be accepted, i.e., the link needs to be profitable
for both banks. Otherwise, adding the link is not feasible. In contrast, no agreement is
necessary if a bank wants to remove a link. A bank may alter several links at the same
time.10 To formalize this property we introduce the network g i,T =
 N ,L i,T for a bank
i ∈ N and a subset of banks T ⊆ N \ {i}. The network g i,T corresponds to the network
g = (N ,L ) in the following way:
L i,T := (L ∪ {i j : j ∈ T, i j 6∈ L }) \ {i j : j ∈ T, i j ∈ L} .
Put differently, a link between bank i and a bank in T is either removed if the link exists or
added if the link does not exist.
Definition 1.3. A network g = {N ,L} is called unilaterally stable if for all banks i ∈ N
and all subsets of banks T ⊆N \ {i} the following properties are satisfied:
9The concept was first introduced by Buskens & van de Rijt (2008) and also used in the context of financial
networks by van der Leij et al. (2016)
10In contrast, pairwise stability requires that there is no incentive for any bank to add or remove exactly one
link. This concept does not seem suitable here because banks may not benefit by adding or removing one
link but by altering a group of links. For an example see Goyal (2007).
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bank j ∈ T with i j 6∈ L .
The first condition tells that removing one or more direct links in a unilaterally stable
network is not profitable. The second condition says that, in addition, adding links in a
unilaterally stable network is not profitable for the bank making the link proposal or the
bank receiving the link proposal.
Finally, it can be interesting to examine how many components the network has and
whether all banks have the possibility to prevent cheating.
Definition 1.4. A network g = {N ,L} is called connected if for all i, j ∈ N there is a path
from i to j. A network is minimally connected if for all i, j ∈ N there is exactly one path
from i to j.
For example, the matching is not connected and therefore in particular not minimally
connected because every bank is linked to exactly one bank and not (at least indirectly) to
all banks. A core-periphery network with more than two core banks is an example for a
connected network that is not minimally connected because there is more than one path
connecting two core banks (compare Figure 1.3). The star network is connected as well
as minimally connected. Two banks are either directly linked or there is exactly one path
including both banks and the center of the star.
Our aim is to identify network structures that satisfy efficiency or unilateral stability.
In particular, we ask under which conditions core-periphery networks are efficient or
unilaterally stable.
1.5. The interbank market at t = 1
At date t = 1 a bank either invests its funds in a risky project without going to the interbank
market or searches for an investment partner at the interbank market. The expected return
from the risky project is equal to pl
r





otherwise. Since pl r < pmR< phR, banks search for an investment partner at the interbank
market. Consider a pair of banks i, j ∈ N that decides to interact at the interbank market.
One of these banks, say bank i, obtains the opportunity to cheat. The expected benefit from
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the risky project for bank i is given bypm R2 +B if bank i cheats,ph R2 if bank i does not cheat.
Due to profit maximization and individual rationality of cheating (compare condition (1.1)),
bank i cheats if there is no monitoring. The expected benefit of bank j is given bypm R2 if bank i cheats,ph R2 if bank i does not cheat.
Depending on the informational network that has been formed at t = 0, there are now
three possibilities:
(i) There is neither a direct nor an indirect link between the banks i and j.
(ii) There is a direct link between the banks i and j.
(iii) There is an indirect but no direct link between the banks i and j.
If the two banks are linked neither directly nor indirectly (case (i)), there is no possibility
for bank j to monitor bank i. Thus, bank i cheats and the benefit from the risky project is
pm
R
2 +B and pm
R
2 , respectively.
If there is a direct link between the two banks (case (ii)), bank j can monitor bank i, bank
i does not cheat, and the expected benefit from the risky projects is ph
R
2 for both banks.
Now, consider the interesting case (iii) that the two banks are linked indirectly but not
directly. In particular, let i = i0, i1, . . . , in = j with n> 1 be a path from i to j. If this path
is used for intermediation, then bank j lends to bank in−1 and can perfectly observe bank
in−1’s actions. Bank in−1 lends the funds of bank j to bank in−2 and can perfectly observe
bank in−2’s actions. In this way, each bank im, m ∈ {2, . . . , n}, ensures that bank im−1 does
not renege on monitoring obligations. Finally, bank i1 lends the fund of bank j to bank
i and ensures that bank i does not cheat. The intermediaries i1, . . . , in−1 demand a fee.
Expected return from the risky project for bank j is given by ph
R
2 if bank j pays the fee and
pm
R
2 otherwise. The interaction between the banks i and j thus takes place through the




− fn > pm R2
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holds. Here, fn denotes the total fee that bank j pays to all n− 1 intermediaries.
We determine the total intermediation fee fn through Nash bargaining and assume
that fn is distributed equally among the intermediaries. Let S := (ph − pm) R2 denote the
expected surplus of bank j that occurs if cheating is prevented. There are n banks involved
in the bargain and we assume that bargaining power is uniformly distributed: Bank j
has bargaining power 1n and the n − 1 intermediaries have bargaining power n−1n . The
bargaining problem is thus given by
f ∗n = argmaxfn




which is solved by
f ∗n = S · n− 1n .
Every intermediary obtains the fee
f¯n = S · 1n .
The intermediation fee satisfies some nice properties. First, the individual intermediation
fee f¯n is decreasing in the number of intermediaries – a higher number of intermediaries
implies a lower bargaining power of a single intermediary. Second, the total intermediation
fee f ∗n is increasing in the number of intermediaries – a higher number of intermediaries
implies a lower bargaining power of bank j and thus a higher total intermediation fee.
Both the bank in need of intermediation and the intermediary are interested in keeping
the number of intermediaries low. However, note that 2 f¯3 > f¯2. This implies that a bank
receiving two requests from banks in need of intermediation finds it more profitable to
search for a second intermediary, respectively, than to match the two banks which require
intermediation and to be the only intermediary. Hence, it may not be feasible for a bank to
establish a project by using only one intermediary.
Note that S − f ∗n > 0 holds, i.e., a bank prefers using intermediaries over establishing
a project without using a link. This implies that in a connected network every project
has a high success probability. In particular, at t = 1 the first-best option is to establish a
project with a directly linked bank. The second-best option is to establish a project with an
indirectly linked bank and use as few intermediaries as possible. The third-best option is to
establish a project with an unconnected bank.
Therefore, at t = 1 banks first ask directly linked banks to establish a joint project or
at least to facilitate finding an interbank partner. If this is not successful, banks search
for unconnected interbank partners. More precisely, the process of searching a partner at
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Figure 1.4: A core-periphery network with |C|= 3 and |P|= 9
the interbank market at t = 1 proceeds in five steps. For illustration of the search process
assume that in t = 0 the informational network illustrated by the left panel in Figure 1.4
formed. The network is of a core-periphery type with core banks c1, c2, c3 and periphery
banks p1, . . . ,p9.
1. Choice of strategies: Banks can offer each bank to use the direct link. Thus, a bank’s
strategy is a sequence of zeros and ones stating whether the bank proposes an offer
to a particular directly linked bank or not.
Example: A possible strategy combination for the network structure given by the
left panel of Figure 1.4 is illustrated in the right panel of Figure 1.4. An arrow going
from bank i to bank j means that bank i offers to use the direct link to bank j. We
can distinguish between unilateral offers, i.e., arrows only going in one direction,
and bilateral offers, i.e., arrows going in both directions.
2. Bilateral offers: Consider the set of direct links that were offered to use in the first
step by both associated banks (bilateral offers). Some of these links are randomly
chosen (with equal probability) such that
• every bank is chosen at most once,
• there is no link that could be chosen additionally without violating the first
condition.
The chosen links are used to establish a joint project. The remaining links involved
in bilateral offers can be used for intermediation.
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Example (continued): Assume that the first step resulted in the situation which is
illustrated in the right-hand panel of Figure 1.4. There are four bilateral offers. For
example, it is possible to choose only the link c1c2 because no other link could be
chosen without choosing c2 more than once. Also, it is possible to choose c1c3 and
c2p4. It is not possible to choose only c1c3 because another link can be added (c2p4)
without choosing a bank more than once. The disregarded bilateral offers can be
used for intermediation. For example, if the link c2p4 is not chosen, it is used for
intermediation.
3. Unilateral offers:
3.1. Establishing projects: If the bank receiving the unilateral offer has not established
a project yet, it establishes a project with a bank that unilaterally offered to use
the link. A project is established with the bank that proposed the most unilateral
offers. If a bank proposed (received) several unilateral offers that can be used
to establish a project, then one offer is randomly chosen to be realized.
3.2. Intermediation: Consider the case that the bank receiving unilateral offers
already established a project. The banks proposing the unilateral offers use
the bank receiving the unilateral offers as intermediary (if they do not have an
interbank partner yet). If the bank cannot act as an intermediary for all banks,
some banks are randomly chosen for intermediation. If a bank proposed several
unilateral offers that can be used for intermediation, one is chosen randomly.
Example (continued): Again, assume that the first step resulted in the situation
which is illustrated in the right-hand panel of Figure 1.4. First, consider the case
that c2c3 is chosen in the second step. Then, in step 3.1., one of the banks p1, . . . ,p3
is randomly chosen to establish a project with c1. Step 3.2. determines that the
remaining periphery banks use the directly linked core bank as intermediary. In the
special case of p6, core bank c2 or c3 is chosen randomly (each with probability
1
2).
Second, consider the case that c1c2 is chosen in the second step. Then, in step 3.1.
p6 is chosen to establish a project with c3 because it proposed the most offers (two
instead of one). This is a profit-maximizing condition because from the point of
view of c3 the banks p7, . . . ,p9 need c3 as an intermediary with probability one but p6
only with probability 12 . Step 3.2 then assigns the remaining periphery banks to their
directly linked core banks for intermediation.
4. Trading outside the network: Banks that do not have a partner for establishing a
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project (through a direct or indirect link) are randomly matched and trade without
using a link.
Example (continued): Step four does not apply because every bank found an inter-
bank partner using a direct or indirect link.
To not further increase the complexity of the model, we assume that banks that use an
intermediary are assigned a partner randomly such that as many intermediaries as possibly
receive the intermediation fee f¯3. This is in line with the properties of the intermediation
fee explained above.
Example (continued): Again, assume that the first step resulted in the situation which is
illustrated in the right-hand panel of Figure 1.4. If, for example, c1c2 is chosen in the second
step and c3p6 in step 3.1., then p1 (which uses c1 as intermediary) could be matched to p4
(which uses c2 as intermediary). The path realizing trade between p1 and p4 is then given
by p1, c1, c2,p4. Given the network structure in the left panel and the strategies illustrated
in the right panel of Figure 1.4 a possible outcome resulting from steps three and four is
given by the following pairs of banks:
• c1 has a joint project with c2;
• c3 has a joint project with p6;
• p1 has a joint project with p4, they use the intermediaries c1 and c2;
• p2 has a joint project with p7, they use the intermediaries c1 and c3;
• p3 has a joint project with p8, they use the intermediaries c1 and c3;
• p5 has a joint project with p9, they use the intermediaries c2 and c3.
As equilibrium concept we consider a stronger version of the Nash equilibrium. The tuple
of all strategies chosen in step one is considered an equilibrium if
• no bank can increase expected profit by unilaterally deviating.11
• no coalition of two banks can increase the single expected profit of both banks by
unilaterally deviating
11Unilateral deviation means that one bank changes its strategy, while the others’ strategies are not altered.
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The first condition is the usual condition which determines a Nash equilibrium. The second
condition, to some degree, allows for cooperation because establishing a project requires
agreement from two banks. Therefore, by changing its strategy, a bank cannot necessarily
change its interbank partner. However a coalition of two banks can always decide to
establish a project if this is profitable for both.
If there are several equilibria for a given informational network at t = 1, we assume that
each is equally likely to arise.
The described search process at the interbank market is discussed in the following. Instead
of randomly matching banks, a procedure consisting of several steps is considered. First,
banks ask directly linked banks whether they want to establish a joint project. Second, if the
interest is bilateral, a joint project is established. Here, choosing links in the way described
above, guarantees that link formation is simultaneous. Instead, one could consider that
banks decide about accepting offers in a randomly chosen order, which leads to the same
outcome. Third, a bank can accept received one-way offers and function as an intermediary.
In this way, the process accounts for the fact that banks usually do not know whether a
borrower bank uses the money for a project or to lend to another bank. Lastly, banks that
do not find a partner who is directly or indirectly linked are randomly paired. Hence, the
modeling is consistent with observations that banks prefer trading through relationships
(compare Cocco et al. (2009)).
1.6. Link formation at t = 0
Banks can form informational links (i.e., establish relationships) at t = 0: Banks simultane-
ously propose links to other banks. A link proposal can either be accepted or rejected. Thus,
in order to establish a direct link between two banks, both banks need to agree to form the
link. In this case both banks have to pay the link costs. A link between bank i and bank j
costs both banks ci j > 0, respectively. As already said, the link cost reflects the quality of
information between banks i and j as well as the efficiency in acquiring information about
other banks. The agreement of bank j is not necessary if bank i wants to remove the link
i j.
When forming links, banks face the following trade off: On the one hand, adding links
increases the expected benefit from the investment project and increases (decreases) the
probability of receiving (paying) intermediation fees. On the other hand, links are costly.
We first analyze network formation in the case of homogeneous link costs, i.e., every pair
of banks faces the same costs if they want to establish a link. Then, we turn to the case of
heterogeneous link costs.
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1.6.1. Homogeneous link costs
For now let us concentrate on the case that link costs are homogeneous for all banks. In
other words the efficiency in acquiring information about other banks and the basic quality
of information is the same for every pair of banks. Formally, ci j = c¯ for all i, j ∈ N with
i 6= j.
To begin with, efficient networks are determined. The cheapest way (in terms of link
cost) to assure at t = 0 that the expected return of all projects is equal to phR and that
there is no cheating, is to link every bank with exactly one bank. Every network with more
than N links implies higher link costs but at most the same project return and thus at most
the same aggregated return. Intermediation fees just redistribute the individual returns
and thus have no effect on the aggregated profit. The link cost then determines whether it
is efficient to form links or not. If costs are high compared with the benefit of preventing
cheating, it is efficient to form no links at all. If costs are low, it is efficient to form exactly
one direct link for every bank. This leads us to the following result:
Proposition 1.1. The empty network is efficient if
2c¯ ≥ phR− pmR−B. (1.3)
Every matching is efficient if 2c¯ ≤ phR− pmR−B. There are no other efficient networks.
Proof. See appendix.
Condition (1.3) is very intuitive: A link between two banks costs in total 2c¯ which is the
left-hand side of the inequality. If the link is established, the joint return from the project
of the two banks is equal to phR because the link prevents cheating. However, if the link is
not established, the joint return of both banks is equal to pmR+B because cheating is not
prevented. The difference phR− pmR−B gives the benefit of the link. Thus, it is efficient
to form a link only if the costs of a link are smaller than its benefit.
In particular, the result implies that neither the star network nor any core-periphery
network is efficient because in these cases banks are overconnected and have more links
than they need to assure a high success probability and to prevent cheating.
The next result states under which conditions efficient networks also satisfy unilateral
stability.
Lemma 1.1. The empty network is unilaterally stable if and only if
2c¯ ≥ (ph − pm)R−B.
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The matching is unilaterally stable if and only if
(ph − pm)R−B≥ 2c¯ ≥ 13 (ph − pm)R. (1.4)
Proof. See appendix
If it is beneficial for one bank to prevent cheating at the cost of one link, it is beneficial
for all banks to do so. The statement also holds vice versa: If it is beneficial to add N links
in an empty network such that every bank is connected to exactly one other bank, then it is
beneficial for one bank to add one link in the empty network. Thus, the empty network is
unilaterally stable if and only if it is efficient. If link costs are higher than the benefit of the
link, no link is added.
A matching cannot be unilaterally stable if the empty network is unilaterally stable and
vice versa (except in the marginal case that equality holds for the left-hand inequality in
(1.4)). Banks can profitably add one link in the empty network if a matching is unilaterally
stable and banks can profitably delete one link in a matching if the empty network is
unilaterally stable. This explains the left-hand inequality of condition (1.4). The right-hand
inequality states that it is not beneficial to add any more links, i.e., that the benefit of
intermediation is smaller than the link costs.
While any other network than the empty network and a matching is too connected with
respect to efficiency, “overconnected” networks may still be unilaterally stable. In particular,
also the complete network, where every bank is directly linked to every other bank, is
unilaterally stable if link costs are sufficiently small.




2N − 1 [(ph − pm)R−B] ;
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The next network structure that we want to consider is the star network. The star network
is not efficient because it contains 2N−1 links and leads to an aggregated return of 2N ·ph R2 .
The star network is therefore dominated (in terms of efficiency) by the matching which
implies fewer links (N < 2N − 1) and the same aggregated return. Although the star
network is too “overconnected” to be efficient, it can be unilaterally stable as the following
Proposition shows:
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To guarantee that the star network is unilaterally stable, on the one hand, link costs
must be sufficiently small such that intermediation is profitable, i.e., intermediation fees
compensate the bank in the center of the star for a large number of links and the associated
cost. On the other hand, link costs must be sufficiently low such that the remaining banks
prefer using intermediaries over increasing the number of links. The right-hand inequality
of (1.6) guarantees that
• being connected is more beneficial than being unconnected (and accepting the risk
of being cheated),
• receiving one intermediation fee compensates the bank in the center of the star for
paying for two links.
The left inequality of (1.6) guarantees that (for banks which are not in the center) paying an
intermediation fee is preferable to adding additional links in order to avoid intermediation.
Let us now consider core-periphery networks. To examine whether core-periphery
networks are unilaterally stable, it is important to know a bank’s expected profit in a
core-periphery network. While link costs and the benefit from the risky project are easy
to calculate, it is not trivial to determine the expected number of intermediation fees that
a bank receives and the probability that a bank has to pay an intermediation fee. The
following Lemma states the banks’ behavior at t = 1 given that link formation at t = 0
resulted in a core-periphery network. Hence, the result is crucial for the stability analysis
of core-periphery networks.
Lemma 1.4. Assume that the link formation at t = 0 resulted in a core-periphery network
with 1 < k < 2N − 1 core banks12 and 2N − k periphery banks. At t = 1 in equilibrium
every core bank has a joint project with another core bank if the number of core banks is even.
Otherwise, there is exactly one core bank that has a joint project with a periphery bank.
Proof. See appendix.
12Note that k = 1 yields the star network and k = 2N − 1 the complete network.
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The intuition is that it is more likely to act as an intermediary for a periphery bank than
to act as an intermediary for a core bank because core banks are better connected. Thus, if
a core bank decides to invest in a joint project with another core bank instead of investing
in a joint project with a periphery bank, the bank’s expected benefit from intermediation is
higher. Consider the case that there is an odd number of core banks, i.e., one core bank
invests in a joint project with a periphery bank at t = 1. The result implies that this core
bank invests in a project with the most connected periphery bank that the core bank is
directly linked to. It is least likely to act as an intermediary for the periphery bank with the
highest number of direct links. Note that the result is independent of the assumption that
link costs are homogeneous because the informational network is already fixed at t = 1
when banks search for a trading partner at the interbank market.
The result is helpful to prove that in a core-periphery network at t = 0 there is always an
incentive for at least one bank to profitably deviate.
Proposition 1.2. No core-periphery network with 2< k < 2N − 1 core banks is unilaterally
stable.
Proof. See appendix.
The proof shows that at least one of the following statements is true for all core-periphery
networks
(i) There are links that can a bank can remove without changing expected return from
investment and intermediation (unused links).
(ii) It is profitable for a pair of periphery banks to add a link.
(iii) It is profitable for a core bank to remove links to at least one periphery or core bank.
To get an intuition, this is illustrated in Figure 1.5. The left-hand panel shows possible
types of unused links. Given the informational network, t = 1 in equilibrium at c1 only offers
to c2 to use the direct link and vice versa to maximize expected profits from intermediation.
Otherwise, there is a positive probability that either c1 or c2 has to establish a project with
a periphery bank (which is then p1) reducing the expected intermediation profit. The same
holds for c3 and c4. As a consequence, first, periphery banks p1 and p2 use an intermediary
with probability one. The periphery banks can therefore remove one direct link to core
banks without changing expected profit from investment and intermediation. Second, the
core bank c5 cannot establish a project with a core bank. Therefore, c5 can remove a direct
link to a core bank without changing expected profit from investment and intermediation.
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Figure 1.5: Unstable core-periphery networks
Now consider the right-hand panel of Figure 1.5. The core bank c1 pays c¯ for the link to
p1 and gets the intermediation fee f¯3. The same holds for the link to p2. If the periphery
banks p1 and p2 decide to add a direct link, they pay c¯, avoid using intermediaries, and
gain 12 f
∗
3 = f¯3. Thus, if c¯ < f¯3 either a pair of periphery banks can profitably add a direct
link (case (ii)) and if c¯ > f¯3 a core bank can profitably remove direct links to periphery
banks (case (iii)).
Concluding, the partition of all banks in core banks and periphery banks is not sustainable.
If there are no unused links, intermediation fees are either too high, which implies that
adding links to avoid intermediation is profitable for a periphery bank, or too low, which
implies that intermediation is not beneficial and core banks can profitably remove links to
core or periphery banks.
Unilateral stability in general also does not hold for a core-periphery network with k = 2
core banks. However, in the extreme case (and only in this case) that the cost of a link
is equal to the intermediation premium, c¯ = f 3, and every core bank is directly linked to
exactly half of the periphery banks the network is unilaterally stable.13
As a consequence, the model with homogeneous link costs cannot explain core-periphery
formation in interbank markets. However, as we will see next, core-periphery networks
can be unilaterally stable if banks are heterogeneous with respect to their link costs. Thus,
heterogeneity is crucial to explain core-periphery formation.
13This can be seen in the first step of the proof of Proposition 1.2
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1.6.2. Heterogeneous link costs
In the following, we allow for heterogeneous link costs ci j, i.e., the quality of information
between two pairs of banks may be different and banks may differ with respect to their
efficiency in acquiring information. The aim is to show that core-periphery networks
can be unilaterally stable if banks are heterogeneous. In this way, heterogeneous banks
can rationalize core-periphery structures in interbank markets. However, core-periphery
structures are in general not efficient as the following Proposition shows:
Proposition 1.3. Consider a network g = (N ,L ) containing a circle, i.e., there is a path
i = i0, i1, . . . , im = i, m ∈ N, from bank i ∈ N to bank i. Then, network g is not efficient.
Proof. See appendix.
In other words, if two banks are linked by more than one path, the resulting network
cannot be efficient because only one path is necessary to sustain a high expected project
return. Therefore, at least one link can be deleted without changing aggregated profit.
Remember that intermediation premia redistribute individual project returns but do not
affect the aggregated return from investment projects.
In particular, core-periphery networks with k > 2 core banks are not efficient because
there are at least two paths linking two core banks. Hence, the core is “too connected”.
Additionally, if a periphery bank is linked to more than one core bank, this also contradicts
efficiency.
Now, consider core-periphery networks with respect to unilateral stability. Our first
finding is that two levels of link costs are already sufficient to have unilaterally stable
core-periphery networks.
Proposition 1.4. Assume that there are two different levels of link costs c¯h > c¯l > 0 and banks
can be partitioned in two groups N = C ∪˙P with C,P 6= ; and an even number of banks
|C|= k > 0 in group C, such that
ci j =
c¯l , if i ∈ C or j ∈ C,c¯h, if i, j ∈P.
Then, the core-periphery network with core banks C and periphery banks P is unilaterally
stable if the following conditions hold:
(i) every periphery bank is directly linked to exactly one core bank;
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k−1 f 3, (ph − pm) R2 − B2 − f 3
©
;
(iii) c¯h ≥ f 3.
Proof. See appendix.
Essentially, core-periphery networks can be unilaterally stable if c¯h is sufficiently large
and c¯l is sufficiently small. On the one hand, c¯h needs to be sufficiently large to guarantee
that there is no incentive for inefficient banks to form direct links to other inefficient banks.
On the other hand, c¯l needs to be sufficiently small to guarantee that there is an incentive
for efficient banks to form direct links and such that intermediation is profitable. Note
that the efficient banks are the core banks and the inefficient banks form the periphery.
Inefficient banks use the efficient banks’ advantage by paying an intermediation fee. If the
efficient banks’ advantage is sufficiently large, it is more beneficial to pay an intermediation
fee than to trade inefficiently. The result can be generalized to the case that the number of
efficient banks is odd. However, in this case further constraints regarding c¯l are necessary
because there is an incentive for periphery banks to directly link to more than one core
bank.
While in Proposition 1.4 periphery banks are directly linked to an arbitrary core bank,
the distribution of the link costs may also explain why a periphery bank is directly linked
to one specific core bank:
Proposition 1.5. Assume that there are two different levels of link costs c¯h > c¯l > 0 and banks
can be partitioned in m+ 1 ∈ N groups N = C ∪˙P1 ∪˙P2 ∪˙ . . . ∪˙Pm with C,P1, . . . ,Pm 6= ;
and an even number of banks |C|= |{1, 2, . . . , k}|= k > 0 in group C, such that
ci j =
c¯l if i, j ∈ C or i ∈ C, j ∈Pic¯h, otherwise.
Then the core-periphery network with core banks C, periphery banks P=P1 ∪ . . .∪Pk and
i j ∈ L for i ∈ C and j ∈Pi is unilaterally stable if the following conditions hold:




k−1 f 3, (ph − pm) R2 − B2 − f 3
©
;
(iii) c¯h ≥ f 3.
Proof. The proof proceeds analogously to Proposition 1.4.
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In this case there are banks that are better informed about or more transparent for a
certain group of banks. In this way, every core bank has its own “client base”. Every
inefficient bank chooses a certain efficient bank to ask for intermediation. In this way,
heterogeneous link costs do not only explain which banks belong to the core or to the
periphery but may also explain a periphery bank’s exact position in the periphery.
1.7. Conclusion
Core-periphery structures are found in many financial networks, especially in interbank
markets. The presented model provides a rational for this empirical finding. Banks are
opaque and can invest interbank loans in gambling assets which is non-verifiable. Peer
monitoring, modeled as entering costly relationships, can prevent gambling. Banks then
prefer to lend through relationships. However, when banks decide on forming relationships
they face a trade off. On the one hand, relationships are costly. On the other hand, increasing
the number of relationships (i) increases the probability to lend through a relationship,
(ii) increases the expected number of received intermediation fees, and (iii) decreases the
probability to pay an intermediation fee.
While core-periphery networks are in general not efficient because they are too connected,
they can be unilaterally stable if there is a group of sufficiently better informed or more
efficient banks. These banks then form the core and act as intermediaries between the
remaining banks, the periphery. Heterogeneity is crucial to explain the stability of core-
periphery networks. Although, depending on link costs, the number of links in unilaterally
stable networks can vary from the empty network to the complete network, a core-periphery
network is not unilaterally stable under the assumption of homogeneity. The partition
of banks in strongly connected core banks and weakly connected periphery banks is not
sustainable. If there are no unused links, either intermediation fees are too large such
that periphery banks can profitably add links to avoid intermediation (the periphery is
underconnected) or intermediation fees are too small such that core banks can profitably
remove links, waive intermediation fees and save link costs (the core is overconnected).
The model is consistent with empirical observations on the interbank market. Banks
prefer to trade through relationships because they have better information about banks
with which they share a relationship. A relationship helps to overcome informational
frictions and monitoring problems. Banks with better information or a more efficient
monitoring technology can exploit their informational advantage and receive higher rents
from borrowing and lending through relationships (intermediation fees). This is in line
with the observation that banks obtain more favorable loan conditions if they trade through
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relationships. Heterogeneity in information about other banks cannot only explain core-
periphery formation but also the persistence of core-periphery networks. Since banks
preferably lend through relationships, it can even be assumed that banks’ position in the
network strengthens over time because repeated trade improves information between
trading partners. The observation that bigger banks are usually core banks is also consistent
with our model. On the one hand, banks that act as intermediaries at the interbank market
are endogenously bigger because in addition to their projects they receive and extend
substantially more interbank loans than periphery banks, in particular if the periphery is
large. On the other hand, big banks can exploit economies of scale and achieve a better
monitoring efficiency than smaller banks which strengthens their position in the core.
The presented model emphasizes the role of informational frictions and peer monitoring
in interbank markets. Besides liquidity management, the distribution of private information
among banks represents a second key factor explaining bank behavior and structural
features of the interbank market.
There are still some open questions and extensions of our model. First, it would be
interesting to consider the network formation process over several periods where the banks’
information is updated after the realization of returns of interbank transactions. One
would expect that relationships are strengthened in the course of time because information
between two banks get better with every interaction.
Second, an exciting extension is the introduction of asymmetric link costs, i.e., ci j 6= c ji.
This would allow to differentiate between transparent banks and banks which are efficient
in monitoring. While linking with a transparent bank should be cheap, a transparent bank
does not necessarily face low link costs. For efficient banks the effect is vice versa. Note
that the introduction of asymmetric link costs does not change the presented results.
Third, bargaining power in our model is exogenous and uniformly distributed. Hetero-
geneity in bargaining power could have a similar effect like heterogeneity in link costs. As
intermediation fees are higher for banks with more bargaining power, these banks have a
higher incentive to connect in order to receive intermediation fees.
Finally, it would be interesting to see how the network and network formation reacts to
different kinds of shocks such as a drop in the banks’ efficiency in acquiring information or
the default of a core bank.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.1: A matching leads to the aggregated profit of
−c¯ · 2N + ph R2 · 2N .
Every bank pays for exactly one link, prevents cheating by using this link and thus faces the
success probability of ph. A network with more than N links cannot be efficient because
costs increase but the aggregated return at most stays the same. Intermediation fees just
redistribute the individual returns and thus have no effect on the aggregated profit.











Adding a link between a pair of banks is an improvement in the sense of efficiency if
−2c¯ + phR≥ pmR+B.
If it is an improvement to add a link between one pair of banks, it is also an improvement
to add a link between a second pair of banks and so on. We obtain the desired result.








The only possible deviation is to add links. It is beneficial for a bank to propose exactly one
link if







The proposal is accepted under the same condition. If it is not beneficial to propose one
link, i.e.,
2c¯ ≥ (ph − pm)R−B (1.7)
holds, then it is not feasible to add more than one link because proposals are not accepted.
Thus, the empty network is unilaterally stable if condition (1.7) holds.
Consider now a matching, where every bank is linked to exactly one other bank. It is not
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beneficial to cut this one link if and only if







It is not beneficial for a bank to propose more than one additional link. Banks use their direct
links for their transaction instead of paying an intermediation fee. If the bank proposes
one link, then this is beneficial for both banks (the bank that proposes and the bank that
receives the proposal) if
−2c¯ + ph R2 +
1
3




In this case both banks choose the newly established link for a joint project and act as inter-
mediaries between the banks that they are additionally linked with. Since the intermediation
then involves four banks, the individual intermediation fee is equal to f 3 =
1
3 (ph − pm) R2 .
Accordingly, a matching is unilaterally stable if
(ph − pm)R−B≥ 2c¯ ≥ 13 (ph − pm)R.
Proof of Lemma 1.2: The expected profit of a bank in a complete network is equal to
− (2N − 1) c¯ + ph R2 (1.8)
First note that a bank choosing to remove one link uses an intermediary with probability 1.
In equilibrium no bank agrees to trade directly with this bank because it is more beneficial
to act as an intermediary for this bank (− (2N − 1) c¯+ ph R2 < − (2N − 1) c¯+ ph R2 + 12N−2 · f 2).
Therefore, if it is beneficial to delete links, it is most beneficial to delete all or all but one
link. Put differently,












while deleting all but one link yields the expected profit
− c¯ + ph R2 −
1
4
(ph − pm) R2 . (1.10)
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Comparing (1.8) with (1.9) and (1.10), we can see that the complete network is unilaterally
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Proof of Lemma 1.3: In the star network the expected profit of the bank in the center of
the star is given by
Πstarcb = − (2N − 1) c¯ + ph R2 + (N − 1) f¯2,
and since f¯2 = f ∗2 , the expected profit of the remaining banks is given by








The following deviations are possible:
1. The bank in the center can remove an arbitrary number of links.
2. Considering one of the remaining banks, the bank can add an arbitrary number of
links (if this is feasible) or remove the link to the bank in the center.
First, consider the bank in the center of the star.








This is not beneficial for the bank if
2c¯ ≤ 2N + 2




2c¯ ≤ f 2 + 12N − 1

3 f 2 −B

.
• The bank could remove an odd number l < 2N − 1 of links. In this case the bank es-
tablishes a joint project with an unlinked bank and functions solely as an intermediary
in the remaining small star. Expected profit is given by









Removing the l links is thus not beneficial for the bank in the center if
2c¯ ≤ f 2 + 1l

3 f 2 −B

.
• The bank could remove an even number l + 1< 2N − 1 of links (l odd) and obtain
the expected profit
− (2N − 1− l − 1) c¯ + ph R2 +
2N − 2− l − 1
2
· f 2.
This is not beneficial for the bank if
2c¯ ≤ f 2.
To sum up, deviation is not beneficial for the bank in the center of the star if
2c¯ ≤min
§




3 f 2 −B
ª
.
Second, consider a bank that is not the center of the star.
• The bank could add one direct link to another bank different from the center of the
star. The link ensures that both banks do not need intermediation at t = 1 because
they can establish a joint project. In this case the expected profit is given by
−2c¯ + ph R2 .








• Adding more than one direct link to other banks is not feasible, since in equilibrium
at t = 1 the bank then establishes a project with the bank in the center of the star to
maximize expected intermediation fees. The remaining banks therefore have to pay
an intermediation fee for sure and are worse off in the new situation.
• Deleting the link to the bank in the center of the star leads to an expected profit of
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2 and is not beneficial if






• The bank could remove the link to the bank in the center of the star and add less
then four direct links to other banks. If one direct link is added, the bank has to pay
the intermediation fee f 3 with probability
1
2 instead of f 2 with a probability smaller
than 12 . Thus, this is not beneficial. Adding two or three links leads to a situation
where the bank does not need to pay an intermediation fee but also does not receive
intermediation fees. Still the bank pays for two or three direct links. The deviation is
therefore equal to (add two links) or dominated by (add three links) the deviation
stated at the first bullet point.
• The bank could remove the link to the bank in the center of the star and add at least
four direct links to other banks. We show that if 2c¯ ≥  1− 12N−1 f 2 holds, this is not
feasible: Assume that the bank proposes the offer to add a direct link to m≥ 4 other
banks. In case off accepting, these banks earn an expected profit of





f 2 · 12.









holds. This condition is implied by 2c¯ ≥  1− 12N−1 f 2.
Summing up, there is no incentive to deviate for a bank that is not in the center of the star
if















f 2 ≤ 2c¯ ≤min
§




3 f 2 −B
ª
holds.
Proof of Lemma 1.4: Consider the situation that l ≤ 2N−k2 periphery banks want to use
some core bank ci as an intermediary. The core bank ci does not match two of the l periphery
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banks but matches both with periphery banks of some other (not necessarily the same)
core bank c j. In this way, ci receives
2 f 3 =
2
3
S > 1 · f 2 = 12S
from the intermediation of the two banks.
Denote by El the expected number of periphery banks that are directly linked to the core
bank ci and that want to use this link. If ci decides to invest in a joint project with one of
the periphery banks that he is directly linked to, El decreases. Thus, if it is certain that no
core bank needs intermediation, ci prefers investing in a joint project with a core bank in
order to maximize the expected profit from intermediation.
Now assume that there is a core bank c j that requires intermediation if all periphery banks
that are directly linked to c j invest in a joint project with another core bank (otherwise c j
can use a direct link). Still, it is more beneficial for a core bank ci to invest in a joint project
with c j or another core bank than to invest in a joint project with a periphery bank that is
directly linked to c j because the probability that a directly linked periphery bank uses the
direct link to ci is at least as large as the probability that the core bank c j uses the direct
link to ci. The probability that a periphery bank that is directly linked to c j uses the direct






where lc > 1 denotes the number of direct links to core banks that the periphery bank has.
Assume that l j < k is the number of periphery banks that are directly linked to c j. If all
of the l j periphery banks invest in a joint project with one of the remaining k − 1 core
banks, the probability that c j uses the direct link to ci is equal to
1
k−1 . Thus, we only need to
consider the case that the l j periphery banks are linked to every core bank. The probability
that a periphery bank that is directly linked to c j uses the direct link to ci is then
1
k . In this
case the probability that all of the l j periphery banks invest in a joint project with one of
the remaining k− 1 core banks is given by
(k− 1)! 
k− 1− l j

!︸ ︷︷ ︸
number of possibilities to match l j






number of possibilities to match l j
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which proves the claim.
Proof of Proposition 1.2:
1.step: Core-periphery networks with an even number of core banks are not unilaterally
stable.
Since core banks have joint projects with core banks at t = 1, every periphery bank
has to pay an intermediation fee with probability 12 , independent of the number of
core banks that the periphery bank is linked to. Thus, a core-periphery network
where a periphery bank is directly linked to l > 1 core banks is not unilaterally stable.
If, however, every periphery bank is linked to exactly one core bank, then also the
core-periphery network is not unilaterally stable: There is at least one core bank
that is directly linked to at most half of the periphery banks. This core bank then
receives the intermediation fee 13 (ph − pm) R2 from intermediation of every directly
linked periphery bank. A periphery bank pays the intermediation fee 23 (ph − pm) R2
with probability 12 . On the one hand, a core bank has no incentive to remove the
direct link to a periphery bank if
c¯ ≤ 1
3
(ph − pm) R2 .






(ph − pm) R2 .
Thus, if c¯ 6= 13 (ph − pm) R2 , there is either an incentive for two periphery banks to add
a direct link or an incentive for a core bank to remove links to periphery banks.
If c¯ = 13 (ph − pm) R2 , the least connected core bank can profitably remove a link to
another core bank and accept to loose one intermediation premium with a probability
smaller than one.
This argumentation does not work for an odd number of core banks because one core
bank lends to a periphery bank. Thus, there can be an incentive for a periphery bank
to be linked to more than one core bank.
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2.step: Core-periphery networks with an odd number of core banks are not unilaterally stable.
Step 2.1: We show that a core-periphery network where more than one periphery
bank is linked to exactly one core bank cannot be unilaterally stable.
Assume first that every core bank ci that is linked to periphery banks i1, i2,··· with
exactly one direct link has also a direct link to periphery banks i¯1, i¯2, . . . with more
than one direct link to core banks. In this case banks i1, i2, . . . use an intermediary
with probability one and we can proceed analogously to step 1 in order to disprove
unilateral stability. If c¯ = 13 (ph − pm) R2 holds, there is a core bank who can increase
expected profit by deleting links. There is a core bank with expected profit larger or
equal to






where li (l i¯) is the number of direct links between the core bank and periphery banks
with (more than) one link and El i¯ is the expected number of direct links between
the core bank and periphery banks with more than one link which are used for
intermediation. If the core bank deletes all but one link to a periphery bank with
exactly one link, profit changes to −c¯ + ph R2 . Since c¯ = f 3 > f 22 and l i¯ > El i¯ holds,
this is an improvement.
Assume second that there is a (nonempty) group of core banks that are directly linked
to at least one periphery bank with more than one direct link, respectively (group 1),
and a group of core banks that is only linked to periphery banks with exactly one link
(group 2). Since k is odd, one of the groups contains an even number of banks. At
t = 1 the equilibrium outcome of the search process at the interbank market implies
that the banks of one group invest in joint projects with each other in order to keep
the expected number of obtained intermediation fees as large as possible. There is
no joint project between two banks from different groups. If the number of core
banks in group 1 is even, periphery banks can profitably remove links because they
use an intermediary with probability one. If the number of banks in group 2 is even,
there is a core bank that can remove a link to a core bank from the other group
without changing the expected project return or the expected number of obtained
intermediation premia.
Assume last that all periphery banks are directly linked to exactly one core bank.
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There are at least two periphery banks with the expected profit








where li denotes the number of periphery banks that are directly connected to the
same core bank ci. If one core bank is directly linked to more than half of the periphery
banks, some periphery banks pay intermediation fees f ∗2 . Adding a link to another
periphery bank changes the expected profit to
−2c¯ + ph R2









The directly linked core bank’s profit is given by
− (k− 1+ li) c¯ + ph R2 +
1
k






Removing all but one direct link to a periphery bank changes the expected profit to
−c¯ + ph R2
and is not beneficial if
c¯ ≤ kli − 1
k (k + li − 2) · f 3.










either the periphery banks are underconnected or the core banks are overconnected.
We now turn to core-periphery networks where at most one periphery bank is directly
linked to only one core bank.
Step 2.2: We show that every core-periphery network where at most one periphery
bank is directly linked to exactly one core bank, is not unilaterally stable.
Remember that a core bank ci who has no joint project with another core bank chooses
to have a joint project with the directly linked periphery bank i∗ that has the most
links to core banks. We call i∗ a maximally connected periphery bank for ci. This
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periphery bank is least likely to choose ci as an intermediary.
Thus, if a core bank ci is directly linked to a periphery bank i with li direct links
to core banks and a periphery bank j with 1 < l j < li direct links to core banks,
the core-periphery network is not unilaterally stable. If bank j is not the maximally
connected periphery bank for any core bank, then j uses an intermediary with
probability 1 and direct links to core banks can be removed beneficially. If bank j
is a maximally connected periphery bank for some other core bank(s), j still needs
intermediation with probability 1. The reason is that j chooses a particular core bank
for intermediation with a higher probability than i if both banks need intermediation
( 1l j >
1
li
). Therefore, in equilibrium at t = 1 projects are established through direct
links in a way that
• neither i nor j has a project with a core bank or
• i but not j has a project with a core bank.
Again, j can beneficially remove a link to a core bank.
We continue considering core-periphery networks where every core bank is directly
linked to periphery banks with the same number of direct links and and to at most
one periphery bank with exactly one direct link. Without loss of generality we can
additionally assume that every core bank is equally likely to have a joint project with
a periphery bank at t = 1. Otherwise, there are two core banks that do not have a
joint project with each other at t = 1 with probability 1 and the link between the two
core banks can be removed beneficially.
Denote by
Pmax := arg max
i∈P
ic j ∈ L : c j ∈ C	
the set of those periphery banks with the most direct links to core banks and let
l∗ := max
i∈P
ic j ∈ L : c j ∈ C	
be the number of direct links that these periphery banks have. Furthermore, for every
core bank c j let
x j :=
ic j ∈ L : i ∈Pmax	
be the number of maximally connected periphery banks that core bank c j is linked to.
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The expected profit of a periphery bank i ∈Pmax is given by












Adding a direct link to another periphery bank changes the profit to
Π
+pb
i = − (l∗ + 1) · c¯ + ph R2 .
The action is feasible (i.e., the proposal of adding a link is accepted) if it is beneficial













f ∗3 . (1.11)
Removing all but one direct link to core banks changes the expected profit to




The action is not beneficial if
c¯ ≤ 1









f ∗3 . (1.12)
Assume first x j ≥ 2 for all core banks c j that are connected to a periphery bank

















2 (l∗ − 1)
>
1














Assume second that there is a core bank cn such that xn = 1, i.e., cn is directly linked
to at most two periphery banks (one periphery bank with l∗ direct links and possibly
one periphery bank with exactly one link). If the core bank is directly linked to one
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periphery bank, the expected profit is given by











where i is the periphery bank that is connected to cn. Removing all direct links but
one to a core bank and one to a periphery bank, cn is then a periphery bank that is
connected to another periphery bank. This action yields the expected profit
Π−cb
cn
= −2c¯ + ph R2













which is clearly a contradiction to condition (1.11) because 12 f
∗
3 = f¯3 and l
∗ > 1.
If the core bank is linked to two periphery banks, the expected profit is given by













where i is the maximally connected periphery bank that is connected to cn. Here,
removing all direct links but one to a core bank and the two links to periphery banks





≥ −3c¯ + ph R2 + f¯3.













This is again a contradiction to condition (1.11).
Concluding, the core-periphery network is not unilaterally stable because at least one
of the following statements is true.
• There are unused links that a bank can remove without changing its expected
47
1. Core-Periphery Formation in Interbank Markets
benefit from the investment and expected intermediation fees.
• There is an incentive for a periphery bank to add a link to another periphery
bank (the periphery is underconnected).
• There is an incentive for a core bank to remove links to other core banks (the
core is overconnected).





i j∈L ,i 6= j



















2) is the expected number of banks that (do not) use a direct or indirect link
to establish an investment project at t = 1 depending on the network g. Cutting (for
example) the link imim−1 decreases the aggregated link cost by 2cim im−1 but does not affect
the aggregated expected return from investment projects because there is still a path from
im to im−1. Hence, the network g = (N ,L \ {imim−1}) yields a higher aggregated profit
than g. Network g is not efficient.
Proof of Proposition 1.4:
Condition (i): Since the number of core banks is even, core banks establish joint projects
with core banks and not with periphery banks according to Lemma 1.4. Adding links to
core banks is thus not profitable for a periphery bank because the link cost increases but the
expected return from the investment project and the expected cost due to intermediation
stay the same. Hence, condition (i) implies that it is not feasible for a core bank to add
links to the periphery.
Condition (ii): There is no incentive for any bank to cut links if cl is sufficiently small. In
particular,
• a periphery bank cannot profitably cut the link to the core bank if
c¯l ≤ (ph − pm) R2 −
B
2
− f 3. (1.13)
• A core bank cannot profitably cut x links to directly linked periphery banks if
x c¯l ≤ x f 3. (1.14)
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• A core bank cannot profitably cut all direct links if
(k− 1+ li) c¯l ≤ (ph − pm) R2 −
B
2
+ li f 3, (1.15)
where li denotes the number of direct links between the core bank ci and periphery
banks. A core bank cannot profitably cut x < k− 1 links to core banks if x c¯l ≤ qx f 3
where qx denotes the probability that the core bank cannot establish a joint project
with another core bank. We have
1− qx = (k− 1− x) (k− 3) (k− 5) . . . 1(k− 1) (k− 3) . . . 1︸ ︷︷ ︸





c¯l ≤ 1k− 1 f 3 (1.16)
and implies that it is not profitable to cut all links to core banks. Condition (1.14) is
implied by condition (1.16). Condition (1.15) is implied by conditions (1.13),(1.14),












Condition (iii): It is feasible and profitable for a periphery bank to add at least one link to
another periphery bank if and only if c¯h < f 3 holds.
It is implied that there is no incentive for a periphery bank i ∈P to cut the direct link to
the core bank ci and add a direct link to a core bank c j. This action is either not profitable
if the intermediation fee stays the same (l j <
2N−k
2 ) or not feasible (l j ≥ 2N−k2 ) because the
intermediation fees that c j receives decrease.
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2. The Eect of the Central Bank’s Standing Facilities on
Interbank Lending and Bank Liquidity Holding
2.1. Introduction
The interbank market plays a crucial role for banks’ liquidity management and provides
essential safety for banks. Especially the overnight interbank market facilitates smoothing
liquidity shocks. To control level and volatility of the interest rate on overnight interbank
markets, central banks in several countries provide two standing facilities, a deposit facility
and a lending facility. Under normal circumstances policy rates are set at a penalty level and
interbank markets guarantee a smooth liquidity transfer between banks. The 2007/2008
financial crisis demonstrated the fragility of interbank markets and the severeness of a
freeze of interbank markets. As discussed earlier, the crisis showed that a change in policy
rates may not work as expected by policy makers.
Against this background the model presented in this chapter aims at a better understand-
ing of the functioning of overnight interbank markets and the channels through which
the central bank may influence not only interbank lending and the interbank rate but also
bank liquidity holding. In particular, the research question is how changes in the central
bank’s policy rates facilitate interbank lending (i) by influencing the conditions under which
interbank lending takes place, and (ii) by influencing bank liquidity holding and thus the
chances that interbank lending occurs. Here, liquidity holding refers to a bank’s liquid
reserves that are not invested in long-term projects. Trades at the interbank market are
not the outcome of a tender procedure with a large number of banks but are often over-
the-counter and organized bilaterally. The model accounts for this fact by concentrating
on two banks and applying the Nash bargaining solution to determine the interbank rate.
Interbank transactions are uncollateralized as is the case for overnight markets in most
countries (see for example European Central Bank (2011b), Bank of Japan (2012), Federal
Reserve Board (2016)).
The considered model has three dates. At the first date, banks observe the central bank’s
policy rates and choose their liquidity holding. They invest in a risky technology yielding an
uncertain return at the last date. At the second date, an idiosyncratic liquidity shock occurs.
Banks might become illiquid. To regain liquidity, they use the central bank’s lending facility
or the unsecured interbank market. At the third date, the investment’s return realizes and
loans are due for repayment. An important feature of the model is that liquidity holding
is bank specific and endogenous. This allows to examine the effect of the central bank’s
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standing facilities on the conditions of interbank lending (first channel) as well as on
bank liquidity holding and therefore on the chances that interbank lending occurs (second
channel).
The results show that liquidity is held to lend to the interbank market in case counterparty
risk is not too high. If banks expect interbank lending to be sufficiently likely and profitable,
a smooth liquidity transfer at the interbank market is guaranteed. The central bank is able
to facilitate interbank lending by decreasing the deposit rate because the central bank’s
deposit facility then looses attractiveness compared with lending at the interbank market.
However, if the deposit rate is too small, bank liquidity holding is equal to zero. This
implies that liquidity supply at the interbank market may be too small to meet the whole
liquidity demand. The effect of a change in the marginal lending rate is ambiguous. On
the one hand, an increase in the marginal lending rate decreases the attractiveness of the
central bank’s lending facility. On the other hand, an increase in the marginal lending
rate increases the repayment claim of the central bank. For a bank that needs both an
interbank loan and a loan from the central bank, financial resources that remain to repay
the loan from the interbank market decrease. For this reason a bank might loose its access
to the interbank market if the marginal lending rate increases. As a consequence, also a
wide corridor between the central bank’s deposit rate and the marginal lending rate can
prevent interbank lending. Finally, a crisis scenario is considered. If investment projects are
perceived to be too risky, this can result in interbank market failure and liquidity hoarding.
The chapter is organized as follows. In the next section related literature and the chapter’s
contribution are discussed. The model is presented in section 2.3. Section 2.4 analyzes
how the central bank influences the conditions for interbank lending for fixed liquidity
holding and liquidity shocks. Liquidity holding is endogenized in section 2.5. This allows
to analyze the central bank’s impact on banks’ liquidity holding. In section 2.6 a crisis
scenario is considered where banks’ risk perception may deviate from the actual risk of
investment projects. Section 2.7 provides a conclusion.
2.2. Related literature and contribution
This chapter contributes to the literature in the following ways. A first strand of literature
considers instruments of the central bank and examines their effect on interbank lending.
Most studies on standing facilities14 build on the early contribution of Poole (1968)15 who
14Of course, there are also studies focusing on other instruments than standing facilities (see for example
Allen et al. (2009), Freixas et al. (2011)).
15Baltensperger (1980) provides a survey to early literature on this topic.
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examines implications of uncertain liquidity shocks for banks’ reserve management. In his
model, the central bank’s instrument is a lending facility. The interbank rate is fixed and
there is no bargaining at the interbank market. The model has been extended in several
ways: Pérez Quirós & Rodríguez Mendizábal (2012) study the interplay of the central bank’s
standing facilities and open market operations. They show that a central bank can separate
different aims in the following way: the level of the refinancing rate signals the monetary
policy stance measured by some interest rate target, the width of the corridor between the
deposit rate and the marginal lending rate controls volatility of the interbank rate, and the
relative position of the refinancing rate within the corridor controls the demand for excess
reserves. In a related study Berentsen & Monnet (2008) show that the central bank can
tighten or loosen its policy without changing the target rate by symmetrically changing
the width of the corridor. Whitesell (2006) compares a reserve regime, where the central
bank’s tool is setting reserve requirements, with a rate-corridor regime, where the central
bank’s tool is setting the deposit rate and the marginal lending rate. The optimal width
of the corridor is also discussed by Bindseil & Jablecki (2011). They show that a wider
corridor implies a greater interbank turnover, a leaner balance sheet of the central bank,
and greater short-term volatility of the interbank rate. These models do not account for
the fact that interbank lending is the outcome of a bilateral bargaining process. Closely
related to the model presented in this chapter Vollmer & Wiese (2013, 2016) also consider
a bargaining model and ask for the condition under which interbank lending breaks down.
All of the above mentioned studies predict that a wider corridor, in particular a large
marginal lending rate, will facilitate interbank lending. The model presented in this chapter
comes to a different conclusion for the following reasons: in contrast to previous models (i)
borrowers may not be able to repay their loans and (ii) banks can borrow from the central
bank and the interbank market at the same time. As mentioned above, banks that need
both a loan from the central bank and the interbank market therefore may loose access to
the interbank market due to an increase in the marginal lending rate. Such an increase
implies an increase in the repayment claim from the central bank. Hence, the financial
resources remaining to repay an interbank loan decrease. Additionally, we contribute to
this literature by especially considering the effect of the standing facilities on bank liquidity
holding. To our knowledge, only Neyer & Wiemers (2004) also come to the conclusion that
an increase in the marginal lending rate may decrease interbank lending activity but for a
different reason: In their model heterogeneity in the opportunity cost of holding collateral
yields intermediation: Banks with low opportunity cost borrow from the central bank and
distribute this liquidity at the unsecured interbank market to banks with high opportunity
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cost. Hence, an increase in the marginal lending rate decreases the liquidity supply at
interbank markets.
A second strand of literature deals with the explanation of interbank market failure. The
most common explanation made so far for stressed interbank markets during the financial
crisis is that asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers at the interbank
market leads to an increase in counterparty risk and to a decrease in the trading volumes
(Freixas & Holthausen 2005, Heider et al. 2015). Some studies introduce other kinds
of frictions such as aggregate liquidity shocks (Allen et al. 2009), Knightian uncertainty
(Pritsker 2013), or participation costs at the interbank market (Hauck & Neyer 2014). Peiris
& Vardoulakis (2013) allow for the possibility that agents can choose to default on their
loan repayments and show that trade fails if the level of reserves is too low. Increased risk
or risk perception of investment opportunities is considered by de Castro & Chateauneuf
(2011) and Ozsoylev & Werner (2011) who show that ambiguous information or ambiguity
aversion can lead to illiquid markets and less trade. Their framework is more general and
does not take into account the special characteristics of interbank markets. Lagos et al.
(2011) model a crisis as an aggregate negative shock that reduces investors’ willingness
to hold risky assets and show that dealers will be unwilling to provide liquidity when
interbank trading frictions are severe. This chapter adds to this literature by showing that if
investment projects are perceived to be too risky, this can result in interbank market failure
and liquidity hoarding.
For a more extensive review on overnight interbank markets see Green et al. (2016).
2.3. Model setup
The model contains three dates, t ∈ {0, 1,2} . There is a continuum of depositors, two banks
i ∈ {1, 2}, and the central bank. The central bank offers a deposit facility and a lending
facility. Here, rd denotes the deposit rate and rl ≥ rd denotes the marginal lending rate.
More precisely, banks can store funds at the central bank and obtain a return rate of rd .
Banks can borrow from the central bank at a rate rl . Policy rates rd and rl are exogenous.
Banks are risk neutral and maximize (expected) profits.
At t = 0 the banks observe the central bank’s policy rates. Each bank raises deposits of
mass 1. Interest on deposits is set to zero.16 Deposits are insured with the premium equal
to zero. Deposits are stored until t = 1 or invested in an illiquid risky project yielding an
uncertain return at time t = 2. The return is given by Ri > 1 with probability pi (success)
16Note that rd denotes the return on bank deposits at the central bank. Interest on household deposits at banks
is set to zero.
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and by 0 with probability 1− pi (failure). Returns are independently distributed. Also at
time t = 0 bank i learns the properties of the investment, which is the tuple (pi, Ri), and
the properties of the other bank’s investment. The bank chooses to invest a share αi ∈ [0, 1]
of deposits in the risky project, which is observable to the other bank. We refer to the term
1 − αi as liquidity holding or liquidity of bank i. Liquidity holding is bank specific and
endogenous. It is assumed that piRi ≥ rd holds. Otherwise banks do not invest but have
liquidity holdings equal to 1.17
At t = 1 depositors increase or withdraw their deposits. Thus, an idiosyncratic liquidity
shock λi ∈ [−1,1] occurs18. For reasons of tractability, we assume that liquidity shocks
are independently, identically, and uniformly distributed, i.e., λi ∼ U[−1,1]. A bank facing
a positive liquidity shock receives additional liquidity and has two options: (i) supplying
liquidity at the interbank market and (ii) storing disposable funds at the central bank
at deposit rate rd . The interbank market is uncollateralized.
19 A bank facing a negative
liquidity shock can meet the liquidity demand by reducing the liquidity reserve (1−αi).
If liquidity holding is larger than the depositors’ liquidity demand, the bank supplies
the difference at the interbank market or deposits the remainder at the central bank. If
depositors’ liquidity demand is larger than the bank’s liquidity holding, the bank has again
two options: (i) borrowing Li from the other bank and (ii) borrowing Fi from the central
bank. Here, L1 = −L2 > 0 indicates that bank 1 borrows from bank 2. Analogously, Fi > 0
indicates that bank i borrows from the central bank. For reasons of tractability we abstract
from the possibility that a bank needs to provide collateral to receive a loan from the central
bank. Resulting from a bilateral bargaining process, the interbank rate rIB for an interbank
loan is determined by the Nash bargaining solution, while the marginal lending rate is
given by rl .
20
At t = 2 all outstanding payments are realized. If successful, banks receive a positive
return from their investment. A bank that was granted a loan at t = 1 now has to repay the
17Assuming that the bank invests an amount αi , the expected return from investing equals piRiαi , while
storing αi at the central bank yields rdαi .
18One can distinguish between idiosyncratic and aggregate liquidity shocks (see for example Allen et al.
(2009)). Since the model describes the interbank market at normal times, here, only idiosyncratic liquidity
shocks are considered.
19By concentrating on unsecured interbank markets, we take into account the role of counterparty risk but
neglect the role of availability, cost and quality of collateral. Unsecured interbank markets are particularly
vulnerable to changes in the perceived creditworthiness of counterparties. This will be especially important
when considering a crisis scenario (see section 2.6). Heider & Hoerova (2009) analyze the interrelation
between secured and unsecured interbank lending.
20The possibility of ex-ante contracts where the interbank rate is determined already at t = 0 is discussed in
Appendix 2.B. The results do not depend on the use of the Nash bargaining solution in a qualitative way,
see also Appendix 2.B.
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loan. Of course it may happen that the bank is not able to repay the loan or is able to repay
only a part of the loan. If both an interbank loan and a loan from the central bank were
granted, the central bank is paid out first. Since the interbank market is uncollateralized,
the creditor bank may also receive only a part of the agreed repayment or nothing at all.
Moreover, banks reclaim their deposits at the central bank. Bank i still has outstanding
liabilities of (1+λi) towards their depositors. This capital is withdrawn at an uncertain


























• loans are due
for repayment
Figure 2.1: Time structure of the model
2.4. Central bank behavior and interbank lending
2.4.1. Liquidity constraints and expected bank profits at t = 1
At the second date t = 1 banks have already chosen their liquidity holding and liquidity
shocks have occurred. The aim is to identify (i) the conditions under which interbank
lending takes place, (ii) the terms of an interbank loan contract in this case, and (iii) the
influence of the central bank on (i) and (ii). At t = 1, four cases may occur:
I No bank is in need of a loan, i.e., 1−αi +λi ≥ 0 for i ∈ {1, 2} .
II Bank 1 is illiquid, while bank 2 is not, i.e., 1−α1 +λ1 < 0, 1−α2 +λ2 ≥ 0.
II.1 Bank 2 is able to meet bank 1’s liquidity demand completely, i.e., 2−α1 −α2 +
λ1 +λ2 ≥ 0.
55
2. Interbank Lending and Bank Liquidity Holding
II.2 Bank 2 is able to meet only a part of bank 1’s liquidity demand, i.e., 2− α1 −
α2 +λ1 +λ2 < 0.
III Bank 2 is illiquid, while bank 1 is not, i.e., 1−α1 +λ1 ≥ 0, 1−α2 +λ2 < 0.
III.1 Bank 1 is able to meet bank 2’s liquidity demand completely, i.e., 2−α1 −α2 +
λ1 +λ2 ≥ 0.
III.2 Bank 1 is able to meet only a part of bank 2’s liquidity demand, i.e., 2−α1 −
α2 +λ1 +λ2 < 0.
IV Both banks are illiquid, i.e., 1−αi +λi < 0 for i ∈ {1,2} .














Figure 2.2: Possible situations at time t = 1 depending on λ
In situation I no interbank lending takes place at time t = 1 because no bank is in need
of a loan. Banks deposit their liquidity at the central bank. The expected bank profit is
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given by
rd (1−αi +λi) + piαiRi − (1+λi) . (2.1)
The first two terms describe the amount bank i expects at time t = 1 to have at time t = 2.
The deposit at the central bank plus interest is paid back and the bank receives a positive
return from the investment with probability pi. These terms are always non-negative.
Thus, the bank does not go bankrupt at time t = 2. The outstanding liabilities (1+λi) are
subtracted.
Also, no interbank lending takes place if situation IV occurs because both banks are illiquid
and no interbank loan can be granted. Therefore, banks take out a loan Fi = −1+αi −λi
from the central bank. The expected bank profit is given by
pi (αiRi − rl (−1+αi −λi))+ − (1+λi) , (2.2)
with (x)+ := max {x , 0} . Again, the first term describes the amount bank i expects at t = 1
to have at t = 2. The bank is only able to repay the loan from the central bank if the
investment is successful and rl is sufficiently small. Otherwise, bank i goes bankrupt. Thus,
bank i’s project can be financed completely through the central bank if
rl ≤ αiRi−1+αi −λi (2.3)
holds. The outstanding liabilities towards the depositors are subtracted.21
No interbank lending occurs independently of the central bank’s policy if situation I or IV
occurs. Thus, the central bank cannot influence the conditions of interbank lending.
Now, consider the more interesting situations II and III. For reasons of symmetry there is
no loss of generality if we consider situation II, only. Here, bank 1 is illiquid and bank 2
holds sufficient liquidity to grant at least a part of the loan needed. Banks bargain about
21Note that (2.2) can be negative although banks are protected by limited liability. Here, the crucial assump-
tion is that outstanding liabilities (1+λi) are withdrawn at an uncertain time in the future that is not
considered. Hence, at t = 1 banks maximize expected profit resulting from decisions and payments made
at t = 1 and t = 2. For situation IV this corresponds to pi (αiRi − rl (−1+αi −λi))+. The term (1+λi) is
still subtracted because outstanding liabilities cannot count as profit. This is not crucial for the bank’s be-
havior because the bank cannot affect (1+λi). If (2.2) is negative this means that the bank goes bankrupt
at t = 2 or will go bankrupt in the future if it does note take out a loan or makes another investment at a
later date, say t = 3. It is assumed that banks do not consider these future dates for their decision making.
The assumption keeps analysis tractable because several case distinctions can be avoided. It does, however,
not qualitatively change the results. Considering

pi (αiRi − rl (−1+αi −λi))+ − (1+λi)
+
instead of
(2.2) would yield a smaller upper bound on rl compared to (2.3). In all other aspects, this effect is
taken into account by considering pi (αiRi − rl (−1+αi −λi))+ instead of pi (αiRi − rl (−1+αi −λi)).
This remarks do also apply for expected profits in situation II and III which are considered below.
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an interbank loan. If banks cannot agree upon conditions for an interbank loan, bank
1 borrows from the central bank and the expected profit is the same as in situation IV
(compare with (2.2)). Bank 2 stores its excess liquidity at the central bank and faces the
same expected payoff as in situation I (compare with (2.1)). Assume that banks agree
upon conditions for an interbank loan. The interbank rate rIB resulting from bargaining lies
between the central bank’s deposit rate and the marginal lending rate, i.e., rIB ∈ [rd , rl].
An interbank rate below rd does not result from bargaining because a creditor bank in this
case prefers depositing at the central bank to supplying liquidity at the interbank market.
Also, an interbank rate above rl does not result because a debtor bank in this case prefers
borrowing from the central bank over borrowing from the interbank market. Therefore, it
is not optimal to borrow more than needed from the central bank or the interbank market.
As a consequence, no bank borrows from the central bank to grant a loan at the interbank
market. Also, no bank borrows from the interbank market to deposit at the central bank.
Bank 2’s reserve is either large enough to meet all of the liquidity needs of bank 1, or bank
2 grants a part of the loan needed by bank 1, only. Thus, due to profit maximization, the
loan volume is given by
L1 := min {−1+α1 −λ1, 1−α2 +λ2} .
The loan contract consists of the interbank loan volume L1 and the interbank rate rIB
defining the repayment. If the loan granted by bank 2 is not sufficient to meet all of the
liquidity needs of bank 1, the debtor bank has to borrow the remainder F1 from the central
bank:
F1 := −1+α1 −λ1 − L1
= (−2+α1 +α2 −λ1 −λ2)+ .
The expected profit of bank 1 at t = 1 is given by
E t=1Π1 = p1 (α1R1 − rIB L1 − rl F1)+ − (1+λ1) . (2.4)
At time t = 2 bank 1 has to repay the interbank loan and possibly the loan taken out from
the central bank. The bank is able to meet the repayment claim with probability p1. Since




(α1R1 − rl F1) =: r IB.
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Otherwise, bank 2 still receives at most the repayment r IB L1. It is therefore sufficient to
concentrate on interbank rates satisfying rIB ≤ r IB. With this assumption bank 2 receives
the whole repayment claim rIB L1 at t = 2 if bank 1’s investment is successful. Bank 2
receives nothing from bank 1 if the investment is not successful because bank 1 goes
bankrupt in this case. The expected profit of bank 2 is given by
E t=1Π2 = rd (1−α2 +λ2 − L1) + p2α2R2 + p1rIB L1 − (1+λ2) . (2.5)
Bank 2 receives the deposits plus interest from the central bank, a positive return from
the investment with probability p2, and the repayment claim from the interbank loan with
probability p1.
2.4.2. The Nash bargaining solution
At t = 1 banks bargain about an interbank loan contract. We determine the interbank rate
using the Nash bargaining solution. Consider the case that one bank is liquid, while the
other bank is not (cases II and III). Without loss of generality again assume that bank 1 is
the debtor bank, while bank 2 is the creditor bank (case II). The threat point (T P1, T P2) is
given by the profits that banks expect at time t = 1 to have at time t = 2 if no interbank
lending takes place. From (2.1) and (2.2) we have
T P1 = p1 (α1R1 − rl (−1+α1 −λ1))+ − (1−λ1) ,
T P2 = rd (1−α2 +λ2) + p2α2R2 − (1−λ2) .






E t=1Π1 ≥ T P1 and E t=1Π2 ≥ T P2.
Furthermore, the condition rIB ≤ r IB needs to be taken into account, as explained above.
Assume that banks 1 and 2 consider borrowing from or lending to the interbank market.
In this case banks compare supplying (demanding) liquidity at the interbank market with
depositing at (borrowing from) the central bank. They agree upon an interbank loan if
there is a nonempty set of interbank rates that bank 1 is able to repay and that promise a
higher profit for both banks than the central bank’s deposit (marginal lending) rate. This is
the case if the following condition holds:
Lemma 2.1. Interbank lending occurs with bank 1 as debtor and bank 2 as creditor if and
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The intuition is as follows: First, consider bank 2. The central bank offers the deposit rate
rd . At the interbank market bank 2 receives a return with probability p1, only. Therefore,
bank 2 supplies liquidity at the interbank market if the return is at least as large as rdp1 . Second,
consider bank 1. Bank 1’s alternative to trading at the interbank market is borrowing from
the central bank at the marginal lending rate rl . However, if bank 1’s project cannot be
financed completely through the central bank (i.e., α1R1 − rl (−1+α1 −λ1)< 0, compare
with (2.3)), the alternative to trading at the interbank market is bankruptcy. Therefore, an
interbank rate that bank 1 is willing and able to repay may be even smaller than rl .
The following result describes how the occurrence of interbank lending is affected by
policy rates.
Corollary 2.1. Assume that interbank lending is prevented, i.e.,
rd
p1
> rl − 1L1 (rl (−1+α1 −λ1)−α1R1)+ holds.
(a) A decrease in rd can facilitate interbank lending.
(b1) If rl ≤ α1R1−1+α1−λ1 , an increase in rl can facilitate interbank lending.
(b2) If rl >
α1R1−1+α1−λ1 and L1 = 1−α2 +λ2, a decrease in rl can facilitate interbank lending.
(b3) If rl >
α1R1−1+α1−λ1 and L1 = −1+α1 −λ1, a change in rl does not affect the occurrence of
interbank lending.
Proof. See appendix.
Decreasing the central bank’s policy rate for deposit-taking seems to be a suitable action
to facilitate interbank lending because it extends the set of interbank rates that bank 2
is willing to accept (see (a)). However, no similar statement holds for the central bank’s
marginal lending rate. On the one hand, increasing rl may extend the set of interbank rates
that bank 1 is willing to accept. On the other hand, decreasing rl may extend the set of
interbank rates that bank 1 is able to repay. The second effect does not play a role if bank 1
can finance completely through the central bank (see (b1)). In this case bank 1 can repay all
interbank rates below rl and increasing rl just extends the set of interbank rates that bank
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1 is willing to accept. If, however, bank 1 cannot finance completely through the central
bank, an increase in rl may have no effect or even a negative effect on the occurrence of
interbank lending for the following reason. While bank 1 is willing to accept all interbank
rates below rl , bank 1 is not able to repay all interbank rates below rl . First, consider the
case that bank 1 needs a loan from the central bank in addition to an interbank loan (see
(b2)). In this case increasing rl increases the central bank’s repayment claim against bank
1. Thus, the financial resources remaining to repay a loan at the interbank market decrease.
Consequently, increasing rl decreases the set of interbank rates that bank 1 is able to repay.
Second, assume that bank 2 can meet bank 1’s liquidity demand completely (see (b3)).
In this case the set of interbank rates that bank 1 is able to repay does not depend on rl
because bank 1 does not need a loan from the central bank in addition to an interbank
loan. Consequently, a change in rl has no effect on the occurrence of interbank lending.
Summing up, the effect of changing the central bank’s marginal lending rate is ambiguous.
This has some interesting implications.
If the central bank chooses to enlarge the width of the corridor between the marginal
lending rate and the deposit rate, a positive impact on interbank lending can only be
guaranteed if the marginal lending rate stays constant. Thus, interestingly, also a wide
corridor can prevent interbank lending if bank 2 is able to grant only a part of the loan
needed by bank 1. In this case bank 1 is not able to meet any repayment claim that bank
2 is willing to accept. A wide policy rate corridor does not necessarily make interbank
lending more likely compared with a narrow corridor. Also, shifting the policy rate corridor
downwards (without changing the spread rl−rd) to support the functioning of the interbank
market, can be less effective compared with decreasing the deposit rate.
Note that the central bank can always prevent interbank lending. For example, if the
corridor between the central bank’s policy rates is sufficiently narrow (rl = rd + " with
" > 0 sufficiently small), the central bank is a better alternative for both banks. In this case
bank 1 claims an interbank rate below the central bank’s marginal lending rate. Otherwise,
bank 1 borrows from the central bank. Bank 2 claims an expected interbank rate above
rd , i.e., an interbank rate above
rd
p1
. Otherwise, bank 2 deposits the surplus liquidity at the
central bank. If the central bank’s marginal lending rate and the deposit rate are close,
both requirements cannot be fulfilled at the same time. Then, both banks use the standing
facilities.
Now, assume that interbank lending is not prevented, i.e., inequality (2.6) holds. In this
case, there exists a nonempty set of interbank rates that both banks would agree upon. The
two banks bargain about the interbank rate rIB determining the repayment. In particular,
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the interbank rate r∗IB resulting from Nash bargaining is the maximizing argument for 
E t=1Π1 − T P1
  






≤ rIB ≤ rl − 1L1 (rl (−1+α1 −λ1)−α1R1)
+ .
Lemma 2.2. Assume that interbank lending is not prevented. The interbank rate that results




(rd + p1rl)− 12L1 (rl (−1+α1 −λ1)−α1R1)
+ .
Proof. See appendix.
How does the interbank rate change with the central bank’s marginal lending rate and
the deposit rate? First, it can be seen that r∗IB is monotonically increasing with respect to
rd because with increasing rd the central bank’s attractiveness to the creditor bank also





L1 = −1+α1 −λ1
L1 = 1−α2 +λ2slope= 12L1 (1−α1) +λ1 + L1
α1R1−1+α1+λ1
Figure 2.3: The interbank rate resulting from Nash bargaining
Second, Figure 2.3 shows the effect with respect to rl . Starting at rd , the central bank’s
marginal lending rate is first monotonically increasing in rl but then becomes constant or
even monotonically decreasing. The following interpretation can be provided: On the one
hand, with increasing rl the central bank becomes less attractive for bank 1 in comparison
to the interbank market. Bank 2 can claim a higher interbank rate. On the other hand, if rl
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is too high, bank 1 becomes bankrupt if no loan is granted by bank 2. The interbank rate
rIB stays constant if bank 1 does not need a loan from the central bank. The first effect
vanishes because the central bank cannot loose further attractiveness. If bank 1 still needs
a loan from the central bank, the interbank rate even decreases with increasing rl because
the funds remaining to meet bank 2’s repayment claim also decreases.
It is also interesting to consider the dependence of r∗IB on the lending volume L1. Note that
the loan volume only affects the interbank rate if bank 1 cannot finance completely through
the central bank. Otherwise, r∗IB only depends on those parameters which determine the
rates that banks are willing to accept, i.e., on p1, rd , rl , and not on those parameters which
determine the rates that bank 1 is able to repay, such as L1. Thus, consider the case that
bank 1 cannot finance completely through the central bank. If bank 2 can meet bank 1’s
liquidity demand completely (L1 = −1+α1−λ1), an increase in the lending volume, either
due to an increase in α1 or due to a decrease in λ1, results in a decrease in the interbank
rate r∗IB. An increase in the lending volume coincides with an increase in bank 1’s liquidity
demand and thus in an increase in the amount that has to be repaid to bank 2 at t = 2.
Bank 2 demands a lower interbank rate and counteracts the increasing repayment claim
to guarantee that bank 1 is still able to repay the loan. If bank 2 cannot meet bank 1’s
liquidity demand completely (L1 = 1−α2 +λ2), an increase in the lending volume does
not coincide with a higher liquidity demand of bank 1 but results from an increase in bank
2’s excess liquidity. In this case, increasing the lending volume increases the interbank rate
r∗IB because bank 1 then borrows less from the central bank (at rate rl ≥ r∗IB). Hence, bank
1 is able to meet a higher repayment claim at the interbank market.
2.5. Equilibrium liquidity holding at t = 0
To examine the effects of the central bank’s standing facilities on bank liquidity holding, we





liquidity holding is important because the central bank may be able to facilitate interbank
lending by influencing bank liquidity holding: If a bank has a large liquidity holding at
t = 0, this bank is more likely to be able to grant a loan at the interbank market at t = 1
than a bank with small liquidity holdings.
Thus, consider t = 0 and the expected profit of bank i at this date, denoted by E t=0Πi.
Since liquidity shocks are independently and uniformly distributed in the interval [−1, 1],
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E t=1Πi (λ1,λ2) dλ1 dλ2.
Banks maximize their expected profits. Thus, best-response functions and liquidity holding
in equilibrium can be derived from expected profit.
For reasons of tractability assume rl < Ri for i ∈ {1, 2} from now on. This condition
guarantees that condition (2.3) holds, i.e., bank i’s project can be financed completely
through the central bank. According to Lemma 2.1 the following cases can occur:
• Interbank lending is prevented, i.e., p1rl , p2rl < rd .
• Interbank lending occurs with bank 2 as creditor and bank 1 as debtor but not vice
versa, i.e., p1rl ≥ rd > p2rl .
• Interbank lending occurs with bank 2 as debtor and bank 1 as creditor but not vice
versa, i.e., p2rl ≥ rd > p1rl .
• Interbank lending is not prevented, i.e., p1rl , p2rl ≥ rd .
Without loss of generality assume p1 ≥ p2 from now on. The different regions in (rd , rl)-
space are illustrated in Figure 2.4.
The conditions that determine whether interbank lending occurs at t = 1 do not depend
on loan volume or on liquidity shocks. These conditions are known at t = 0. Therefore,
banks already know at t = 0 if bargaining at the interbank market is possible at t = 1 in
case one bank is solvent and the other one insolvent. The intuition behind is the following:
The alternative to supplying (demanding) liquidity at the interbank market is depositing at
(borrowing from) the central bank. Whether interbank lending is more profitable than using
the central bank’s facilities, is only determined by the central bank’s marginal lending rate,
the deposit rate, and the probability that the interbank loan is repaid because the banks’
projects can be financed completely through the central bank. Thus, a bank’s decision
regarding supplying (demanding) liquidity at the interbank market does not depend on the
amount of the liquidity surplus (liquidity needs) or the amount of the interbank loan.
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Figure 2.4: Conditions for interbank lending for p1 > p2
Proposition 2.1. Assume p1 ≥ p2 holds. The bank with the less risky project holds no liquidity,
i.e., α∗1 = 1. The liquidity holding of the bank with the riskier project can be described in the
following way:
(a) If rd > p1rl ≥ p2rl ,
α∗2 = 1.
(b) If p1rl ≥ rd > p2rl ,
α∗2 =

0, 16p2R2 − 11rd − p1rl − 4p2rl < 0
{0,1} , 16p2R2 − 11rd − p1rl − 4p2rl = 0
1, 16p2R2 − 11rd − p1rl − 4p2rl > 0.
(c) If p1rl ≥ p2rl = rd ,
α∗2 =

0, 16p2R2 − 15rd − p1rl < 0
[0, 1] , 16p2R2 − 15rd − p1rl = 0
1, 16p2R2 − 15rd − p1rl > 0.
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(d) If p1rl ≥ p2rl > rd ,22
α∗2 =

0, 16p2R2 − 15rd − p1rl < 0
1, 16p2R2 − 7p2rl − 8rd − p1rl > 0
−3+Ç9+ 1p2rl−rd (16p2R2 − 15rd − p1rl), otherwise.
Proof. See appendix.
First, notice that the bank with the less risky investment holds no liquidity independent
of rd and rl . For this bank, holding liquidity to meet depositors’ liquidity demand is less
profitable than investing in the risky project and refinancing through the interbank market
or the central bank. A change of the central bank’s marginal lending rate or the deposit
rate has no effect.
Second, consider the bank with the riskier investment, here bank 2. The bank’s liquidity
holding depends on the possibility of interbank lending at t = 1. If the bank already knows
at t = 0 that no interbank transactions occurs at t = 1, liquidity holding is equal to zero
(compare case (a), rd > p1rl ≥ p2rl). In this case investing and refinancing through the
central bank if necessary is more profitable than depositing liquidity at the central bank to
be able to meet the depositors’ liquidity demand.
If interbank lending is not prevented completely already at t = 0, the bank might hold
liquidity (compare cases (b)-(d)). Therefore, the liquidity is not held to meet the depositors’
liquidity demand but to supply liquidity at the interbank market. Whether the possibility of
supplying liquidity at the interbank market is more profitable than investing, is determined
by the central bank’s policy rates and the properties of the banks’ investments. If case (b)
occurs, it is known at t = 0 that bank 2 will not be a debtor but possibly a creditor at t = 1.
Therefore, this bank’s liquidity holding depends on whether granting an interbank loan
is more profitable than investing (α∗2 = 0) or not (α
∗
2 = 1). Cases (c) and (d) describe
the situation where bank 2 could be a creditor as well as a debtor at t = 1, i.e., interbank
lending is not prevented in any direction at t = 0 (compare Figure 2.4). Therefore, in
equilibrium the bank might also do both, invest and hold liquidity.
A subsequent question is how the banks’ liquidity holding reacts to changes in the central
bank’s policy rates. The following result shows the influence of rd:
Corollary 2.2. The equilibrium liquidity holding of the bank with the riskier project is
(i) increasing and piecewise convex in rd if rd ≤ p1rl ,
22The condition α∗2 ∈ [0,1] holds and the radicand in the third case is non-negative. An explanation is
provided in the proof.
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(ii) equal to zero if rd > p1rl .
Proof. See appendix.
A small rd as well as a large rd might motivate the bank to hold no liquidity in equilibrium.
If the deposit rate is small, the interbank rate is too small to be attractive. Moreover, it is
not even sure whether bank 1 will need a loan at time t = 1. Investing is more profitable
than holding additional liquidity to supply it at the interbank market. With increasing rd ,
interbank lending becomes more profitable because the interbank rate increases. Then,
bank 2 has an incentive to hold liquidity. Liquidity holding increases with increasing rd and
might even be equal to one. However, if rd gets too large, interbank lending is prevented.
Using the central bank’s deposit facility is more profitable than supplying liquidity at the
interbank market at a rate that bank 1 is willing to accept. Also, investing and refinancing
through the central bank is more profitable than using the deposit facility. Thus, liquidity
holding is equal to zero because interbank lending is prevented.
Remember that we saw earlier that a decrease in the deposit rate may facilitate interbank
lending because the option of supplying liquidity at the interbank market gets more attrac-
tive compared with the central bank’s deposit facility. Now, the above result suggests that a
decrease in the deposit rate may also be harmful for interbank lending because liquidity
holding decreases and hence the amount of funds that could be supplied at the interbank
market decreases.
The following result shows the influence of the central bank’s marginal lending rate:
Corollary 2.3. The equilibrium liquidity holding of the bank with the riskier project is in-
creasing in rl .
Proof. See appendix.
If rl is small, i.e., p1rl < rd , interbank lending is prevented. Liquidity holding is equal to
zero. If rl is large, i.e., p1rl ≥ rd , interbank lending is not prevented with bank 1 as debtor
and bank 2 as creditor. Therefore, bank 2 might have an incentive to hold liquidity. With
increasing rl the attractiveness of borrowing from the central bank decreases. Also, the
interbank rate increases and thus the attractiveness of the possibility of supplying liquidity
at the interbank market. Liquidity holding of bank 2 increases.
The following corollary examines if the central bank always has the possibility to influence
banks’ investment behavior by changing the marginal lending rate or the deposit rate.
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Corollary 2.4. If the risk of both investments is not too different, i.e., if p1 − p2 is sufficiently
small, changes in rd or rl have no effect on banks’ liquidity holding. The liquidity holding in
equilibrium is constantly equal to zero.
Proof. See appendix.
According to this result, changes in the central bank’s marginal lending rate or the deposit
rate have no influence on the banks’ liquidity holding if the risk of their investments is
not too different. In this case banks invest all disposable funds in the risky project. The
intuition is the following. For the bank with the riskier investment, i.e., bank 2, a large p1
promises a high expected return from interbank lending, while a small p2 promises a small
expected return from investing. Hence, a small p1 ≥ p2 sufficiently close to p2 guarantees
that investing is more profitable than the possibility of supplying liquidity at the interbank
market. Here, a situation is uncovered where the central bank is not able to influence
bank liquidity holding by changing the marginal lending rate or the deposit rate. Note
that interbank lending, however, does not necessarily break down at t = 1. If, for example,
one bank receives a positive liquidity shock, while the liquidity shock of the other bank is
negative, interbank lending possibly occurs. The central bank in this case is only able to
facilitate interbank lending at t = 1 but not at t = 0.
To conclude, the central bank does not necessarily have an influence on bank liquidity
holding. However, if the central bank’s policy rates indeed affect the banks’ liquidity
reserves, actions that make interbank lending more likely or profitable lead to liquidity
holding at the first date that guarantees a good liquidity provision at the second date when
liquidity shocks occurred.
2.6. Financial turmoil: increased risk perception
So far the model describes the functioning of bilateral interbank transactions in normal
times without a financial turmoil. Banks’ risk perception is now also modeled to show
that liquidity hoarding might occur if banks’ investment projects are perceived to be risky.
Remember that pi denotes the actual probability that bank i’s investment is successful.
Assume now that this probability is not known to the banks. Instead, we introduce p¯i which
denotes bank i’s subjective probability of success. For simplicity assume that risk perception
is the same for both banks, i.e., if bank 1 believes his investment to be successful with
probability p¯1, bank 2 does also.
During a financial crisis the banks’ risk management may fail, i.e., the risk of the invest-
ment projects is not assessed correctly. As a consequence investment projects are perceived
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to be riskier than they actually are, i.e., p¯1 ≤ p1 and p¯2 ≤ p2. Thus, according to the
banks’ risk perception, the investment project might not have a positive net present value
(i.e., p¯iRi < rd). This situation might also occur if the banks’ assessment of risk is correct
(p¯i = pi) but investment projects become more risky during the crisis (pi decreases). If the
investment project’s net present value is negative, the affected bank holds liquidity reserves
equal to 1 because storing liquidity at the central bank is more profitable than investing in
the risky project.
Proposition 2.2. If the banks’ investment projects satisfy
p¯iRi < rd , (2.8)





for i, j ∈ {1, 2} , i 6= j, this results in inefficient liquidity hoarding in case bank j receives a
negative liquidity shock.
Proof. This is a direct conclusion of Proposition 2.1.
The intuition behind the result is the following: Condition (2.8) says that bank i’s
investment project has a negative net present value from the banks’ point of view. Thus,
bank i will hold liquidity reserves equal to one. The remaining two conditions concern
bank j. Condition (2.9) tells that bank j’s investment project is perceived to have a positive
net present value, and condition (2.10) that bank j does not obtain an interbank loan.
Therefore, bank j’s investment project has a high return but is perceived to be very risky.
Bank j holds no liquidity according to Proposition 2.1 and has to regain liquidity in case of
a negative liquidity shock by borrowing from the central bank. If bank j needs liquidity,
bank i hoards liquidity and does not provide it since supplying liquidity at the interbank
market is expected to be less profitable than storing liquidity at the central bank.
Note that the conditions in Proposition 2.2 not necessarily hold for the actual probabilities
p1 and p2 if they hold for the risk perceptions p1 and p2. The expected probabilities of
success do not have to coincide with the true probabilities of success. Thus, it is possible
that liquidity hoarding is induced by a wrong risk perception. Furthermore, a similar result
can be obtained if banks’ risk perceptions on the same project differ.
69
2. Interbank Lending and Bank Liquidity Holding
2.7. Conclusion
In this chapter a model of the interbank market and central bank intervention is presented.
We have analyzed why banks hold liquidity, why banks participate in the interbank market,
and how the central bank can influence banks’ behavior.
In the following several policy implications are discussed. The central bank’s policy rates
determine the attractiveness of the standing facilities compared with the interbank market.
While a decrease in the deposit rate facilitates the liquidity transfer at the interbank market,
the effect of a change in the marginal lending rate is ambiguous. The different effects
should be taken into account when setting the policy rates. Implications are for example: A
wide corridor between the deposit rate and the marginal lending rate does not necessarily
improve the conditions for interbank lending compared with a narrow corridor. At the
same time, a decrease in the deposit rate can be more effective than shifting the policy rate
corridor downwards (i.e., both policy rates are changed but their distance is kept constant).
Furthermore, it has to be taken into account that the policy rates influence bank liquidity
holding. If the interbank market is expected to be less profitable than investing or using the
central bank’s standing facilities, liquidity is not held to supply it at the interbank market.
For example this is the case if the deposit rate is sufficiently small. Two situations may
occur. If investment projects are not too risky, banks hold no liquidity and invest in risky
projects. If, however, the risk of investing in risky projects is too high, banks may start too
hoard liquidity. A change of the central bank’s policy rates is not necessarily effective.
A venue for further research is the effectiveness of other policy instruments. For example,
the effectiveness of the liquidity coverage ratio in the Basel III regulations could be discussed.
The required liquidity reserve can be used when the bank is hit by a negative liquidity
shock. Thus, one would expect that the liquidity coverage ratio decreases the demand for
central bank liquidity. At the same time the volume of risky loans is reduced. This can
also be welfare reducing if the risky project has a positive net present value. It would be
interesting to see a model analyzing the effects for interbank lending and welfare. Peiris
& Vardoulakis (2013) show in a more general framework that reserve requirements can
also restore trade. Higher liquidity holdings due to the reserve requirements decrease the
possibility of a default on loan repayments and make it profitable to grant loans. Another
solution of this issue could be the acquisition of toxic assets by the central bank as discussed
by Tirole (2012).
The chapter also points to further topics for future research. First, in the model it was
assumed that depositors are paid out at a distant, unconsidered time in the future. While
this assumption was made to keep the analysis tractable, it becomes critical if there is
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no full but only partial deposit insurance. For example, deposits could be insured up to
100.000 EUR. Since the central bank and loans from the interbank market are repaid before
the depositors in the model, a partial deposit insurance may lead to a bank run. Hence, the
implications of several designs of the deposit insurance deserve further attention.23
Second, the model concentrates on two banks, i.e., the partner at the interbank market
is fixed. We do not model the search process at the interbank market but assume that the
bank already made the optimal choice. A model with a larger number of banks would be a
possible extension. In particular, as discussed in the first chapter, there are several studies
providing empirical evidence that interbank markets often have a network structure where
banks rely on their relationships and interbank rates are determined through bilateral
bargaining (Cocco et al. (2009); Craig & von Peter (2014); Zappa & Zagaglia (2012)). It
would be interesting to see how monetary policy influences the banks’ lending behavior at
the interbank market depending on the bank’s position in the network.
Third, we assumed that banks always have access to the central bank’s lending facility
without having to provide collateral. Considering collateral requirements for a loan from
the central bank introduces another instrument apart from policy rates. A tightening of
collateral requirements then decreases attractiveness of the lending facility and increases
the attractiveness of borrowing from the interbank market (see Hauck & Neyer (2014)).
As a related point, one could also examine the effect of standing facilities on secured
short-term interbank markets. The effects can be expected to be similar, however, instead of
counterparty risk defining features of interbank lending would then be accessibility, quality,
and cost of collateral.
Appendix
2.A. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2.1: Bank 1 is able to repay the repayment claim in case of a successful
investment if




(α1R1 − rl (−1+α1 −λ1))
23Several possibilities to prevent bank runs are discussed by Ennis & Keister (2016) or Martin (2006), among
others.
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Bank 1 accepts the loan contract if
E t=1Π1 ≥ T P1
⇐⇒ p1 (α1R1 − rIB L1 − rl (−1+α1 −λ1 − L1))+
≥ p1 (α1R1 − rl (−1+α1 −λ1))+




≤ rl , rl ≤ α1R1−1+α1−λ1 .
(2.12)
Bank 2 accepts the loan contract if
E t=1Π2 ≥ T P2
⇐⇒ rd (1−α2 −λ2 − L1) + p2α2R2 + p1rIB L1 ≥ rd (1−α2 +λ2) + p2α2R2
⇐⇒ rIB ≥ rdp1 . (2.13)
Interbank lending is not taking place if all three conditions (2.11), (2.12) and (2.13) cannot




(α1R1 − rl (−1+α1 −λ1 − L1)) and rl > α1R1−1+α1−λ1 , or
• rdp1 > rl and rl ≤ α1R1−1+α1−λ1 .
These conditions are equivalent to
rd
p1
> rl − 1L1 (rl (−1+α1 −λ1)−α1R1)
+
which proves the claim.
Proof of Corollary 2.1: Denote LHS = rdp1 and RHS = rl − 1L1 (rl (−1+α1 −λ1)−α1R1)+.
Note that LHS depends on rd but not on rl , and RHS depends on rl but not on rd . LHS
is increasing in in rd which proves (a). If rl ≤ α1R1−1+α1−λ1 , then RHS = rl is increasing in rl
proving (b1). If rl >
α1R1−1+α1−λ1 and L1 = 1− α2 + λ2, then RHS = rl − rl −1+α1−λ11−α2+λ2 + α1R1L1 is
decreasing in rl proving (b2). If rl >
α1R1−1+α1−λ1 and L1 = −1 + α1 − λ1, then RHS = α1R1L1
does not depend on rl proving (b3).
Proof of Lemma 2.2: The Lemma is proven by case distinction.
72
Appendix
• rl ≤ α1R1−1+α1−λ1 :





1 (rl − rIB) (p1rIB − rd)




(rd + p1rl) .
• rl >
α1R1−1+α1−λ1 :
According to (2.7) the interbank rate is the solution to
max
rIB









rd − 12L1 (rl (−1+α1 −λ1 − L1)−α1R1) .




(rd + p1rl)− 12L1 (rl (−1+α1 −λ1)−α1R1)
+ .
Proof of Proposition 2.1: The proof proceeds in the following way: First, banks’ expected
profits at t = 0 is derived. The second step is the calculation of the best response functions
and liquidity holding in equilibrium.








E t=1Πi (λ1,λ2) dλ1 dλ2.
Depending on the liquidity shocks, banks face a different expected profit. The different
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sections are illustrated in Figure 2.2. According to this case distinction we split the integral
E t=0Πi = E
t=0 (Πi ∧ I .) + E t=0 (Πi ∧ I I .) + E t=0 (Πi ∧ I I I .) + E t=0 (Πi ∧ IV.)
and derive each of the summands separately. Note that E t=0 (Πi ∧ I I .) and E t=0 (Πi ∧ I I I .)
can again be split into several summands. For reasons of symmetry it is sufficient to consider
bank 1, only.
I. 1−αi +λi ≥ 0:





rd (1−α1 +λ1) + p1α1R1

















IV. 1−αi +λi < 0:





p1 (α1R1 − rl (−1+α1 −λ1))





















p1 (α1R1 − rl (−1+α1 −λ1))
− (1−λ1) dλ2 dλ1












b. rl ≥ rdp1 :
II.1. 1−α2 +λ2 ≥ −1+α1 −λ1:





− (1−λ1) + p1 (α1R1
− 1
2p1































II.2. 1−α2 +λ2 < −1+α1 −λ1:






p1 (α1R1 − rl (−2+α1 +α2 −λ1 −λ2)
− 1
2p1
(rd + p1rl) (1−α2 +λ2)






























rd (1−α1 +λ1) + p1α1R1

















b. rl ≥ rdp2 :
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III.1. 1−α1 +λ1 ≥ −1+α2 −λ2:










(rd + p2rl) (−1+α2 −λ2)































III.2. 1−α1 +λ1 < −1+α2 −λ2:








(rd + p2rl) (1−α1 +λ1)

















When adding up, four situations need to be distinguished:
• p1rl , p2rl < rd :
E t=0Π1 = E
t=0 (Πi ∧ I .) + E t=0 (Πi ∧ I I .∧ a)
+E t=0 (Πi ∧ I I I .∧ a) + E t=0 (Πi ∧ IV.)
76
Appendix
• p1rl < rd ≤ p2rl:
E t=0Π1 = E
t=0 (Πi ∧ I .) + E t=0 (Πi ∧ I I .∧ a)
+E t=0 (Πi ∧ I I I .∧ b ∧ I I I .1.) + E t=0 (Πi ∧ I I I .∧ b ∧ I I I .2.)
+E t=0 (Πi ∧ IV.)
• p2rl < rd ≤ p1rl:
E t=0Π1 = E
t=0 (Πi ∧ I .) + E t=0 (Πi ∧ I I .∧ b ∧ I I .1.)
+E t=0 (Πi ∧ I I .∧ b ∧ I I .2.) + E t=0 (Πi ∧ I I I .∧ a)
+E t=0 (Πi ∧ IV.)
• rd ≤ p1rl , p2rl:
E t=0Π1 = E
t=0 (Πi ∧ I .) + E t=0 (Πi ∧ I I .∧ b ∧ I I .1.)
+E t=0 (Πi ∧ I I .∧ b ∧ I I .2.) + E t=0 (Πi ∧ I I I .∧ b ∧ I I I .1.)
+E t=0 (Πi ∧ I I I .∧ b ∧ I I I .2.) + E t=0 (Πi ∧ IV.)
We obtain expected profit at time t = 0:
• If p1rl < rd , p2rl < rd ,
E t=0Π1 = p1α1R1 +
1
4
rd (2−α1)2 − 14 p1rlα
2
1 − 1.
• If p1rl ≥ rd > p2rl ,
E t=0Π1 = −1+ p1α1R1 + rd (1−α1)












• If p2rl ≥ rd > p1rl ,
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• If p1rl ≥ rd , p2rl ≥ rd ,
E t=0Π1 = −1+ p1α1R1 + rd (1−α1)




















A symmetric result holds for bank 2. Now, the best-response functions and liquidity holding
in equilibrium is derived:
• First, consider rd > p1rl , p2rl , i.e., there is no interbank lending at t = 1. Expected
profit at t = 0 of bank 1 is given by
E t=0Π1 = p1α1R1 +
1
4
rd (2−α1)2 − 14 p1rlα
2
1 − 1.
To derive the best-response function, we form the derivative with respect to α1
∂ E t=0Π1
∂ α1




= p1R1 − rd + 12α1 (rd − p1rl)> 0
which yields
α∗1 = 1.
For reasons of symmetry we also get
α∗2 = 1.
• Second, consider p1rl ≥ rd > p2rl . Expected profit at t = 0 of bank 1 is given by
E t=0Π1 = −1+ p1α1R1 + rd (1−α1)


































+(p1R1 − rd) .
If p1rl = rd , the derivative equals p1R1 − rd > 0, so α∗1 = 1 holds. Otherwise,
the derivative describes a quadratic function with two zeros αmin1 and α
max
1 . Since










p1rl − rd < 0,





p1rl − rd .
Since R1 > rl , we have




> − (2+α2) +
q
(2+α2)
2 + 5+ 2α2




From the now obtained inequalities αmin1 < 0< 1< α
max
1 we know that the expected
profit of bank 1 at t = 0, E t=0Π1, must be increasing with respect to α1. Thus,
α∗1 = 1
holds. For reasons of symmetry we can derive α∗2 from the case p2rl ≥ rd > p1rl
which is considered next.
• Consider p2rl ≥ rd > p1rl . Expected profit of bank 1 at t = 0 is given by














which is a quadratic function in α1. Since rd > p1rl , the expected profit is convex
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in α1 which yields that the share of the funds invested by bank 1 is equal to zero or
equal to one. Moreover, for reasons of symmetry we know from the above case that
α∗2 = 1. Comparing expected profit at α1 = 0 and α1 = 1 yields:
E t=0Π1 (0, 1) = −1+ rd + (p2rl − rd) 548
E t=0Π1 (1,1) = −1+ p1R1 + 14 (rd − p1rl) +
1
24




0, 16p1R1 − 11rd − 4p1rl − p2rl < 0
{0,1} , 16p1R1 − 11rd − 4p1rl − p2rl = 0
1, 16p1R1 − 11rd − 4p1rl − p2rl > 0
and
α∗2 = 1.
• Last, we have to consider the case p1rl , p2rl ≥ rd . Bank 1 expects the profit
E t=0Π1 = −1+ p1α1R1 + rd (1−α1)




















Differentiating with respect to α1 yields
∂ E t=0Π1
∂ α1
= p1R1 − rd − (p2rl − rd) 116α
2
2










Assume without loss of generality p1 ≥ p2. Then:
∂ E t=0Π1
∂ α1




















= p2R2 − rd − (p1rl − rd) 116α
2
1










If p2rl = rd ,
∂ E t=0Π2
∂ α2
= p2R2 − rd − (p1rl − rd) 116α
2
1
and together with α∗1 = 1
α∗2 =

0, 16p2R2 − 15rd − p1rl < 0
[0, 1] , 16p2R2 − 15rd − p1rl = 0
1, 16p2R2 − 15rd − p1rl > 0.
Now, consider p2rl > rd . The expected profit of bank 2 at t = 0 is a cubical function
in α2. We use α
∗
1 = 1. The first order condition is equivalent to





Any solution of the first-order condition is a maximum because
∂ 2E t=0Π2
∂ α22









The profit function has no maximum in (0, 1) if
9+
1
p2rl − rd (16p2R2 − 15rd − p1rl)≤ 0.
In this case the profit function is monotonically decreasing and thus
α∗2 = 0.
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p2rl − rd (16p2R2 − 15rd − p1rl).




0, 16p2R2 − 15rd − p1rl < 0
1, 16p2R2 − 7p2rl − 8rd − p1rl > 0
αmax2 , otherwise
which proofs the claim.
Proof of Corollary 2.2: Since α∗2 = 1 if rd > p1rl , (ii) is clear. Therefore, now concentrate
on rd ≤ p1rl . Note that liquidity holding in equilibrium 1−α∗2 is increasing and convex in
rl if α
∗
2 is decreasing and concave in rl .
First, consider the case that liquidity holding of bank 2 in equilibrium is constantly equal
to zero if rd < p2rl , i.e.,
1
8
(16p2R2 − 7p2rl − p1rl)≥ p2rl .
A short calculation shows that this condition is equivalent to
p2rl ≤ 115 (16p2R2 − p1rl) and to
p2rl ≤ 111 (16p2R2 − p1rl − 4p2rl) .
Thus, in case equality holds in the above conditions we get
α∗2 =

1 p2rl > rd
[0, 1] , p2rl = rd
0, p2rl < rd ,




(16p2R2 − 7p2rl − p1rl)< p2rl ,
meaning that liquidity holding is not constantly equal to zero if rd < p2rl . Again the
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(16p2R2 − p1rl − 4p2rl) .
This immediately yieldsα∗2 = 0 in case rd ≥ p2rl . It remains to be shown thatα∗2 is decreasing






p2rl − rd (16p2R2 − 15rd − p1rl) =: −3+
p
x .




16p2R2 − p1rl − 15p2rl
2
p
x (p2rl − rd)2 .
The conditions 16p2R2−8rd − p1rl −7p2rl ≤ 0 and p2rl > rd imply that the numerator and
thus the whole derivative is negative. The share of the funds that is invested in equilibrium




− (16p2R2 − p1rl − 15p2rl)





(p2rl − rd)2 − 2px (p2rl − rd)

< 0
and obtain that α∗2 is concave with respect to rd .
Proof of Corollary 2.3: If rl is small (p1rl < rd), then α
∗
2 = 1 and thus liquidity holding is
equal to zero. It is therefore sufficient to concentrate on the section p1rl ≥ rd .
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Thus, in case equality holds in the above conditions we get
α∗2 =
¨
[0,1] , p2rl = rd
1, p2rl < rd ,








meaning that liquidity holding is not constantly equal to zero if rd < p2rl . Again the







This immediately yields α∗2 = 1 in case rd ≥ p2rl . It remains to be shown that α∗2 is
decreasing if p2rl > rd , 16p2R2 − 15rd − p1rl ≥ 0 and 16p2R2 − 8rd − p1rl − 7p2rl ≤ 0. In





p2rl − rd (16p2R2 − 15rd − p1rl) =: −3+
p
x .




−p1 (p2rl − rd)− (16p2R2 − 15rd − p1rl) p2
2
p
x (p2rl − rd)2 .
The conditions 16p2R2 − 15rd − p1rl ≥ 0 and p2rl > rd imply that the numerator and thus
the whole derivative is negative.
Proof of Corollary 2.4: First, consider changes in rd . If liquidity holding of bank 2 in
equilibrium is equal to zero for all rd satisfying p2rl < rd ≤ p1rl , liquidity holding is
constantly equal to zero for all rd according to Corollary 2.2. Therefore, it is sufficient to
concentrate on the case p2rl < rd ≤ p1rl . A necessary and sufficient condition for liquidity
holding being constantly equal to zero for all p2rl < rd ≤ p1rl is given by
16p2R2 − 12p1rl − 4p2rl > 0
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which is equivalent to
16p2(R2 − rl)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+ 12rl(p2 − p1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
> 0.
Therefore, liquidity holding is constantly equal to zero if p1 and p2 are sufficiently close,
meaning that the second summand is not too small.
Second, consider changes in rl . If liquidity holding of bank 2 in equilibrium is equal
to zero for all rl satisfying rd < p2rl ≤ p1rl , liquidity holding is constantly equal to zero
for all rl according to Corollary 2.3. Therefore, it is sufficient to concentrate on the case
rd < p2rl ≤ p1rl . A necessary and sufficient condition for liquidity holding being constantly
equal to zero is given by
16p2R2 − 8rd − 7p2rl − p1rl > 0 for all rd<p2rl .
We use rl < R2 and get the condition
8 (p2R2 − rd)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+R2 (p2 − p1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
> 0.
Therefore, liquidity holding is constantly equal to zero if p1 and p2 are sufficiently close,
meaning that the second summand is not too small.
2.B. Robustness check: interbank rate and ex-ante contracting
In our model the interbank rate is determined by bilateral bargaining at t = 1. More
precisely, rIB is determined by the Nash bargaining solution. While it is consistent with
empirical evidence that the interbank rate is determined bilaterally, one may question
the use of the Nash bargaining solution. In particular, it is also plausible that the lender
makes a “take it or leave it” offer. This yields an interbank rate that maximizes the lender’s
expected profit. More generally, the banks’ bargaining power must not necessarily be equal
as previously assumed.
Note that Lemma 2.1 holds also if the Nash bargaining solution is not used. Assume
again without loss of generality that bank 1 needs liquidity, 1−α1 +λ1 < 0, while bank 2
does not, 1−α2 +λ2 ≥ 0. Any bilateral process that results in an agreement to engage in
interbank lending yields an interbank rate satisfying
rd
p1
≤ rIB ≤ rl − 1L1 (rl (−1+α1 −λ1)−α1R1)
+
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If rdp1 > rIB holds, bank 2’s expected return from supplying liquidity at the interbank market,
p1rIB, is smaller than bank 2’s expected return from depositing liquidity at the central
bank, rd . Hence, bank 2 does not supply liquidity at the interbank market. If rIB > rl
holds, bank 1’s repayment rate for borrowing from the interbank market, rIB, is larger
than the repayment rate for borrowing from the central bank, rl , and bank 1 does not
demand liquidity from the interbank market. If rIB > rl− 1L1 (rl (−1+α1 −λ1)−α1R1) with
rl (−1+α1 −λ1)> α1R1 the de-facto interbank rate is still rl− 1L1 (rl (−1+α1 −λ1)−α1R1)
because bank 1 is not able to repay a higher amount. Therefore, lending volume on the
interbank market between bank 1 and 2 is given bymin {−1+α1 −λ1, 1−α2 +λ2} ,
rd
p1
≤ rIB ≤ rl − 1L1 (rl (−1+α1 −λ1)−α1R1)+
0, otherwise.
Assuming that the two banks interact at the interbank market, expected profits are given
by (2.4) and (2.5), respectively. Hence, the lender’s profit is maximized by the highest
possible interbank rate that does not prevent interaction, i.e.,
rIB = rl − 1L1 (rl (−1+α1 −λ1)−α1R1)
+ .
The borrower’s profit is maximized by the lowest possible interbank rate that does not
prevent interaction, rIB =
rd
p1
. More generally, any interbank rate that does not prevent






rl − 1L1 (rl (−1+α1 −λ1)−α1R1)
+

for some γ ∈ [0, 1]. We show that Proposition 2.1 and Corollaries 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 can be
transferred to this more general case. The proofs proceed exactly analogous. As before, we
assume rl < Ri, i ∈ {1,2} which guarantees that bank i’s project can be financed completely
through the central bank. Let us start with Proposition 2.1. If the interbank rate is given by
r˜IB, the equivalent of Proposition 2.1 is as follows:
Assume p1 ≥ p2 holds. The bank with the less risky investment holds no liquidity, i.e., α∗1 = 1.
The liquidity holding if the bank with the riskier project can be described in the following way:




(b) If p1rl ≥ rd > p2rl ,
α∗2 =

0, 8p2R2 − (5+ γ) rd − 2p2rl − (1− γ) p1rl < 0
{0, 1} , 8p2R2 − (5+ γ) rd − 2p2rl − (1− γ) p1rl = 0
1, 8p2R2 − (5+ γ) rd − 2p2rl − (1− γ) p1rl > 0
(c) If p1rl ≥ p2rl = rd ,
α∗2 =

0, 8p2R2 − (7+ γ) rd − (1− γ) p1rl < 0,
[0,1] , 8p2R2 − (7+ γ) rd − (1− γ) p1rl = 0,
1, 8p2R2 − (7+ γ) rd − (1− γ) p1rl > 0.
(d) If p1rl ≥ p2rl > rd ,
α∗2 =

0, 8p2R2 − 7rd − p1rl < 0,
1, 8p2R2 − 3rd − p1rl − 4p2rl > 0,
8p2R2−7rd−p1rl
4(p2rl−rd ) , otherwise
for γ= 0 and
α∗2 =

0, 8p2R2 − (7+ γ) rd − (1− γ) p1rl < 0








p2rl−rd − 1−γγ p1rl−rdp2rl−rd , otherwise
for γ 6= 0.
Proof. We distinguish four different situations
1. p1rl , p2rl < rd : Expected profit of bank 1 is given by












= p1R1 − rd + 12α1 (rd − p1rl)> 0
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2. p1rl ≥ rd > p2rl: Expected profit of bank 1 is given by





























> p1R1 − p1rl > 0
which yields α∗1 = 1. For reasons of symmetry we can derive α
∗
2 from the case
p2rl ≥ rd > p1rl which is considered next.
3. p2rl ≥ rd > p1rl: Expected profit of bank 1 is given by




















= p1R1 − rd2 (2−α1) +
1− γ
8







(rd − p1rl)> 0.
The maximum α∗1 is either 0 or 1. Using α
∗
2 = 1 (obtained from the previous case),
we get
E t=0Π1 (0,1) = −1+ rd + 524 (1− γ) (p2rl − rd) ,
E t=0Π1 (1,1) = −1+ p1R1 + 14 (rd − p1rl) +
1
12




0, 8p1R1 − (5+ γ) rd − 2p1rl − (1− γ) p2rl < 0,
{0,1} , 8p1R1 − (5+ γ) rd − 2p1rl − (1− γ) p2rl = 0,
1, 8p1R1 − (5+ γ) rd − 2p1rl − (1− γ) p2rl > 0.
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4. p1rl , p2rl ≥ rd: Without loss of generality assume p1 ≥ p2. Expected profit of bank 1
is given by










































> (p1R1 − rd)− (p1rl − rd)> 0
which yields α∗1 = 1. Using α
∗
1 = 1, we obtain for bank 2
∂ E t=0Π2
∂ α2















(1+α2) (p2rl − rd)− 1− γ2 (p2rl − rd)< 0.
If p2rl = rd , we have
∂ E t=0Π2
∂ α2




0, 8p2R2 − (7+ γ) rd − (1− γ) p1rl < 0,
[0,1] , 8p2R2 − (7+ γ) rd − (1− γ) p1rl = 0,
1, 8p2R2 − (7+ γ) rd − (1− γ) p1rl > 0.
If p2rl > rd and γ= 0, we have
∂ E t=0Π2
∂ α2








0, 8p2R2 − 7rd − p1rl < 0,
1, 8p2R2 − 3rd − p1rl − 4p2rl > 0,
8p2R2−7rd−p1rl
4(p2rl−rd ) , otherwise.











p2rl − rd = 0
This equation has no solution if
(2− γ)2 (p2rl − rd) + γ [8p2R2 − (7+ γ) rd − (1− γ) p1rl]< 0,
in this case expected profit is decreasing in α2 and α
∗
2 = 0. Otherwise, solutions to
the first-order condition are given by αmin2 < α
max
2 :











p2rl − rd < 0
















0, 8p2R2 − (7+ γ) rd − (1− γ) p1rl < 0








p2rl−rd − 1−γγ p1rl−rdp2rl−rd , otherwise
which proves the claim.
We proceed with proving Corollaries 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 that can be transferred one to one.
Proof of Corollary 2.2: Since α∗2 = 1 if rd > p1rl , (ii) is clear. Therefore, concentrate on
rd ≤ p1rl .
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First case: α∗2 = 1 for all rd < p2rl , i.e.,
1
3+ 2γ
(8p2R2 − (4− γ) p2rl − (1− γ) p1rl)≥ p2rl .
A short calculation shows that this condition is equivalent to
p2rl ≤ 17+ γ (8p2R2 − (1− γ) p1rl) and to
p2rl ≤ 15+ γ (8p2R2 − (1− γ) p1rl − 2p2rl) .
Thus, in case equality holds in the above conditions, we get
α∗2 =

1 if p2rl > rd
[0, 1] , if p2rl = rd
0, if p2rl < rd ,




(8p2R2 − (4− γ) p2rl − (1− γ) p1rl)< p2rl ,








(8p2R2 − (1− γ) p1rl − 2p2rl) .
This immediately yields α∗2 = 0 in case rd ≥ p2rl . It remains to be shown that α∗2 is
decreasing and concave if p2rl > rd , 8p2R2 − (7+ γ) rd − (1− γ) p1rl ≥ 0 and 8p2R2 −
(3+ 2γ) rd − (1− γ) p1rl − (4− γ) p2rl ≤ 0. This is easily verified for γ = 0 as well as for
γ > 0 by considering the first and the second derivative of α∗2 with respect to rd .
Proof of Corollary 2.3: If rl is small (p1rl < rd), then α
∗
2 = 1 and thus liquidity holding is
equal to zero. Thus, concentrate on p1rl ≥ rd .
First case: α∗2 = 0 for all p2rl > rd , i.e.
8p2R2 − (7+ γ) rd
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This condition is equivalent to
8p2R2 − (5+ γ) rd




Thus, in case equality holds in the above conditions, we get
α∗2 =
¨
[0,1] , if p2rl = rd
1, if p2rl < rd ,
and, in case the equality does not hold, we have α∗2 = 0 if p2rl = rd which proves the claim.
Second case:
8p2R2 − (7+ γ) rd




Again the inequality is equivalent to
8p2R2 − (5+ γ) rd




This immediately yields α∗2 = 1 in case rd ≥ p2rl . It remains to be shown that α∗2 is
decreasing if p2rl > rd , 8p2R2 − (7+ γ) rd − (1− γ) p1rl ≥ 0 and 8p2R2 − (3+ 2γ) rd −
(1− γ) p1rl − (4− γ) p2rl ≤ 0. This is easily verified for γ = 0 as well as for γ > 0 by
considering the first and the second derivative of α∗2 with respect to rl .
Proof of Corollary 2.4: First, consider changes in rd . If liquidity holding in equilibrium of
bank 2 is equal to zero for all rd satisfying p2rl < rd ≤ p1rl , liquidity holding is constantly
equal to zero for all rd according to Corollary 2.2. Therefore, it is sufficient to concentrate
on the case p2rl < rd ≤ p1rl . A necessary and sufficient condition for liquidity holding
being constantly equal to zero for all p2rl < rd ≤ p1rl is given by
8p2R2 − 6p1rl − 2p2rl > 0
which is equivalent to
8p2(R2 − rl)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+ 6rl (p2 − p1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
> 0.
Therefore, liquidity holding is constantly equal to zero if p1 and p2 are sufficiently close,
meaning that the second summand is not too small.
Second, consider changes in rl . If liquidity holding in equilibrium of bank 2 is equal
to zero for all rl satisfying rd < p2rl ≤ p1rl , liquidity holding is constantly equal to zero
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for all rl according to Corollary 2.3. Therefore, it is sufficient to concentrate on the case
rd < p2rl ≤ p1rl . A necessary and sufficient condition for liquidity holding being constantly
equal to zero is given by
8p2R2 − (3+ 2γ) rd − (4− γ) p2rl − (1− γ) p1rl > 0 for all rd<p2rl .
We use rl < R2 and get the condition
(3+ 2γ) (p2R2 − rd)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+(1− γ)R2 (p2 − p1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
> 0.
Therefore, liquidity holding is constantly equal to zero if p1 and p2 are sufficiently close,
meaning that the second summand is not too small.
Another possibility of extending the model is allowing for ex-ante contracts. The idea
is that banks agree on an interbank rate at t = 0, i.e., before liquidity shocks realize. At
t = 1 banks decide on interbank lending volumes based on the interbank rate that was
fixed at t = 0. Note that also ex-ante, i.e., at t = 0, banks do not agree on an interbank
rate larger than rl or smaller than
rd
pi
, i ∈ {1,2} , because otherwise using the central bank’s
lending or deposit facility is more beneficial than using the interbank market.24 Since
lending volumes are unknown at t = 0, banks may ex-ante agree on an interbank rate that
ex-post, i.e., at t = 1, is larger than rl − 1Li (rl (−1+αi −λi)−αiRi)+ where i denotes the
bank that ex-post is in need of liquidity and j the bank that ex-post has excess liquidity. In
this case the lender anticipates that the borrower is not able to repay the full interbank
rate and decides on interbank lending at t = 1 based on the truncated interbank rate
rl − 1Li (rl (−1+αi −λi)−αiRi)+ instead of the interbank rate fixed at t = 0. Hence, any






rl − 1L1 (rl (−1+α1 −λ1)−α1R1)
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
for some γ ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, introducing ex-ante contracts does not change our results.
A potential difference between ex-ante and ex-post interbank contracts is not whether
interbank lending takes place or not but the actual value of the interbank rate. For example
it could be the case that banks ex-ante agree on a lower interbank rate than the interbank
rate resulting from ex-post bargaining. In this case, the lender is worse off due to the
ex-ante agreement.




The Regulation of Multinational Banks
Regulators have several instruments to enhance financial stability and to ensure the safety
and soundness of the banking system. A first instrument that is used in most countries
around the world is a deposit insurance (Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 2005). A deposit insurance
protects depositors against losses and can thereby prevent bank runs and the social cost
involved.
Second, regulators can set up several requirements that restrict bank behavior, such as
deposit interest rate ceilings, restriction with respect to the banks portfolio or balance sheet
(including reserve requirements and capital requirements), and restrictions concerning
entry, branching, network, and merger (Freixas & Rochet 2008).
A third element of banking regulation is monitoring and supervision. A regulator is
allowed to conduct inspections and set up requirements for disclosure of a bank’s finances.
In this way the regulator can examine and assess the risks and the soundness of the bank
as well as the compliance with regulatory requirements (European Central Bank 2014).
Finally, regulation includes resolution policies that handle banks in distress that are
approaching or reaching insolvency. Goodhart & Schoenmaker (1993) distinguish between
four kinds of resolution policies that have been applied in the 1980s and the early 1990s:
a rescue package in the form of emergency aid or capital injection, a takeover by other
banks (“purchase and assumption”), the creation of a special regime administered by the
government or the deposit insurance, and liquidation of the bank. The procedures are
described more detailed in Bovenzi & Muldoon (1990).
Internationally active banks constitute a special challenge for national regulators. Activity
in foreign countries is reflected in banks’ balance sheets. On the asset side, banks hold
foreign assets, such as loans to foreign entities or holdings of foreign bonds, in addition to
domestic assets. On the liability side, banks raise external funding. This includes foreign
deposits or the sale of bonds to investors in foreign countries. International bank activity
constitutes a special challenge for regulation because banks are generally supervised by
national regulators. Therefore, banks can escape tight regulation by strategically allocating
their activity to different countries (Karolyi & Taboada 2015).25
Multinational banks are a special form of internationally active banks. They establish
25There are several other disadvantages and of course advantages of international bank activity that are not
directly related to regulation. For an overview see Allen et al. (2011), Claessens & van Horen (2013).
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a presence abroad by opening a branch or a subsidiary. Multinational banks worldwide
gained in importance in the last years. Between 1995 and 2009 the average share of foreign
banks in local banking systems increased from 20 to 34 percent with the fastest expansion
of foreign banks in Eastern Europe and Central Asia (Claessens & van Horen 2013). In
particular, the transformation of banking systems in Central and Eastern Europe has been
remarkable: from state-owned mono-bank systems to foreign-bank dominated systems
within ten years (Allen et al. 2011).
The 2007/2008 financial crisis demonstrated the lack of an appropriate regulatory
framework for multinational banks. National regulators did not coordinate well when
they had to resolve failing multinational banks. The lack of coordination and resulting
inefficient resolution can be attributed to conflicts of interests between national regulators
(Allen et al. 2011). Prominent examples are the resolution of Fortis, Dexia, and Kaupthing
(for a detailed discussion see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2010).
The Belgian/Dutch bank Fortis was considered systemically relevant in Belgium, Luxem-
bourg, and the Netherlands. When Fortis lost access to the overnight interbank market in
September 2008, it became clear that a resolution was necessary. Fortis was resolved along
national lines. Despite ongoing information sharing, the Belgian and the Dutch regulator
assessed the situation differently and took different measures. The Dutch government
purchased the Dutch parts of Fortis. In contrast, the majority of the Belgian parts was sold
to BNP Paribas. However, the sale was suspended by shareholders and continued only after
the renegotiation of terms. This shows the lack of effective special measures that allow for
quick action in urgent situations.
Dexia is the result of a merger of a Belgian and a French bank and has a significant
presence in Luxembourg. Despite being supervised by regulators in three countries, the bank
still needed a recapitalization of more than EUR 6 billion. However, Belgium, France, and
Luxembourg agreed to share the burden and also established a joint guarantee mechanism.
The Icelandic Bank Kaupthing had branches and subsidiaries in more than 13 jurisdictions.
After the failure of other Icelandic banks Kaupthing suffered a loss in depositor confidence
which resulted in massive withdrawals for various branches and subsidiaries. National
supervisors in host countries took control of several branches and subsidiaries and organized
a resolution. The failure of Kaupthing showed that the bank had become “too big” for
Icelandic authorities to provide effective supervision and resolution.
After the crisis emphasized the importance of multinational banks for financial stability,
researchers and policy makers began to discuss the design of an appropriate regulatory
framework (Allen et al. 2011, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2010). In the euro
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area these considerations lead to the construction of a European Banking Union (EBU).
For a detailed description of the elements and functioning of the banking union the reader
is referred to European Central Bank (2017). The banking union aims at ensuring that
common regulatory rules are applied consistently across banking sectors in all participating
countries. Regulatory rules are written down in a single rulebook. The two main pillars are
the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM).
The purpose of the SSM is to ensure consistent supervision. In cooperation with national
central banks, the European Central Bank monitors banks and assesses their soundness and
compliance with regulatory rules. The SRM provides a framework for the orderly resolution
of failing banks. Together both pillars aim at ensuring financial stability. The third pillar of
EBU, that is not yet in place, is a common deposit insurance scheme. Such a scheme will be
effective from 2024. EBU participation is mandatory for all euro area countries. Countries
that are part of the European Union but not of the euro area may join on an opt-in basis.
The following two chapters are concerned with the welfare effects of multinational bank
activity and the resulting implications for regulation. Chapter 3 asks for the incentives
of a national regulator to join a banking union and to transfer regulatory powers to the
supranational level. The focus is on bank supervision and bank resolution. A national
regulator ignores possible gains or losses which accrue to other jurisdictions if banks are
internationally active. A supranational regulator takes these regulatory external effects into
account. While supranational regulation improves total welfare, this is not necessarily the
case for welfare in single countries. By analyzing size and determinants of spillover effects
we show how these effects constrain a country’s willingness to participate in a banking
union. The results may explain why some Member States of the European Union currently
hesitate to join the European Banking Union.
While chapter 3 abstracts from bank behavior, this assumption is relaxed in chapter 4.
More precisely, the size of external effects inter alia depends on the choice of multinational
banks’ representative form and not only on regulation. A multinational bank’s represen-
tative form can be either a branch representation or a subsidiary representation, i.e., a
multinational bank can go abroad by opening a branch or subsidiary in the foreign country.
The model presented in chapter 4 offers a starting point to study the interdependence
between banks’ choice of their representative form and regulation. Multinational banks
decide between the branch and the subsidiary representation depending on the strictness of
regulation. Therefore, regulators can provide incentives for banks to choose representative
forms in the the regulator’s interest by adapting the strictness of regulation. This strategic
choice of the strictness of regulation implies a “race to the top” in regulatory standards.
97
Monitoring levels set by national regulators are larger than efficient monitoring levels.
Additionally, a banking-union scenario is considered where national regulators are in charge
of information collection but a central regulator decides on regulation. Monitoring by
national regulators decreases if a central regulator is introduced. However, total welfare
can still be increased by a further decrease in monitoring levels.
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3. National versus Supranational Bank Regulation:
Gains and Losses of Joining a Banking Union
3.1. Introduction
Misalignment between banking structures and bank regulation causes coordination failures
between national regulators which may result in suboptimal regulatory decisions. A major
reason are regulatory externalities because national regulators do not take into account the
possible spillovers of their own regulatory actions on foreign financial markets. In conse-
quence, internationally active banks justify the transfer of national powers of supervision
to a supranational regulator.
The European Banking Union (EBU) is a recent example for such a transfer of regulatory
powers. Membership in EBU is mandatory for all Member States of the euro area, but
Member States of the European Union outside the euro area have the right to join on an
“opt-in” basis and to establish “close cooperation” with the European Central Bank (ECB).
In this case at least the three largest domestic banks will be subject to micro-prudential
supervision by the ECB. The ECB in turn also influences macro-prudential standards and
has a large responsibility in the resolution of systemically important banks within EBU.
The United Kingdom has already declared that it will definitively not participate. Sweden
is currently considering membership. Denmark and probably Bulgaria and Romania will
join EBU. The remaining four Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, the Czech
Republic, Croatia, Hungary, and Poland, currently take a “wait and see” position and will
decide only later whether to establish close cooperation or not.
While reservations against opting-in to EBU partly reflect legal constraints which prevent
opt-in countries to be on equal footing with euro area countries, we consider a further
reason why single countries may hesitate to join EBU. Our starting point is the fact that a
banking union takes a holistic view, i.e., it focuses on the soundness of a banking group
as a whole and pays less attention to particular subsidiaries of multinational banks. Such
a perspective is harmless as long as cross-country differences between national banking
systems are small and different units of multinational banks are distributed equally among
member states. This, however, is not the case within the European Union where subsidiaries
of multinational banks dominate banking sectors in most CEE countries (see Figure 3.1)
and parent banks are mainly located within the current EBU member states.
The model presented in this chapter focuses on this aspect and tries to understand how
the structures of the domestic and foreign banking sectors influence the incentives for
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Source: ECB consolidated banking Data
Figure 3.1: Share of domestic and foreign credit institutions
a national regulator to transfer regulatory powers to a supranational level. The focus is
on bank supervision and bank resolution. Multinational banks do business in their home
country through a parent bank and in the foreign country through a subsidiary. The parent
bank and the subsidiary both raise deposits locally and invest funds into a local risky project.
Deposits are fully insured by national deposit insured schemes. We model three major
characteristics of multinational banks. First, a subsidiary‘s profits are partly transferred
to the parent bank. Second, a subsidiary is liable for the parent bank’s losses, i.e., if the
parent bank is insolvent, not only a part but all of the subsidiary’s profit is transferred to
the parent bank. There is no profit transfer in the opposite direction from the parent bank
to the subsidiary and the parent bank is not liable for the subsidiary’s losses. Third, failure
of the parent bank affects financial stability in the foreign country but again not vice versa.
Note that the first two points both refer to a profit transfer from the subsidiary to the parent
bank. In contrast, parent bank failure may harm financial stability in the foreign country
also for other reasons, e.g., a loss in the subsidiary’s reputation.
Two regulatory regimes are compared, national regulation and supranational regulation.
A regulator chooses his monitoring effort, learns the riskiness of a bank’s assets and decides
whether or not to resolve the bank. Under national regulation the parent bank and the
subsidiary are supervised by the national regulator in the country in which they are active.
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3.2. Related literature and contribution
This implies that a multinational bank that consists of a parent bank and a subsidiary is
supervised by two different national regulators. Under supranational regulation, there is
only one regulator who supervises all parent banks and subsidiaries.
In our model, national and supranational regulation differ because there are regulatory
externalities which are internalized by the supranational regulator but not by national
regulators. There are two reasons for regulatory externalities. (i) A share (or all) of the
subsidiary’s profit contributes positively to the welfare in the home country where the
parent bank is located. The remaining profit share and the subsidiary’s losses contribute to
welfare in the foreign country in which the subsidiary is active. Consequently, the national
regulator responsible for the subsidiary ignores the profit share that is transferred to the
parent bank. In contrast, the supranational regulator accounts for expected payments
in both countries. (ii) If the parent bank fails, financial stability in the foreign country
where the subsidiary is active is endangered. In contrast to the supranational regulator, the
national regulator supervising the parent bank ignores this spillover to the foreign country.
In consequence of the regulatory externalities, the supranational regulator is less strict
with intervention in subsidiaries and more strict with intervention in parent banks than a
national regulator. Likewise, the supranational regulator chooses less monitoring effort
in countries hosting many subsidiaries but prefers more monitoring in countries where
many parent banks are located. Therefore, a country’s decision to join the banking union
is determined by the number or size of parent banks and subsidiaries. In particular, in
countries whose banking sectors are dominated by subsidiaries, the incentive to join the
banking union decreases in the number of subsidiaries and increases in the number of
parent banks.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section related literature and
the chapter’s contribution is discussed. Section 3.3 provides the model setup. Section 3.4
analyzes the choice between national and supranational regulation. Section 3.5 applies the
model to EBU. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2. Related literature and contribution
The chapter is related to previous studies which also discuss the relationship between
multinational banking and supervisory coordination (for a survey see Beck (2016)). A first
strand of the literature discusses the welfare effects of national regulations if banks are
internationally active and offer cross-border financial services through branches. Acharya
(2003) and Dell’Ariccia & Marquez (2006) show that competition among regulators may
lead to a “race to the bottom” if national regulators choose their banking policies non-
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cooperatively. A supranational regulator who has to set uniform standards makes all
participating countries better off if national banking sectors are not too heterogeneous. In
this chapter, we argue that supranational regulation is welfare-improving for all jurisdictions
in total. Our main contribution, however, is to show that this is not necessarily the case for
each single country and that participation in a banking union may thus not be incentive
compatible from an individual country‘s perspective.
In this respect, this chapter is closely connected to Beck & Wagner (2016) who also
analyze situations where agreeing to supranational supervision may be inferior from a
national point of view. They consider a multinational bank which directly invests parts
of its funds into foreign risky assets. Bank failure causes external stability costs which
may differ across countries. Regulators may resolve a bank after the bank‘s probability
of success becomes publicly known. Since the regulator’s resolution decision is based on
average external costs, a country with small external costs refuses to agree to supranational
supervision if the banks’ foreign exposure is low. Superiority of supranational supervision
also depends on the size of the banks.
Here, we also consider a regulator who may resolve an ailing multinational bank and,
additionally, model the regulators’ monitoring decision. We explicitly consider the payments
which have to be made by a foreign subsidiary of a domestic parent bank. Since the
subsidiary is liable for a parent bank’s losses we derive endogenous stability costs which
depend on the supervisor’s actions. Moreover, we also model the size of the banking sector
by using the number of parent banks and subsidiaries in the domestic and foreign bank
markets.
A second strand of the literature discusses potential cooperation failures between single
regulators. Holthausen & Rønde (2004) and Carletti et al. (2016) analyze the incentives of
a local or national regulator to collect and transmit necessary information. Freixas (2003)
and Goodhart & Schoenmaker (2009) consider the incentives of national regulators to bail
out or liquidate a bank and show that cooperation failures could occur if regulators negotiate
ex post about burden sharing. Bolton & Oehmke (2016) and Faia & Weder di Mauro (2016)
compare different resolution schemes for multinational banks and prove that regulators may
refuse to cooperate in order to prevent transfers from subsidiaries to parent banks or vice
versa. Colliard (2015) models cooperation problems between national and supranational
regulators in the sense that the supranational regulator has a higher cost of inspecting
banks than the national regulator. Besides national and supranational regulation, also a
mixed regulatory framework is considered and it is shown that supranational regulation
is optimal if cross-border activity is sufficiently large. In this chapter the focus is not on
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ex-post incentive compatibility of cooperation inside the banking union but on ex-ante
incentive compatibility of joining the banking union. Although there are no cooperation
problems once supranational regulation is in place, national regulators may refuse to agree
to supranational regulation from the outset.
A third branch of the literature asks how the organizational structures of banking systems
or cross-country heterogeneity influence regulatory behavior. Calzolari & Loranth (2011)
and Calzolari et al. (2016) distinguish between a branch structure and a subsidiary structure
of multinational banks. Branches are regulated by the home country, subsidiaries by the
country in which they are active. They show that intervention incentives are different
for branches and subsidiaries. In addition, supranational supervision may incentivize
more banks to choose a stand-alone structure or a branch structure instead of a subsidiary
structure. Beck et al. (2013) consider a bank which is partially financed by foreign equity
and foreign deposits, and holds foreign assets as well. A national regulator’s incentive to
intervene is distorted whenever the bank does not hold identical shares in foreign equity,
foreign deposits, and foreign assets. In particular, the national supervisor’s incentive to
resolve a weak bank increases in the foreign equity share and decreases in the share of
foreign deposits and of foreign assets.
In this chapter, the focus is also on cross-country differences between banking systems,
but we use a subsidiary structure and assume that each unit of the multinational bank
raises funds and invests only locally. However, the two countries considered differ in the
number or size of parent banks and subsidiaries of multinational banks. It is shown that
this type of banking structure matters for welfare effects of bank regulation, and that in
particular countries where subsidiaries dominate the banking sector may be reluctant to
join a banking union.
A fourth group of papers asks for the effects of international financial market integration
on the welfare effects of national versus supranational regulation. Niepmann & Schmidt-
Eisenlohr (2013) focus on interbank market connections between banking systems and
show that decisions by national governments to bail out failing banks are inefficient. This
inefficiency increases in interbank market linkages. Górnicka & Zoican (2016) consider
bank resolution policies in a two-country model setup with interbank market activities and
cross-border exposures. They show that supranational bank resolution does not necessarily
improve welfare. In contrast to this work, we do not consider interbank market activities
and cross-border exposures because both parent bank and subsidiary are assumed to raise
funds and invest only locally. However, we also model financial market integration, since
we assume that subsidiaries are liable for the parent bank‘s losses and that the subsidiary‘s
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profits are partly transferred to the parent bank.
Finally, the model presented in this chapter contributes to the discussion why EU countries
outside the euro area hesitate to opt-in to the banking union. Berglöf et al. (2012), Darvas
& Wolff (2013), Kisgergely & Szombati (2014), and Belke et al. (2015) point out that, due
to legal constraints, opt-in countries lack participation in the Euro-system’s decision making
process and have only limited access to European financial backstops. Our analysis offers
an additional explanation why EBU membership is disadvantageous for countries hosting
many subsidiaries, independently of the current legal design of the European Monetary
Union. This way EBU may form an obstacle on its own why non-Euro EU countries hesitate
to introduce the Euro.
Besides joint supervision and resolution, a main element of EBU is a common deposit
insurance system such as the one which will become part of EBU by 2024. The literature on
deposit insurances in banking unions stresses that a common deposit insurance allows for
better coinsurance than separate insurance schemes because the number of banks included
is larger. In addition, a harmonized deposit insurance may prevent national regulators
from using deposit insurance levels as a device to compete for deposits and to protect
their banking systems from the destabilizing impact of potential capital flight (Engineer
et al. 2013). Finally, a European deposit insurance system makes decoupling banks from
sovereigns easier (Gros & Schoenmaker 2014). Although we do not model a common
deposit insurance system, our analysis allows for the conclusion that a common deposit
insurance scheme increases the attractiveness of supranational supervision and may thereby
increase the incentive of a country to join the banking union.
3.3. Model setup
3.3.1. Bank projects and regulatory actions
We consider two jurisdictions (or “countries”) A and B but abstract from any exchange rate
risk. The two countries do not necessarily have the same size. In both countries there is a
continuum of profit-maximizing multinational banks each consisting of two bank units, a
parent bank and a subsidiary. A bank unit raises and invests funds only locally. We classify a
bank unit according to the country of ownership and to the country of activity; the country
of ownership is called the “home country” (Table 1). In order to differentiate between
bank units, we use a subscript “Country index ownership→ country index activity”. Hence,
a multinational bank from home country A consists of a parent bank in home country A




Home country A Home country B
Activity
Country A Parent bank A→ A Subsidiary B→ A
Country B Subsidiary A→ B Parent bank B→ B
Table 1: Classification of bank units
country A which is active in the foreign country B (index: A→ B). The same applies for a
multinational bank from home country B.
A multinational bank is endowed with equity which is set to zero and locally raises
deposits D = 1 from households. A parent bank in home country A raises an exogenous
share µA ∈ [0,1] from households in country A and the subsidiary from home country A
raises a share 1−µA from households in country B. We assume that a multinational bank’s
activity level µA in home country A is distributed according to an exogenous distribution
function GA. The same applies for multinational banks from country B.
Deposits are invested in risky projects. Projects are divisible with constant returns to
scale. The (gross) project return per monetary unit invested is either R> 1 with probability
p ∈ [0, 1] or zero otherwise. Probability p is private knowledge of the bank. We assume
that p is the same for both bank units and uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1], i.e.,
p ∼ U[0,1]. Project returns of bank units are uncorrelated.
All deposits are insured by a local deposit insurance with an exogenous insurance premium
set to zero. The deposit insurance in country A insures depositors of parent banks in home
country A and of subsidiaries from home country B. Analogously, the deposit insurance in
country B insures depositors of parent banks in home country B and of subsidiaries from
home country A. There is no common insurance scheme.
We consider two different regulatory regimes, national regulation and supranational
regulation. A regulator (either national or supranational) monitors bank behavior and may
intervene in bank units. Under national supervision parent banks in home country A and
subsidiaries from home country B are supervised by the national regulator in country A.
Analogously, parent banks in home country B and subsidiaries from home country A are
supervised by the national regulator in country B.
National regulators maximize national welfare denoted by WA and WB, respectively. The
national regulator in country A chooses a level of monitoring qA ∈ [0,1], i.e., every bank is
monitored with probability qA or, equivalently, a fraction qA of all banks is monitored (as in
Carletti et al. (2016)). Analogously, the national regulator in country B chooses a level of
105



















Figure 3.2: Time structure of the model
monitoring qB. Under supranational supervision all banks in both countries are supervised
by the supranational regulator who chooses both qA and qB. The supranational regulator
maximizes total welfare W in both countries which we assume to equal the unweighted
sum of welfare in countries A and B (Hardy & Nieto 2011). Thus, each country is weighted
by the supranational regulator according to the size of its banking sector. Supranational
regulation models a banking union.
By monitoring, a regulator (national or supranational) learns the probability p of the
bank’s project. With this knowledge the regulator can choose to resolve projects. In general,
bank resolution can take different forms. We consider an exchange of the bank’s manage-
ment which is conceivable under, e.g., a purchase-and-assumption tool. The regulator is
assumed to intervene in a bank unit if the project’s expected welfare becomes negative. In
this way, by changing the management, the project is continued but return can be increased
in such a way that expected welfare from the project equals zero. Monitoring is costly with
quadratic cost function c2q
2
A for a monitoring level of qA in country A, where c > 0 holds.
For country B we have c2q
2
B.
The timeline is shown in Figure 3.2. At t = 0, regulators choose and announce monitoring
levels qA and qB. At t = 1, multinational banks locally raise deposits and invest them locally
in a risky project. This means that a parent bank raises deposits and invests in projects only
in the home country. Analogously, subsidiaries raise deposits and invest in projects only in
the foreign country. At t = 2, regulators monitor a fraction of banks and intervene in bank
units if necessary. At t = 3, the return of projects realizes and deposits are repaid either by
the bank or the local deposit insurance. Note that the game has only two stages. In the
first stage national regulators simultaneously choose monitoring levels, in the second stage
national regulators decide on intervention.
We model three important features of multinational banks. First, we model unilateral
profit transfers from subsidiaries to parent banks. While a parent bank’s profit completely
remains with the parent bank, an exogenous share ψ ∈ [0, 1] of a subsidiary’s profit is
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transferred to the parent bank. In contrast, losses always remain with the subsidiary. This
has consequences for national welfare because a share ψ of a subsidiary’s expected profit
contributes to welfare in the home country of the subsidiary’s parent bank.
Second, while a subsidiary is liable for the parent bank’s losses, this is not the case vice
versa. If the parent bank’s project fails, not only the share ψ but all of the profit of the
subsidiary (if positive) is used to repay the parent bank’s depositors after local depositors
have been repaid. In contrast, the parent bank is protected by limited liability, i.e., not liable
for the subsidiary’s losses. We assume, as in Calzolari et al. (2016), that the subsidiary’s
profit from investment is not sufficient to rescue the parent bank in case the parent bank
fails. For a multinational bank from home country A and activity level µA in the home
country this translates to µA > (1−µA) (R− 1) or, equivalently, µA > R−1R , i.e., the subsidiary
is sufficiently small. The same applies for country B.
Third, if a parent bank fails, the stability of the subsidiary, and thus the financial market
in the foreign country, is affected, too. We model this effect by introducing exogenous
stability costs C that the foreign country faces if a project of the parent bank fails. The
cost C could also be interpreted as a loss in the subsidiary’s continuation value (Bolton
& Oehmke 2016) or as reputational cost – if the parent bank performs badly, a stigma is
attached to the whole banking group. We do not assume to have an analogous stability
effect on the home country if a subsidiary fails. After all, parent banks are much larger
than subsidiaries and that parent banks are not liable for the subsidiary’s losses.26
Note that the first two features imply that there are also endogenous stability cost. If
the parent bank fails but the subsidiary is successful, the subsidiary is liable for the parent
bank’s losses. In this case not only a share ψ but all of the subsidiary’s profit flows back
to the parent bank. In contrast to the first two features, the third feature is not related to
profit transfers. Parent bank failure may harm financial stability in the foreign country also
for other reasons as described above.
3.3.2. Bank profit and banks’ contributions to national welfare
For the moment, consider the case that there is no regulatory intervention. Then, expected
bank profit is symmetric for a multinational bank from home country A and for a multi-
national bank from home country B. Thus, concentrate on a multinational bank from
home country A with activity level µA in the home country and activity level 1−µA in the
26Additionally, it is assumed that the failure of a parent bank has no effect on financial stability in the home
country. Such stability cost would not cause additional regulatory externalities (which will become clear
later) and are thus set to zero without loss of generality.
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foreign country. We have four possible cases: With probability p2 the project is successful
for both the parent bank and the subsidiary. Net return in this case equals (R− 1). With
probability p (1− p) only the parent bank’s project is successful. Since the parent bank is
not liable for the subsidiary’s losses, losses of the subsidiary are covered by the local deposit
insurance. Net return equals µA (R− 1). With probability (1− p) p only the subsidiary’s
project is successful. In this case, a fraction of the parent bank’s depositors are repaid by
the subsidiary leaving zero net return for the multinational bank in total. Finally, with
probability (1− p)2 both projects fail, all losses are covered by the local deposit insurances,
and the multinational bank’s net return equals zero.
Thus, the multinational bank’s profit is given by
Π= p2 (R− 1) + p (1− p)µA (R− 1) .
The above equation can be rewritten as
Π= pµA (R− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
parent bank
+ p2 (1−µA) (R− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
subsidiary
showing that the multinational bank receives a positive profit from the parent bank (first
summand) if the parent bank’s project is successful. However, the multinational bank
receives a positive profit from the subsidiary (second summand) only if both the parent
bank and the subsidiary are successful because the subsidiary is liable for the parent bank’s
profit. Note that expected profit is always non-negative. Resolution of a bank unit produces
zero expected profit for this bank unit.
Without regulatory intervention multinational banks affect welfare WA in country A in
four ways (compare Figure 3.3). Again, concentrate on a multinational bank from home
country A.
I Profits and losses of the parent bank (A→ A) contribute to welfare in country A. The
parent bank affects (expected) national welfare in country A by
pµA (R− 1)− (1− p)µA. (3.1)
The first term shows the parent bank’s profit, the second term corresponds to the
parent bank’s loss which is covered by the deposit insurance in country A or the
subsidiary.


















Figure 3.3: Multinational bank activity
home country A the contribution to welfare in country A is given by
ψp2 (1−µA) (R− 1) + (1− p) p (1−µA) (R− 1) . (3.2)
The first summand shows that a share ψ of expected profit flows back to the parent
bank if both the parent bank and the subsidiary are successful. In contrast, if only the
subsidiary is successful, then the parent bank receives the full share of the subsidiary’s
profit because the subsidiary is liable for the parent bank’s losses. If the subsidiary’s
project fails, losses do not diminish welfare in country A but welfare in country B.
Expression (3.2) can be rewritten as
ψp (1−µA) (R− 1) + (1− p) p (1−µA) (1−ψ) (R− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=Γ (ψ,R)
.
The term Γ (ψ, R) denotes endogenous stability cost per unit invested by the subsidiary.
Hence, the subsidiary contributes to welfare in country A in two ways: with a shareψ
of expected profit and with expected endogenous stability cost. The cost Γ (ψ, R) are
incurred by the subsidiary and contribute positively to the home country’s welfare
if the parent bank fails, while the subsidiary is successful. Since these endogenous
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stability cost occur due to the subsidiary’s liability for the parent bank’s losses, we
refer to them as “liability transfer”. Note that the liability transfer is decreasing in the
profit share ψ that is transferred from the subsidiary to the parent bank in any case.
Consider a multinational bank from home country B with activity level µB in the home
country and activity level 1−µB in the foreign country.
III The parent bank (B→ B) causes exogenous stability cost to country A in case of failure.
Hence, the parent bank’s activity affects welfare in country A by
− CµB (1− p) . (3.3)
Profits and losses of the parent bank only affect welfare in home country B and not
in country A.
IV For the subsidiary (B→ A) which is active in country A but owned by a bank in country
B, the contribution to welfare in country A is given by
(1−ψ) p2 (1−µB) (R− 1)− (1− p) (1−µB) (3.4)
If both the parent bank and the subsidiary are successful, a share (1−ψ) of the
subsidiary’s profit contributes to welfare in country A (first summand). If only the
subsidiary is successful, the subsidiary is liable for the parent bank’s losses leaving a
contribution of zero to welfare in country A. If the subsidiary is not successful, the
national deposit insurance in country A repays the subsidiary’s depositors independent
of the parent bank’s performance (second summand). Expression (3.4) can be
rewritten as
(1−ψ) p (1−µB) (R− 1)− (1− p) (1−µB)− (1− p) p (1−µB) Γ (ψ, R)
showing that the subsidiary contributes to welfare in country A with a share (1−ψ)
of expected profit (first summand) and with a loss incurred by the local deposit
insurance in case of project failure (second summand). Additionally, the liability
transfer that is paid by the subsidiary if the parent bank fails and the subsidiary is
successful has to be subtracted (third summand).
The analogous distinction can be made for welfare in country B.
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3.4. The choice between national and supranational regulation
In order to analyze the countries’ incentives to join the banking union, we proceed in
the following way. To begin with, we examine the decisions, i.e., resolution policy and
monitoring level, of the national regulator in country A. The decisions in country B
are analogous. It is shown that national regulation in one country affects welfare in
both countries creating regulatory externalities. National regulators maximize national
welfare and do not take regulatory externalities into account. These externalities are
internalized by a supranational regulator whose decisions will be analyzed second. While
supranational regulation improves total welfare, this is not necessarily true for national
welfare. Consequently, national regulators may object against entering a banking union,
i.e., against changing the regulatory regime from national to supranational regulation.
Finally, we compare national welfare resulting from national regulation with national
welfare resulting from supranational regulation in order to examine the incentives to join
the banking union.
3.4.1. National regulation
We consider country A and derive optimal resolution policies as well as optimal monitoring
efforts under national regulation. In line with Figure 3.2, we apply backward induction and
start with resolution policies before considering monitoring levels. The national regulator
in country A is responsible for supervising bank units which are active in country A. These
are parent banks in home country A and subsidiaries from home country B.
At t = 2, if there is no intervention in the parent bank in home country A, contribution
to national welfare is given by expression (3.1). If there is intervention in the parent bank,
contribution to national welfare equals zero. Hence, there is intervention in the parent








If there is no intervention in the subsidiary from home country B, the contribution to
welfare in country A is given by (3.4) and is zero otherwise. Hence, there is intervention in
the subsidiary if
(1−ψ) p2 (R− 1)− (1− p)< 0.
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We define p˜ as the unique solution between 0 and 1 of (1−ψ) p2 (R− 1)− (1− p) = 0.
From the left-hand side of the above inequality, p˜ is increasing in ψ and decreasing in R.
We have p˜ > 1R , i.e., national regulators are more strict with intervention in subsidiaries
than with intervention in parent banks.27
At t = 0, the national regulator decides about the monitoring level. National welfare
in country A depends on the masses of projects realized in the home country and in the
foreign country, respectively. We denote by
• N parentA→A :=
∫ 1
0
µA dGA the mass of projects realized in country A by parent banks in
home country A,
• N subsidiar yA→B :=
∫ 1
0
(1−µA) dGA the mass of projects realized in country B by subsidiaries
owned by parent banks in country A (home country) but active in country B (foreign
country).
In what follows, we assume that N parentA→A , N
subsidiar y
A→B > 0 are exogenous, constant, and
independent of regulation in country A or B. Since N parentA→A and N
subsidiar y
A→B denote masses of
projects (and not shares), the size of a country’s banking sector may differ from the size of
the foreign country’s banking sector. The notations are analogous for country B.
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National welfare in country A is then given by















































National welfare in country A consists of welfare resulting from multinational bank activity
and monitoring cost (last line). In accordance with Figure 3.3 national welfare from
multinational bank activity has four components:
I The first component shows the part of national welfare resulting from activity of parent
banks in home country A. There are parent banks where intervention is beneficial
from a regulatory point of view (first part of the summand), and parent banks where
the regulator never intervenes, independent of monitoring activity (second part of
the summand). Note that the integration boundary 1R corresponds to the national
regulator’s intervention threshold.
II The second summand states national welfare resulting from activity of subsidiaries from
home country A. The two parts again show welfare from subsidiaries’ projects that
are subject to intervention in case of monitoring and national welfare from projects
that are never subject to intervention. The integration boundary p˜ corresponds to
the national regulator’s intervention threshold.
III The third summand concerns national welfare resulting from activity of parent banks in
home country B.
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IV The fourth summand refers to national welfare resulting from activity of subsidiaries
from home country B.
Note that the national regulator in country A can only affect three out of five summands of
national welfare by setting the monitoring level qA. These summands stand for national
welfare resulting from activity of parent banks in home country A (first summand), national
welfare resulting from activity of subsidiaries from home country B (fourth summand), and
monitoring cost (fifth summand). Changes in the monitoring level in country B thus have
a regulatory external effect on welfare in country A. This regulatory externality occurs for
two reasons:
(i) subsidiaries from home country A are regulated by the national regulator in country B
(second summand of (3.5)),
(ii) parent banks in home country B are regulated by the national regulator in country B
(third summand of (3.5)).
We can classify this externality and call it “positive” if an increase in the monitoring level
of country B always leads to an increase in country A’s welfare. A negative externality is
defined analogously. We state:
Proposition 3.1. There is a threshold N¯ (C ,ψ) such that the external effect of regulation
in country B on country A’s welfare is negative if
N parentB→B
N subsidiar yA→B
< N¯ (C ,ψ). The regulatory exter-
nal effect is positive if
N parentB→B
N subsidiar yA→B
> N¯ (C ,ψ). The threshold N¯ (C ,ψ) is increasing in ψ and
decreasing in C.
Proof. See appendix.
The sign of the regulatory external effect on welfare in country A is determined by the
structure of the banking sector in country B. This structure is captured by the relation
of the mass of projects by parent banks in home country B to the mass of projects by
foreign-owned subsidiaries from home country A. Consequently, the regulatory externality
on country A is driven by two counteracting effects.
(i) Subsidiaries from home country B which are active in country A are supervised by the
national regulator in country B who does not consider the share of the subsidiaries’
profits and the liability transfer that increase welfare in country A.
(ii) Parent banks in home country B are supervised by the national regulator in country B
who ignores stability cost that are incurred by country A in case of failure of these
parent banks.
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According to the first effect, the national regulator in country A prefers less monitoring in
country B, and according to the second effect, the national regulator in country A prefers
more monitoring in country B. Hence, there are two possibilities.
• If the banking sector in B is dominated by subsidiaries from home country A, i.e.,
N parentB→B
N subsidiar yA→B
is small, the regulatory external effect mainly occurs because subsidiaries
transfer a share or all of their profit to their parent bank in country A. In this case
increasing monitoring in country B decreases welfare in country A and the external
effect is negative.




external effect mainly occurs because parent banks cause stability cost to country A in
case of project failure. In this case an increase in monitoring in country B increases
welfare in country A and the regulatory external effect is positive.
Note that increasing ψ increases the transfer of subsidiaries which are active in country
B to parent banks in country A. This promotes the first effect. In contrast, increasing C
promotes the second effect.
Analogously, regulation in country A causes an externality on welfare in country B.
However, the national regulator of country A does not account for this externality because
he maximizes welfare in country A.
By setting a monitoring level q∗A, the regulator of country A chooses the fraction of banks
that is monitored. Formally, the national regulator’s problem is given by
q∗A = argmaxqA
WA (qA, qB) ,
where q∗A denotes the Nash-equilibrium strategy of the national regulator in country A. We
obtain:




N parentA→A ∫ 1R
0
1− pR dp + N subsidiar yB→A
∫ p˜
0
(1− p)− (1−ψ) p2 (R− 1) dp
 ,
which is increasing in N parentA→A , N
subsidiar y
B→A ,ψ, and decreasing in c, R.
Proof. See appendix.
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B→A , c, R is straightforward. To understand the
monotonicity of q∗A with respect to ψ, consider a subsidiary which is active in country A.
If ψ increases, a smaller share of expected profit remains in country A, contributing to
national welfare. Consequently, intervention in the subsidiary gets more beneficial. This in
turn increases the benefit of monitoring. Note that the optimal monitoring level does not
depend on N parentB→B , N
subsidiar y
A→B , and C because the national regulator in country A does not
supervise parent banks in home country B and subsidiaries from home country A. Therefore,
the national regulator in country A also cannot affect total expected stability cost that are
incurred by country A.
3.4.2. Supranational regulation
We now consider a banking union where a supranational regulator simultaneously sets
monitoring levels and decides on resolution policies in both countries. Monitoring levels do
not necessarily have to be identical. The supranational regulator maximizes joint welfare
W . Applying backward induction, we first determine the optimal resolution policy of the
supranational regulator at t = 2. The contribution to total welfare of a multinational bank
in country A is symmetric to the contribution of a multinational bank in country B. Hence,
without loss of generality, we concentrate on a multinational bank from home country A.
Consider the parent bank. Profits, losses and exogenous stability cost of the parent bank
contribute to total welfare. Hence, the parent bank affects total welfare by
µA (pR− 1)−µA (1− p)C (3.6)
if there is no intervention in the parent bank and by zero otherwise. Here, the first summand
represents expected profit or expected loss from the parent bank’s project which affects
welfare in the parent bank’s home country. The second summand describes expected
stability cost caused by the parent bank’s failure which affects welfare in the foreign country.
Consequently, a parent bank is subject to intervention if p < 1+CR+C .
For the subsidiary the contribution to total welfare is given by
(1−µA) (pR− 1) (3.7)
if there is no intervention in the subsidiary and by zero otherwise. Total welfare includes
the profit share contributing to home-country welfare as well as the profit share and losses
contributing to welfare in the foreign country. Consequently, a subsidiary is subject to
intervention if p > 1R .
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The supranational regulator’s intervention policy differs from the national regulator’s
intervention policy in the following way. By 1+CR+C ≥ 1R and p˜ > 1R we have:
• For parent banks the intervention policy of the supranational regulator is more strict
than the intervention policy preferred by the national regulator.
• For subsidiaries the resolution policy of the supranational regulator is less strict than
the resolution policy preferred by the national regulator.
The supranational regulator is more strict with parent banks because the supranational
regulator accounts for stability cost caused by the parent banks which is not the case for the
responsible national regulator. The supranational regulator is less strict with subsidiaries
because the supranational regulator accounts for the subsidiary’s profit share contributing
to home-country welfare which is not the case for the national regulator in charge.
Keeping the previous notation, we obtain total welfare at t = 0:









((pR− 1)− (1− p)C) dp

+ N subsidiar yA→B
(1− qB)∫ 1R
0













((pR− 1)− (1− p)C) dp

+ N subsidiar yB→A
(1− qA)∫ 1R
0














There are five elements.
• The first line captures the contribution to total welfare by parent banks in home
country A and the third line the contribution to total welfare by parent banks in home
country B. In both lines, respectively, the first integral covers welfare from projects
which are not monitored and not subject to intervention although they should be
resolved. The second integral covers welfare from projects that are not subject to
intervention independent of monitoring.
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• The second and the fourth line capture contributions to total welfare by subsidiaries
from home country A and home country B, respectively.
• The last line contains total monitoring cost.
Since the supranational regulator maximizes joint welfare, in contrast to national super-
vision, he accounts for both the external effect of regulation in country B on country A’s
welfare and the regulatory external effect from country A on country B. More formally, the
supranational regulator’s problem at t = 0 is given by
(qˆA, qˆB) = arg max
(qA,qB)
W (qA, qB) .
We derive:




N parentA→A ∫ 1+CR+C
0






which is increasing in N parentA→A , N
subsidiar y
B→A , C and decreasing in c, R. A symmetric result holds
for the supranational regulation of county B.
Proof. See appendix.
As in the case of national regulation, the monitoring level qˆA in country A chosen by the
supranational regulator is increasing in N parentA→A , N
subsidiar y
B→A and decreasing in c, R. In contrast
to the case of national regulation, qˆA does not depend on ψ because the supranational
regulator does not only account for the share of the subsidiary’s profits that remains with
the subsidiary but also for the profit share that is transferred to the parent bank. Moreover,
the monitoring level chosen by the supranational regulator depends negatively on stability
cost C which are not taken into account by national regulators.
Since the supranational regulator internalizes the regulatory external effect, a change
in the number N parentA→A of parent banks in home country A or in the number N
subsidiar y
B→A of
subsidiaries that are active in country A affects monitoring levels under national regulation
and under supranational regulation differently. More precisely, we have
∂ qˆA
∂ N subsidiar yB→A
<
∂ q∗A
∂ N subsidiar yB→A
118








These two inequalities reflect the two origins of the regulatory external effect and can be
explained as follows:
(i) Consider subsidiaries from home country B which are active in country A. The national
regulator in country A accounts for the subsidiaries’ losses, the share 1−ψ of expected
profit that remains with the subsidiaries, and the liability transfer that subsidiaries
have to pay if they are successful but their parent bank is not. The supranational
regulator also accounts for subsidiaries’ losses and the share 1−ψ of profit. In contrast
to the national regulator, the supranational regulator additionally takes into account
the share ψ that is transferred to parent banks but ignores the liability transfer which
cancels out in total welfare. Consequently, the supranational monitoring level in
country A reacts less strongly than the national monitoring level to an increase in the
mass of projects realized by subsidiaries from home country B.
(ii) With respect to parent banks in home country A, the national regulator in country A
takes into account the expected return from their investment in the home country
A but not the expected stability costs that are incurred by the foreign country B. In
contrast, the supranational regulator accounts for both. Therefore, the supranational
monitoring level in country A reacts more strongly than the national monitoring level
to an increase in the mass of projects realized by parent banks in country A.
The following Proposition examines under which conditions the national regulator is more
or less strict than the supranational regulator.




N¯1 (C ,ψ). The threshold N¯1 (C ,ψ) is decreasing in C and increasing in ψ.
Proof. See appendix.
The intuition is similar to Proposition 3.1. If the banking sector in country A is dominated
by subsidiaries from home country B, i.e.,
N parentA→A
N subsidiar yB→A
is sufficiently small, the difference
between national and supranational regulation results because the national regulator
ignores the subsidiary’s profit share that is transferred to the parent bank and considers
only the subsidiary’s losses and the profit share remaining with the subsidiary. In contrast,
the supranational regulator accounts for the expected returns to all agents. Therefore,
supranational regulation is less strict. If otherwise the banking sector in country A is
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dominated by parent banks in home country A, i.e.,
N parentA→A
N subsidiar yB→A
is sufficiently large, the
difference between national and supranational regulation arises because the national
regulator, different from the supranational regulator, ignores the expected stability costs
that are incurred by the foreign country. Therefore, supranational regulation is more strict.
3.4.3. Incentives to join the banking union
By comparing the welfare of both countries under national supervision and under suprana-
tional supervision, we are now able to determine the value of the banking union for national
regulators and the supranational regulator. With respect to joint welfare supranational
regulation is always superior to national regulation. In contrast, supranational regulation
is not necessarily preferable from a national point of view. A change of the regulatory
regime from national to supranational regulation may increase national welfare in both
countries. However, it may also be the case that national welfare in one country increases,
while national welfare in the other country decreases. In this case, the increase in national
welfare in one country is larger than the decrease in national welfare in the other country
(in absolute terms) which implies that total welfare still increases.
For country A, joining the banking union and agreeing to supranational regulation is
profitable if national welfare is larger under supranational regulation than under national







holds or equivalently if
∆WA := national welfare in country A under supranational supervision
− national welfare in country A under national supervision.
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
+ N subsidiar yA→B
 q∗B − qˆB∫ 1R
0
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Expression (3.9) gives country A’s gain or loss of joining the banking union. The first four
summands show the change in national welfare broken down by type of the bank unit. The
last summand accounts for the change in national welfare due to the change in monitoring
cost. From (3.9) it can be seen that national welfare changes with a change from national
regulation to supranational regulation for two reasons: the levels of monitoring differ,
i.e., q∗A/B 6= qˆA/B (see the first integral of the first four summands, respectively, and the last
summand), and intervention thresholds change, i.e., 1+CR+C 6= 1R and 1R 6= p˜ (see the second
integral of the first four summands).
We say that the incentive of country A to join the banking union is the larger the larger
expression (3.9). We derive





decreases and N parentA→A ≤NpA.
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increases and N parentB→B ≤NpB.








B ∈ [0,∞] denote threshold values that describe a critical mass of parent banks,
• NsA,N
s
B ∈ [0,∞] denote threshold values that describe a critical mass of subsidiaries.
Proof. See appendix.
The Proposition contains the main result. It shows how a national regulator’s decision
to join a banking union depends on the structure of the home and foreign banking sector.
While the decision to join a banking union is “all or nothing”, we know how changes in the
banking sector’s structure may affect this decision.
In order to understand the intuition behind this result, recall that national and suprana-
tional regulation influence national welfare differently because of two effects:
(i) While the supranational regulator additionally considers the subsidiary’s profit share that
is transferred to the parent bank, the national regulator responsible for supervising
the subsidiary only accounts for the subsidiary’s losses and for the profit share that
remains with the subsidiary.
(ii) The supranational regulator additionally considers total expected stability costs result-
ing from parent bank failure which are ignored by the national regulator responsible
for supervising the parent bank.
Intuitively, the incentive for country A to join the banking union decreases if the regulatory
externality of country A on welfare in country B increases or if the regulatory externality of
country B on welfare in country A decreases. The first condition is given in the following
two cases:
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• If country A is dominated by foreign subsidiaries, i.e., if N parentA→A is sufficiently small or
N subsidiar yB→A is sufficiently large, the regulatory externality of country A on welfare in
country B is dominantly determined by the first effect (see the second line of (a) and
the first line of (b) in Proposition 3.3). In this case, decreasing the number of parent
banks N parentA→A or increasing the number of subsidiaries N
subsidiar y
B→A further increases
the regulatory externality of country A on welfare in country B (in absolute terms).
This in turn increases the difference between national and supranational regulation
in country A which harms welfare in country A.
• If, however, country A is dominated by domestic parent banks, i.e., if N parentA→A is
sufficiently large or N subsidiar yB→A is sufficiently small, the regulatory externality of country
A on welfare in country B is dominantly determined by the second effect (see the first
line of (a) and the second line of (b)). In this case increasing the number of parent
banks N parentA→A or decreasing the number of subsidiaries N
subsidiar y
B→A further increases
the regulatory externality of country A on welfare in country B (in absolute terms).
This in turn increases the difference between national and supranational regulation
in country A which harms country A.
Conversely, the second condition is given in the next two cases:
• If country B is dominated by foreign subsidiaries, i.e., if N parentB→B is sufficiently small
and N subsidiar yA→B is sufficiently large, the regulatory externality of country B on welfare
in country A is dominantly determined by the first effect (see the second line of (c)
and the first line of (d)). In this case increasing the number of parent banks N parentB→B or
decreasing the number of subsidiaries N subsidiar yA→B decreases the regulatory externality
of country B on welfare in country A (in absolute terms). This in turn decreases the
difference between national and supranational regulation in country B which benefits
country B.
• If, however, country B is dominated by domestic parent banks, i.e., if N parentB→B is
sufficiently large and N subsidiar yA→B is sufficiently small, the regulatory externality of
country B on welfare in country A is dominantly determined by the second effect (see
the first line of (c) and the second line of (d)). In this case decreasing the number of
parent banks N parentB→B or increasing the number of subsidiaries N
subsidiar y
A→B decreases
the regulatory externality of country B on welfare in country A (in absolute terms).
This in turn decreases the difference between national and supranational regulation
in country B which benefits country B. The incentive for country A to join the banking
union decreases.
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3.5. European Banking Union
EBU forms a natural experiment which allows us to verify the validity of the arguments
presented in the model section. As mentioned above, the UK has already decided not to join
EBU. Sweden hesitates but announced to undertake a thorough analysis of the implications
of membership. Denmark, Bulgaria and Romania will join. The remaining CEE countries
take a “wait and see position” which is often motivated by the argument that entry into EBU
should be combined with membership in the euro area. It is true that full EMU membership
becomes more likely once the decision to join the banking union has been taken. Without
entering the third stage of EMU, opt-in countries have only insufficient voting rights in the
decision-making process of the ECB and have no access to the fiscal backstop provided by
the European Stability Mechanism (Kisgergely & Szombati (2014); Narodowy Bank Polski
(2015)). Yet, the ultimate decision to apply for membership in EBU has little to do with a
single currency but is strongly connected to international bank activity which is significant
in all opt-in countries (Hüttl & Schoenmaker (2016)).
Our model provides some explanation for the current situation with respect to EBU.
Because of Brexit, we leave UK apart. First, consider CEE countries, where a large share
of assets is held by foreign credit institutions and foreign banking activities are almost
completely carried out by subsidiaries of parent banks in EBU countries. In terms of our
model, this corresponds to a relatively large N subsidiar yEBU→C EE and a small N
parent
C EE→C EE. This suggests
that CEE countries exert a large negative regulatory externality on current EBU countries
(Proposition 3.1). National regulators who are in charge of supervising subsidiaries of
parent banks in CEE countries ignore profit and liability transfers from subsidiaries to
parent banks and consequently their regulation is too strict from a supranational point of
view. If a CEE country enters EBU, regulation in this country would be relaxed (Proposition
3.2) which benefits current EBU countries and harms the CEE country.
With respect to single CEE countries, we account for the share of foreign credit institutions
displayed in Figure 3.1. More precisely, the national regulator in Czech Republic should
have the lowest incentive to join EBU followed by Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria, Poland,
and finally Hungary (Proposition 3.3). Our model suggests that the share of foreign bank
activity in Hungary is already sufficiently high to make EBU membership unattractive.
Finally, our argument does not apply for Romania and Bulgaria because it is already clear
that those two countries are going to enter the third stage of EMU where EBU participation
is mandatory.
Poland forms an interesting case from another point of view because the government
recently gave an impetus to increase local ownership of the banking sector through acquisi-
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tions of foreign-owned banks by state-owned financial institutions. As a result foreign banks’
share in total assets of the sector fell significantly. This decreases the regulatory externality
from Poland on current EBU countries because there are no longer profit transfers from
Polish banks to their former parent banks. Our results suggests that this development
increases Poland’s incentive to enter EBU.
In contrast to CEE countries, Denmark and Sweden are both characterized by a moderate
share of inward banking claims because banking markets are dominated by domestic banks
(compare Figure 3.1). However, the share of outward banking claims towards EBU countries
is relatively large compared with CEE countries. Indeed, banks from these two countries
are among the top ten largest EU banks outside the banking union (five from the UK, four
from Sweden, and one from Denmark), and most of these banks also hold large asset
portfolios within EBU countries (Hüttl & Schoenmaker (2016)). This corresponds to a
relatively small N subsidiar yEBU→DK ,SE and a large N
parent
DK ,SE→EBU . Our results suggest that Denmark and
Sweden exert a positive regulatory externality on current EBU countries (Proposition 3.1).
National regulators ignore stability cost that occur if Danish or Swedish parent banks fail
and consequently their regulation is too soft from a supranational point of view. Domestic
regulators have to fear that the supranational regulator would tighten regulation in their
country.
In case of Sweden, a main argument contributing to the recent decision on EBU mem-
bership is the organizational structure of Nordea Bank AB, Scandinavia’s largest bank.
Nordea currently converts its subsidiaries into branches with approval given by the Swedish
regulator. This implies two effects. First, the regulatory externality that EBU countries
hosting Nordea’s subsidiaries exert on Sweden is internalized, as the Swedish regulator
is in charge of regulating branches but not subsidiaries. Second, the expected burden on
the Swedish deposit insurance increases because depositors of branches are insured by the
Swedish deposit insurance, while depositors of subsidiaries are insured by the foreign de-
posit insurance. The first effect implies that the regulatory externality on Sweden decreases
and EBU membership should become more unattractive. However, (beyond the scope of
our model) the second effect implies that membership could become more attractive if a
common deposit insurance becomes effective. Then, in case of EBU membership losses to
depositors resulting from failure of Swedish branches would be shared between Sweden
and current EBU countries.
Denmark is a special case because its major internationally active bank, Danske Bank
Group, runs a subsidiary only in Finland but uses branches in the other Nordic countries
(Darvas & Wolff (2013)). Since the subsidiary belongs to the three largest banks in Finland,
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it is already regulated by the ECB; the branches are supervised by the Danish Financial
Supervisory Authority and their deposits are insured by the Danish deposit insurance. In
consequence, bank regulation in Denmark has barely any externalities and the decision
whether or not to join EBU is not very much dependent on bank supervision.
Finally, our model allows some conclusions about the consequences of the common
European Deposit Insurance System (EDIS) which is introduced in three steps and will be
fully effective by 2024. Such a common system will increase the attractiveness of EBU for
non-participating countries if their banking sectors are characterized by foreign-owned
subsidiaries (as in the case of CEE countries). If a subsidiary fails, losses are shared among
countries and do not only accrue to the deposit insurance of the country where the subsidiary
is active. Although this is not part of our model, the argument also applies for countries
with banking sectors characterized by domestic-owned branches (as Sweden). If a branch
fails, losses are shared among countries and do not only accrue to the deposit insurance of
the branch’s home country.
3.6. Conclusion
The purpose of the present chapter is to analyze the incentives of a single country to join
a banking union and to analyze how the structure of international banking influences
the decision of a national regulator to transfer supervisory powers to a supranational
agency. We concentrate on bank supervision and resolution. Differences between national
and supranational regulation occur because (i) the supranational regulator considers the
expected return to all agents from investments abroad, while the national regulator, when
regulating a subsidiary, ignores the profit share that is transferred to the subsidiary’s parent
bank, and (ii) in contrast to the supranational regulator, when regulating a parent bank,
the national regulator ignores total expected stability costs that are incurred by the foreign
country because of parent bank failure. Consequently, a country hosting many subsidiaries
joins a banking union if profit transfers are relatively low and if the country’s financial
stability is relatively dependent on parent banks’ performance. The implication for a
country with many banks owning subsidiaries is vice versa. The results provide a possible
explanation why some EU Member States currently hesitate to join the European Banking
Union.
Our analysis rests on a number of assumptions and it is worthwhile to check how critical
they are. First, we assumed that banking structures in the home and foreign country are
exogenous and in particular that the masses of projects financed at home and abroad are
independent of the regulatory regimes. Abstracting from endogenous banking structures
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allows us to focus on the effect of the respective strategies on regulators’ incentives. While
we think that this assumption is justified at least in the short- or medium run, there is also
evidence showing that the effect of the regulatory environment on banking structure is
comparatively small. Factors other than regulatory environment, such as the banks’ size,
the concentration in the banking sector, and the existence of a financial center are more
important determinants for the banks’ internationalization strategies (Focarelli & Pozzolo
(2005); Darvas & Wolff (2013); Ohls et al. (2017)).
Second, our analysis assumed that parent banks and subsidiaries raise deposits and invest
funds only locally. This is in line with recent developments in CEE countries showing that
the traditional funding model ruling before the financial crisis (with parent banks funding
the lending of their subsidiaries) has been declining in recent years (European Central
Bank (2011a)).
Third, in the present model monitoring efforts set by the supranational regulator may
differ for different countries. Assuming that this is not feasible implies less flexibility for
the supranational regulator. This makes supranational regulation more unattractive and
may imply in some cases that central regulation is not even preferred from a supranational
point of view.
A last aspect concerns the normative implications of the analysis and covers the question
how membership in a banking union could be made more attractive for outsiders. Given that
participation is beneficial for all countries in total but not necessarily for single countries,
one could conceive transfer payments from those countries that gain in welfare to those
which loose in welfare. However, such transfers are hard to implement because every
country would claim to be on the losing side and because the size of the loss is difficult if
not impossible to determine. An alternative would be a ban of profit transfers from the
host-country subsidiary to the home-country parent bank which, however, would inhibit
international capital flows and is likely to impair the international allocation of capital. A
more fruitful alternative could be to make multinational banks subject to a multinational
deposit insurance scheme, such as the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS). Such a
scheme could increase the attractiveness of EBU for non-participating countries.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3.1: The regulatory external effect of regulation in country B on
welfare in country A is negative if ∂WA∂ qB < 0 holds and positive if
∂WA
∂ qB
> 0 holds. Taking the
first derivative of national welfare in country A with respect to the monitoring level qB in
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=− N subsidiar yA→B
∫ p˜
0
ψp2 (R− 1) + (1− p) p (R− 1) dp

















holds. The right-hand side is increasing in ψ and decreasing in C .
Proof of Lemma 3.1: Taking the first derivative of national welfare in country A with







1− pR dp + N subsidiar yB→A
∫ p˜
0




= −c < 0 holds such that the first order condition for maximizing national










N parentA→A ∫ 1R
0
1− pR︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥0
dp + N subsidiar yB→A
∫ p˜
0




It is straightforward to see that the above expression is increasing with respect to N parentA→A ,
N subsidiar yB→A and decreasing in c. To see that q∗A is increasing in ψ note that p˜ as well as
(1− p)− (1−ψ) p2 (R− 1) are increasing in ψ. To see that q∗A is decreasing in R, note that
1
R , 1− pR, p˜, and (1− p)− (1−ψ) p2 (R− 1) are all decreasing in R.
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1− pR+ (1− p)C dp













N parentA→A ∫ 1+CR+C
0










B→A . To see that qˆA is increasing in
C note that 1+CR+C as well as (1− pR)+(1− p)C is increasing in C . To see that qˆA is decreasing
in R note that 1+CR+C , (1− pR) + (1− p)C , 1R as well as (1− pR) are increasing in R.
Proof of Proposition 3.2: We have qˆA > q
∗














1− pR dp + N subsidiar yB→A
∫ p˜
0
(1− p)− (1−ψ) p2 (R− 1) dp







p (R− 1) [1− (1−ψ) p] dp + ∫ p˜1
R
(1− p)− (1−ψ) p2 (R− 1) dp∫ 1
R
0
(1− p)C dp + ∫ 1+CR+C1
R
(1− pR) + (1− p)C dp
.
The right-hand side is increasing in ψ and decreasing in C .
Proof of Proposition 3.3:
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which is of the form N parentA→A · x+N subsidiar yB→A · y for appropriate choice of x and y . Since∫ p˜
0
(1− p)− (1−ψ) p2 (R− 1) dp = c ∂ q∗A
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(1− p)− (1−ψ) p2 (R− 1)
≤0,
which proves the claim.
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(d) Analogously to the previous parts of the proof we have
∂∆WA
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≥0.
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4. The Mutual Interdependence between Regulation and
the Representative Form of Multinational Banks
4.1. Introduction
Multinational bank activity is known to generate spillover effects between countries. Since
regulation affects bank behavior, national regulators are able to attenuate or aggravate
spillover effects. If national regulators only consider effects on their own country and thus
ignore these spillover effects, this may lead to inefficient regulatory decisions and banks
may escape effective supervision. This was shown by the famous examples of Fortis, Dexia,
and Kaupthing (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010)) which were discussed
earlier. The size of spillover effects does not only depend on regulation but also (inter alia)
on banks’ choice of their representative form (International Monetary Fund 2010b, Buch
& Goldberg 2017). Multinational banks can choose between the following representative
forms: they can go abroad by opening a branch (branch representation) or by opening
a subsidiary (subsidiary representation) in the foreign country. Regulation affects banks’
choice of representative forms (Focarelli & Pozzolo 2005, Fiechter et al. 2011).
Against this background, we present a simple model to tackle the following three ques-
tions. First, how does regulation affect banks’ choice of their representative form? Second,
how does banks’ choice of their representative form affect the choice of regulatory standards?
Third, which welfare effects are implied?
In the present model multinational banks consist of a home unit and a foreign unit. The
multinational bank is active in the home country and the foreign country. “Home country”
refers to the country where the home unit is active, and “foreign country” refers to the
country where the foreign unit is active. Banks can choose between two representative forms,
the branch representation and the subsidiary representation. The two forms differ with
respect to regulatory responsibility and liability structure. For the branch representation,
both units, the home unit and the branch, are supervised by the home-country regulator. The
bank’s depositors are repaid either by the bank or the national deposit insurance in the home
country. Both units are liable for the other unit’s losses. For the subsidiary representation,
the home unit is supervised by the home-country regulator and the subsidiary by the
foreign-country regulator. The home unit’s depositors are insured by the home-country
deposit insurance, the subsidiary’s depositors are insured by the foreign-country deposit




From the bank’s point of view, the subsidiary representation has the advantage that the
home unit is not liable for the subsidiary’s losses. However, under the branch representation
the multinational bank is supervised by one regulator, only. Thus, the bank chooses the
subsidiary representation if supervision in the foreign country is sufficiently lenient. This
can be considered regulatory arbitrage, banks adjust their representative form depending
on regulation: If supervision in the home country is relatively strict, the bank chooses the
subsidiary representation to avoid regulation in the home country for the foreign unit. If
otherwise supervision in the foreign country is relatively strict, the bank chooses the branch
representation to avoid regulation in the foreign country.
National regulators have two instruments. First, they choose the level of monitoring.
By monitoring a bank or a bank unit, the regulator learns the success probability of the
investment project which is otherwise private knowledge of the bank. Monitoring is costly.
Second, national regulators can intervene in bank units and liquidate investment projects.
With respect to representative forms there are the following welfare effects. Home units
of multinational banks only affect national welfare in the home country. The same holds
for a branch because profits flow back to the home unit in the home country and losses are
borne by the home-country deposit insurance. However, subsidiaries affect national welfare
in the home country and in the foreign country. While a subsidiary’s profit contributes to
national welfare in the home country, losses contribute to national welfare in the foreign
country because the responsible national deposit insurance is the foreign-country deposit
insurance. Since subsidiaries are supervised by the national regulator in the foreign country,
assets of foreign-owned subsidiaries are liquidated more often than assets of branches or
home units because the national regulator responsible for supervision of the subsidiary
accounts for the subsidiary’s losses but not for its profits.
National regulators use monitoring levels as a tool to affect banks’ choice of their repre-
sentative form. A multinational bank chooses the subsidiary representation if the level of
monitoring in the foreign country is sufficiently low as discussed above. An increase in the
level of monitoring therefore has three effects on national welfare. First, the monitoring
effect: If a bank is not monitored, investment projects may not be liquidated although
they should be liquidated from the national regulator’s point of view. An increase in the
monitoring level decreases the number of such mistakes. The effect on national welfare is
positive. Second, the adjustment effect: An increase in the level of monitoring adjusts the
28The described regulatory responsibilities and liability structures closely follow current regulations, see
Fiechter et al. (2011).
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number of foreign-owned branches and foreign-owned subsidiaries. In the foreign country
more banks choose the branch representation and fewer the subsidiary representation. The
effect on national welfare is positive because branches that are active in country A do not
affect national welfare in country A, while subsidiaries that are active in country A affect
national welfare in country A negatively. Losses of subsidiaries active in country A are borne
by the national deposit insurance in country A and not by the national deposit insurance in
their home country B (as is the case for branches). By increasing the level of monitoring
the national regulator can decrease the burden of the national deposit insurance. Third,
the cost effect: An increase in the level of monitoring increases monitoring cost. The effect
on national welfare is negative.
While the monitoring effect and the cost effect are straightforward, the adjustment effect
is the most interesting effect. An increase in the level of monitoring in one country increases
the number of branches and decreases the number of subsidiaries that are active in this
country. Thus, the burden of the national deposit insurance in this country can be reduced.
At the same time the burden of the national deposit insurance in the other country increases
for the same reason. The national regulator in the other country can counteract by also
increasing the level of monitoring in his country. Hence, an increase in the monitoring level
in one country triggers an increase in the level of monitoring in the other country. Hence,
there is a regulatory race to the top in monitoring standards. We show that the levels of
monitoring that result from the regulatory race are inefficiently strict.
We also consider the scenario of a banking union where liquidation decisions are made
by a central regulator who maximizes total welfare of all countries. However, the central
regulator bases his decisions on information collected by national regulators, i.e., national
regulators are in charge of choosing the monitoring level. We show that the liquidation
decision of the central regulator differs from liquidation decisions preferred by national
regulators. Therefore, monitoring levels are lower in the banking-union scenario. National
regulators prefer to remain uninformed rather than to provide information to the central
regulator who triggers a liquidation decision against the national regulator’s interest.
However, in contrast to related literature, monitoring levels in the banking-union scenario
are still inefficiently strict, i.e., total welfare could be increased by further decreasing
monitoring levels.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In the next section related literature and
the chapter’s contribution is discussed. The model setup is presented in section 4.3. Section
4.4 analyzes bank behavior and liquidation decisions as well as monitoring levels chosen
by national regulators. Section 4.5 discusses whether decisions by national regulators
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are efficient from the point of view of total welfare. The scenario of a banking union is
considered in section 4.6. A short conclusion follows.
4.2. Related literature and contribution
The chapter contributes to three different strands of literature. A first strand of literature
deals with the discussion of multinational banks’ choice of their representative forms and
the resulting implications for regulatory arbitrage. Luciano & Wihlborg (2013) examine
the choice of banks’ representative forms and show that banks trade off the benefits
of the representative forms regarding differences in liability structure, default cost, the
probability of a bailout, and the way deposits are allocated between different affiliate
units. Dell’Ariccia & Marquez (2010) consider a model where the subsidiary structure
has the advantage of limited liability, while the branch representation is characterized by
a greater protection against property right infringements. It is shown that banks choose
the branch representation if political risk is relatively high compared with economic risk
and the subsidiary representation otherwise. Harr & Rønde (2006) stress that the branch
structure is less prone to risk-taking in normal times, while a unit’s incentive to gamble is
increased if the other unit is in trouble. In their model the regulator may choose different
capital requirements for branches and subsidiaries. When choosing the representative form,
banks trade off the limited-liability advantage of the subsidiary structure with the benefit
of a different capital requirement.
There are also studies which concentrate on one representative form in particular. The
branch representation is discussed by Holthausen & Rønde (2004). In their model, the
home country regulator which supervises the branch benefits from information shared by
the host-country regulator. It is shown that banks can allocate their investments across
countries to escape closure because the host-country regulator only shares information
in his interest and because the home-country regulator does not internalize spillovers.
The subsidiary representation is analyzed by Kahn & Winton (2004). Here, opening two
subsidiaries instead of a single subsidiary decreases the risk-shifting incentives of a bank.
Our model is closest to Calzolari & Loranth (2011) who find two effects of intervention on
multinational banks. First, there is a liability effect saying that shared liability between units
provides higher incentives for intervention, and second, there is an internationalization
effect saying that intervention in one unit leaves few or no assets to support the other unit.
In their model, regulators minimize losses to the national deposit insurance. In contrast,
national regulators in our model also account for banks’ profits and maximize national
welfare. In consequence, we find different effects. Apart from that, we add to this strand
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of literature by considering a race in regulatory standards where national regulators take
into account banks’ choice of their representative form and by considering a banking-union
scenario.
A second strand of literature is concerned with the gains and losses of supranational
regulation (where a central regulator is in charge of supervision). Colliard (2015) and Beck
& Wagner (2016) show that the benefits of supranational regulation depend on the amount
of cross-border externalities. Hardy & Nieto (2011) analyze the interplay of prudential
supervision and deposit guarantees under national and supranational supervision. They
show that national regulation yields too little supervision and too much deposit insurance.
Closely related to our model, Carletti et al. (2016) find that national regulators collect too
little information if intervention decisions are made by a central regulator.
The studies mentioned above have in common that they do not account for different
representative forms of multinational banks. Regulatory spillovers exist because national
regulators do not account for losses that occur to the other country in case of bank fail-
ure. Therefore, national regulators are typically too forbearing which makes room for
improvement through centralized supervision. In contrast, in our model there are regu-
latory spillovers because national regulators do not account for subsidiaries’ profits that
flow back to the home unit in the other country. Consequently, national regulators are too
strict. Calzolari et al. (2016) also account for different representative forms and show that
financial integration can decrease under supranational regulation. In their model, national
regulators only consider the losses of the national deposit insurance and do not account for
bank profits which also leads to the result that national regulators are too forbearing.
A third stand of literature deals with regulatory races. The conclusion of most studies is
that competition between national regulators leads to a race to the bottom in regulatory
standards. One argument is that by setting lower capital requirements, regulators can
provide their banking sector with an advantage in competition for bank funding (Acharya
2003, Dell’Ariccia & Marquez 2006). Another argument is that taxes on bank profits
converge to zero because national regulators can attract more banks and increase tax
revenues by undercutting the other country’s tax rate (Boyer & Kempf 2017). While
there is evidence that national regulators are more forbearing than a central regulator
(Agarwal et al. 2014), there are also signs that there are incentives for national regulators
to be more strict than a supranational regulator which potentially leads to a race to the
top. In the European Union, the United Kingdom advocated for the right to set higher
regulatory standards without needing the agreement of other Member States. In contrast,
the European Commission argued for maximum harmonization because higher regulatory
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standards could expand through a race-to-the-top mechanism (European Commission
2011). As a compromise, according to CRD IV Member States may now apply stricter
requirements if they are necessary due to national circumstances, financial stability, or
a bank’s specific risk profile (European Commission 2017). More recently, Hungary and
Poland currently hesitate to join the European Banking Union, inter alia, because they
fear that central supervision of foreign-owned subsidiaries located in Hungary or Poland
will be too forbearing (Kisgergely & Szombati 2014, Narodowy Bank Polski 2015). We
provide a model formalizing the argument that higher regulatory standards in one country
decrease the number of subsidiaries active in this country which decreases the burden of
the national deposit insurance.29 It is shown that this mechanism leads to a race to the
top. To our knowledge, there are only two further studies which analyze a mechanism
that may lead to a race to the top in regulatory standards. First, Huertas (2012) argues
that a bail-in tool may lead to more market discipline because uninsured creditors have an
incentive to monitor banks. Increased market discipline, in turn, may lead to a race to the
top because strictly supervised banks are able to receive better funding conditions. Second,
Haufler & Maier (2017) show that there is a selection effect. High capital requirements
drive the weakest banks from the market and hence are a good signal for bank quality. If
the selection effect prevails, a race to the top results.
4.3. Model setup
Consider two countries A and B. There are two types of agents – multinational banks (in
the following MNBs) and regulators.
Multinational banks: In each country there is a continuum of multinational banks with
mass one. An MNB consists of a home unit and a foreign unit. For each MNB there is
a home country and a foreign country. These terms are bank specific. “Home country”
refers to the country where the parent bank, or home unit, of the MNB is active. The MNB
goes abroad by opening a foreign unit. “Foreign country” refers to the country where the
foreign unit is active. A foreign unit can be either a branch (branch representation) or a
subsidiary (subsidiary representation). These two representative forms of an MNB differ
with respect to regulatory responsibility and liability of the home unit for failure of the
foreign unit as will become clear later. The MNB raises one unit of deposits in each country
that is invested locally. Deposits are fully insured by a national deposit insurance with
the premium set to zero. Gross return on deposits is equal to 1. An investment returns
29Closely related, International Monetary Fund (2010a) argues that fiscal risk in a country decreases if
multinational banks headquartered in this country choose the subsidiary representation.
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R> 1 per unit invested with probability p (success) or 0 with probability 1− p (failure).
The success probability p is distributed according to a cumulative distribution function
G with a continuously differentiable density function g. Investments are assumed to be
uncorrelated. The success probability is private knowledge of the MNB. Before the return
realizes, investments can be liquidated. The liquidation value is given by L ∈ (0,1). Banks
are risk neutral and maximize (expected) profits.
Regulators: There is a national regulator in each country. A regulator can monitor bank
units and thereby learns the success probability p. Based on his observation, the regulator
can intervene in a bank unit and liquidate the investment. Regarding intervention in a
multinational bank, a distinction between full and partial intervention is necessary. In
case of full intervention both bank units (home and foreign) are liquidated. In case of
partial intervention only one bank unit is liquidated. Monitoring is costly which implies that
the national regulator in country A chooses a fraction qA of bank units that is monitored.
Equivalently, we could say that every bank unit is monitored with probability qA. Hence, qA
represents the strictness of regulation and the level of monitoring in country A. Monitoring
cost is given by c2q
2
A with c > 0. Analogously, the national regulator in country B chooses a




B. The national regulator’s objective is to maximize
(expected) national welfare.
Representative form:30 The MNB chooses between two representative forms – the
branch representation and the subsidiary representation. An MNB that chooses the branch
representation is supervised by the national regulator in the home country. This concerns
the home unit as well as the foreign unit. Deposits are insured by the home country’s
deposit insurance. The home unit is liable for losses of the foreign unit and vice versa.
This means that assets of the home unit (foreign unit) can be used to repay deposits of
the foreign unit (home unit) if the foreign unit (home unit) fails. In this case, first local
depositors are repaid from local assets. We refer to the MNB that chooses the branch
representation as branch MNB. For an MNB that chooses the subsidiary representation the
home unit is supervised by the home-country regulator, while the foreign unit is supervised
by the foreign-country regulator. Deposits raised in the home country are insured by the
home country’s deposit insurance, deposits raised in the foreign country are insured by the
foreign country’s deposit insurance. The home unit of the subsidiary MNB is not liable for
the foreign unit’s losses. This means that the home unit’s assets cannot be used to repay
the foreign unit’s depositors. However, after the foreign unit’s depositors have been repaid,
30The regulatory responsibilities and liability structures which are described in the following closely follow
current regulations, see Fiechter et al. (2011).
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of the other unit




branch foreign country home country yes
subsidiary foreign country foreign country yes
Table 2: Characteristics of multinational banks
assets of the foreign unit can be used to repay depositors of the home unit. We refer to the
MNB that chooses the subsidiary representation as subsidiary MNB. The use of the terms
“home country” and “foreign country”, regulatory responsibility, and liability structures are
summarized in Table 2.
The following simplifying assumption is made:
R+ L < 2, (4.1)
The condition says that the return of one successful unit is not sufficient to repay depositors
in both countries if the other unit fails or is liquidated.
Timing: There are four dates t = 0,1,2,3. At t = 0 national regulators choose their
level of monitoring qA and qB, respectively. At t = 1 MNBs learn the levels of monitoring
and the success probability of their investment, choose their representative form, raise
deposits, and invest. At t = 2, a fraction of bank units (corresponding to monitoring levels)
is monitored. National regulators learn the investment’s success probability of monitored
units and decide whether or not to liquidate. At t = 3 the return of non-liquidated assets
realizes and depositors are repaid. Figure 4.1 summarizes the timing. The three-stage
model can be solved by backward induction.
4.4. National regulation and bank behavior
In the following, we apply backward induction as far as possible. First, national regulators’
liquidation decisions at t = 2 are analyzed for fixed levels of monitoring and fixed bank
representative forms. Second, the MNBs’ optimal choice of the representative form at t = 1
is derived for given levels of monitoring. Finally, national regulators’ choice of the levels of
monitoring at t = 0 is examined.
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Figure 4.1: Time structure of the model
4.4.1. Liquidation decisions at t = 2
At t = 2 the national regulator has to decide whether or not to intervene in units that are
monitored.
A branch MNB is supervised by the home country. Therefore, the home unit and the
foreign unit are supervised by the same national regulator. Without intervention the branch
MNB’s expected profit is given by
2p2 (R− 1) . (4.2)
If both units are successful, both investments return R and deposits are repaid by the MNB.
If only one unit is successful, the return from one project is not sufficient to repay depositors
in both countries. The MNB’s profit in this case equals 0 because both units are liable for
the other unit’s failure. Again, depositors cannot be repaid by the MNB if both units fail.
Since expected profit is positive and R+ L < 2 holds, the branch MNB will not liquidate its
assets, neither partially (only one unit) nor completely (both units).
National welfare in the home country that results from the branch MNB’s activity differs
from profit because the MNB does not care for the depositor’s losses. Without intervention,
national welfare in the home country that results from the branch MNB’s activity is given
by
2p2 (R− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected profit of the branch MNB
− 2p (1− p) (2− R) + (1− p)2 2︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected losses to the deposit insurance
= 2 (pR− 1) . (4.3)
The first term corresponds to the branch MNB’s expected profit. The branch MNB has a
positive profit if both units are successful. The second term refers to the branch MNB’s
losses that are borne by the home-country deposit insurance and occur if one or both
units fail. If only one unit is successful, the home country’s deposit insurance repays
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2− R = 1− (R− 1) to depositors of the unsuccessful unit because the MNB’s return from
investment is only sufficient to repay R < 2. If both units are unsuccessful, the home
country’s deposit insurance repays all depositors of the branch MNB. Note that the branch
MNB’s activity does not affect national welfare in the foreign country.
If the national regulator decides to intervene, there are two possibilities: (i) partial
intervention and (ii) full intervention. In case of a partial intervention only one unit’s
assets are liquidated, while the other unit continues. National welfare that results from the
branch MNB’s activity in this case is given by
(pR− 1) + (L − 1) . (4.4)
Here, the first summand of (4.4) results from activity of the unit whose assets are not
liquidated. The second summand results from activity of the unit whose assets are liquidated.
In case of full intervention, both units’ assets are liquidated and national welfare that results
from the MNB’s activity is given by
2 (L − 1) . (4.5)
Comparing (4.3) with (4.4) and (4.5), we can see that the branch MNB is never partially




and no intervention otherwise. Note that for a higher liquidation value the national
regulator requires a higher success probability to not intervene in the MNB. An increase
in L increases profitability of liquidating assets. Similarly, a higher return R decreases the
intervention threshold because the option not to intervene is more profitable than for a
lower R.
For a subsidiary MNB considerations are a bit more complicated because the home and
the foreign unit are supervised by different national regulators. Without any intervention
the subsidiary MNB obtains the following expected profit:
2p2 (R− 1) + p (1− p) (R− 1) . (4.6)
If both units are successful, the MNB receives (R− 1) from both units. If the home unit is
successful but the foreign unit is not, the MNB receives (R− 1) from the home unit and
nothing from the foreign unit. Here, (in contrast to the branch case) the home unit of a
subsidiary MNB is not liable for the foreign unit’s losses. Therefore, if the foreign unit of the
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subsidiary MNB fails and the home unit is successful, the foreign country’s deposit insurance
repays foreign depositors, while the home unit keeps the profit (R− 1). The foreign unit is
liable for the home unit’s losses which implies that profit is equal to zero if the home unit
fails. This is independent of success or failure of the foreign unit’s project. Similar to the
branch MNB, the subsidiary MNB does not liquidate any assets without intervention.
Consider the home-country regulator who supervises the home unit. If the foreign unit
is not liquidated, the foreign unit’s profit contributes to the home country’s welfare. Hence,
without intervention national welfare in the home country that results from the MNB’s
activity is given by
MNB’s profit︷ ︸︸ ︷
2p2 (R− 1) + p (1− p) (R− 1)−
losses to the home country’s deposit insurance︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− p) p (2− R) + (1− p)2 · 1
= pR− 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
home unit
+ p (R− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
foreign unit
. (4.7)
The first part on the left-hand side of (4.7) shows the MNB’s expected profit. Profit is
positive if both units are successful or if the home unit is successful but the foreign unit
is not. If the home unit is not successful, the home-country deposit insurance faces a loss
which is captured by the second part on the left-hand side of (4.7). If only the foreign unit
is successful, R− 1 of the project return is used to repay depositors of the home unit. The
remaining amount 2− R of depositors’ claims is repaid by the national deposit insurance
in the home country. If both units fail, the home-country deposit insurance repays all
depositors of the home unit. Depositors of the foreign unit are repaid by the foreign-country
deposit insurance which affects national welfare in the foreign country but not in the home
country. The right-hand side of (4.7) illustrates that both profits and losses of the home
unit contribute to home-country welfare, while only profits but not losses of the foreign
unit contribute to home-country welfare.
In case of partial intervention, assets of only one bank unit are liquidated. If the home-
country regulator intervenes but the foreign-country regulator does not, we have
(L − 1) + p (R− 1) . (4.8)
Conversely, if the foreign-country regulator intervenes but the home-country regulator does
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Finally, in case of full intervention both national regulators intervene and we have
(L − 1) . (4.10)
Comparing (4.7) to (4.8) and (4.9) to (4.10), we see that the home-country regulator





This is independent of the foreign-country regulator’s decision on the foreign unit. Note that
the foreign unit’s profit or loss is not affected by the home-country regulator’s decision on
the home unit. Thus, the intervention threshold coincides with the home-country regulator’s
intervention threshold for a branch MNB.
Consider now the foreign-country regulator who supervises the foreign unit of the
subsidiary MNB. Since positive profits of the foreign unit flow back to the home unit (the
parent bank) and contribute to national welfare in the home country, the foreign-country
regulator is only concerned about the losses to the national deposit insurance that are
caused by failure of the foreign unit. National welfare in the foreign country that results
from the MNB’s activity is given by
− (1− p)
if the foreign-country regulator does not intervene, and by
(L − 1)
in case of intervention. Hence, the foreign-country regulator intervenes and liquidates the
foreign unit’s assets if and only if
p < L.
By LR < L, the national regulator is more strict with foreign units of subsidiary MNBs
than with home units of subsidiary MNBs or with branch MNBs. The intuition is that the
national regulator of a foreign unit of a subsidiary does not account for the foreign unit’s
profits but only for its losses to the national deposit insurance.
The results are summarized in the following Lemma:
Lemma 4.1. The national regulator in country A intervenes
• in a branch MNB with home country A if and only if p < LR ;
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• in the home unit of a subsidiary MNB with home country A if and only if p < LR ;
• in the foreign unit of a subsidiary MNB with home country B if and only if p < L.
Proof. See text.
The national regulator knows the success probability p of a bank unit only if this bank unit
is monitored. The liquidation decisions described above therefore only concern monitored
units. If a unit is not monitored, it is assumed that the national regulator cannot intervene.
4.4.2. Banks’ choice of representative form at t = 1
For the moment, concentrate on MNBs with home country A. This implies that the home
unit is active in country A and that the foreign unit is active in country B. At t = 1 the MNB
can decide between two representative forms: a branch MNB and a subsidiary MNB. For
a branch MNB there are two cases according to Lemma 4.1: If the branch MNB’s success
probability is larger than LR , assets are not liquidated at t = 2. If the branch MNB’s success
probability is smaller than LR , all assets are liquidated if and only if the MNB is monitored.
The home-country regulator in country A monitors the MNB with probability qA. Hence, a
branch MNB’s expected profit is given by2p2 (R− 1) , if p ≥ LR ;(1− qA)2p2 (R− 1) , if p < LR . (4.11)
For a subsidiary MNB there are three cases according to Lemma 4.1.
• If the success probability is larger than L, no unit is liquidated at t = 2.
• If the success probability is smaller than L but larger than LR , the home unit’s assets
still are not liquidated. However, the foreign unit’s assets are subject to liquidation
if and only if the foreign unit is monitored. The national regulator in country B
monitors the foreign unit with probability qB.
• If the success probability is smaller than LR , both units are subject to liquidation if and
only if they are monitored, respectively.
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Hence, expected profit of a subsidiary MNB is given by
p (1+ p) (R− 1) , if p ≥ L > LR ;
p (R− 1) + (1− qB) p2 (R− 1) , if L > p ≥ LR ;
(1− qA) p (R− 1) + (1− qA) (1− qB) p2 (R− 1) , if L > LR > p.
(4.12)
Comparing (4.11) and (4.12) leads to the following result:
Proposition 4.1. The MNB chooses
• the branch representation if and only if 11+qB ≤ p < L;
• the subsidiary representation if and only if p < 11+qB or p ≥ L.
Proof. See appendix.
The subsidiary MNB has the advantage that the home unit is liable for the foreign unit’s
losses. Therefore, if the MNB’s success probability is sufficiently high, i.e., if no assets are
liquidated by the national regulator independent of the representative form, then the MNB
prefers the subsidiary representation. A subsidiary MNB still receives a positive profit if
only the foreign unit fails, while a branch MNB in this case receives zero.
In contrast to the subsidiary MNB, the branch MNB is supervised by one national regulator,
only. Additionally, the foreign unit is subject to a softer liquidation decision in case of
monitoring than the foreign unit of the subsidiary MNB. Therefore, if the success probability
is low, i.e., assets of the MNB are subject to liquidation in case of monitoring, then the
choice regarding the representative form depends on the strictness of national regulation in






Hence, the MNB chooses the branch representation if national regulation in the foreign
country is sufficiently strict. In this case, the branch MNB’s advantage of being supervised
by the home country, only, outweighs the subsidiary MNB’s advantage of being protected
by limited liability. The MNB’s choice of representative form is illustrated in Figure 4.2.
Note that the choice of the representative form does not depend on the monitoring
probability in the home country because the intervention threshold of the home-country
regulator coincides for the home unit of a subsidiary MNB and a branch MNB.
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Figure 4.2: Choice of representative form by MNBs with home country A









The mass of subsidiary MNBs is denoted by SA and according to Proposition 4.1 given by







Of course, BA + SA = 1 holds.
As a next step, we want to consider the national regulator’s preference on the MNB’s
choice of the representative form. Therefore, we compare (expected) national welfare
in country A (at t = 0) that results from a branch MNB’s activity and national welfare
in country A that results from a subsidiary MNB’s activity. For a branch MNB with home
country A national welfare in country A is given by2 (pR− 1) , if p ≥ LR(1− qA)2 (pR− 1) + qA2 (L − 1) , if p < LR . (4.16)
The first case refers to the situation where the success probability of the MNB’s investments
is sufficiently high and thus there is no liquidation independent of monitoring. In the
second case the success probability is low and thus both units are liquidated if the MNB is
monitored which happens with probability qA.
For a subsidiary MNB with home country A national welfare in country A is given by
(pR− 1) + p (R− 1) , if p ≥ L > LR
(pR− 1) + (1− qB) p (R− 1) , if L > p ≥ LR
(1− qA) (pR− 1) + qA (L − 1) + (1− qB) p (R− 1) , if L > LR > p.
(4.17)
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The three cases describe the following situations:
(i) The success probability of the MNB’s investments is high and thus there is no liquidation
independent of monitoring.
(ii) The success probability takes an intermediate value and thus the home unit is never
liquidated, but the foreign unit is subject to liquidation if and only if it is monitored
which happens with probability qB.
(iii) The success probability is low and thus both units are subject to liquidation if and
only if they are monitored.
A branch MNB with home country B does not affect national welfare in country A, while
activity of a subsidiary MNB with home country B affects national welfare in country A by− (1− p) , if p ≥ L;− (1− qA) (1− p) + qA (L − 1) , if p < L. (4.18)
Again, the two cases correspond to the situations where (i) the foreign unit of the subsidiary
MNB is is never subject to liquidation, and where (ii) the foreign unit is liquidated if and
only if it is monitored which happens with probability qA.
We obtain
Proposition 4.2. The national regulator in country A prefers
• MNBs with home country A to choose a branch representation if and only if






1+ qB (R− 1)
ª
;
• MNBs with home country B to choose a branch representation.
A symmetric result holds for the national regulator in country B.
Proof. See appendix.
Similar to the MNB, the national regulator in country A prefers MNBs with home country A
to choose the branch representation if and only if the national regulation in the foreign
country is sufficiently strict. However, by a comparison of Proposition 4.1 and Proposition
4.2 and by 11+qB(R−1) >
1
1+qB
too few MNBs with home country A choose the subsidiary
representation from the national regulator’s point of view. For MNBs with home country B
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it is the other way around – from the point of view of the national regulator in country A
too many MNBs with home country B choose the subsidiary representation. The intuition
is as follows: Losses to depositors due to failure of the foreign unit are incurred by the
foreign country’s deposit insurance for a subsidiary MNB and by the home country’s deposit
insurance for a branch MNB. For the MNB this aspect does not matter because the MNB
does not account for the national deposit insurance’s losses. However, for the national
regulator in country A this aspect constitutes an advantage for subsidiary MNBs with home
country A and branch MNBs with home country B.
Note that 11+qB(R−1) − 11+qB is increasing in qB, i.e., the difference between the national
regulator’s preferred choice and the MNBs’ choice of the representative form is the larger
the larger qB.
4.4.3. National regulators’ choice of the level of monitoring at t = 0
At t = 0 the fractions of bank units that are monitored, qA and qB, are chosen simultaneously
with the objective to maximize national welfare. We are interested in the external effect
of national regulation in one country on national welfare in the other country and in the
dependence of the choice of national regulation in one country on national regulation in
the foreign country.
Again, concentrate on country A. Depending on project return R, liquidation value L
and national regulation qB in country B, there are the following types of MNBs with home
country A according to Lemma 4.1 Proposition 4.1:
1. p ∈ 0,min¦ 11+qB , LR©: The MNB chooses the subsidiary representation at t = 1. The
home unit’s assets are liquidated if the home unit is monitored at t = 2 and the
foreign unit’s assets are liquidated if the foreign unit is monitored at t = 2.
2. p ∈ min¦ 11+qB , LR© , LR: The MNB chooses the branch representation at t = 1. Both
units’ assets are liquidated if the MNB is monitored at t = 2.
3. p ∈  LR ,min¦L,max¦ 11+qB , LR©©: The MNB chooses the subsidiary representation at
t = 1. The home unit’s assets are not liquidated at t = 2. The foreign unit’s assets
are liquidated if the foreign unit is monitored at t = 2.
4. p ∈ min¦L, max¦ 11+qB , LR©© , L: The MNB chooses the branch representation. No
assets are liquidated at t = 2.
5. p ∈ [L, 1]: The MNB chooses the subsidiary representation. No assets are liquidated
at t = 2.
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Accordingly, national welfare in country A is given by
WA (qA, qB) =
∫ min¦ 11+qB , LR©
0









© [2qA (L − 1) + 2 (1− qA) (pR− 1)]G (dp)
+
∫ min¦L,max¦ 11+qB , LR©©
L
R










©© 2 (pR− 1)G (dp) +
∫ 1
L
[(pR− 1) + p (R− 1)]G (dp)
+
∫ min¦ 11+qA ,L©
0







The first four lines of the right-hand side show national welfare that results from the activity
of MNBs with home country A. Every summand is related to a different MNB type discussed
above. The fifth line shows national welfare that results from the activity of MNBs with
home country B. There are only two instead of five summands because branch MNBs do
not affect national welfare in the country where the foreign unit is located. The integrands
in the first five lines are according to (4.16), (4.17), and (4.18). The last line shows
monitoring cost.
National regulation qB in country B affects national welfare in country A in the following
way.
Proposition 4.3. The external effect of national regulation in country B on national welfare
in country A is negative, i.e., an increase in qB yields a reduction in national welfare in country
A.
Proof. See appendix.
More precisely, national regulation in country B, qB, affects national welfare in country A
in two ways:
(i) An increase in qB decreases expected profits from subsidiary MNBs with home country
A that are characterized by a success probability p < L (compare (4.12)).
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(ii) An increase in qB incentivizes more MNBs with home country A to choose the branch
representation instead of the subsidiary representation (compare Proposition 4.1).
According to Proposition 4.2 from the point of view of the national regulator in country
A too few MNBs with home country A choose the subsidiary representation. Additionally,
this divergence between the national regulator’s preference and the MNBs’ preference on
the representative form is amplified by increasing qB. Hence, effects (i) and (ii) work in
the same direction which implies that an increase in qB unambiguously decreases national
welfare in country A.
Now, consider the question how national regulation in country A, qA, affects national
welfare in country A. Assume that qA 6= 1L −1 holds. Then, the derivative of national welfare
















© [L − pR] G (dp)
+
∫ min¦ 11+qA ,L©
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Accordingly, a change in qA has three different effects on national welfare in country A:
(i) Monitoring effect (first two lines): An increase in qA increases the probability that projects
which should be liquidated from the national regulator’s point of view are indeed
liquidated. The monitoring effect is positive.
(ii) Adjustment effect (third line): An increase in qA incentivizes more MNBs with home
country B to choose the branch representation instead of the subsidiary representation.
The adjustment effect is non-negative because the national regulator in country A
prefers MNBs with home country B to choose the branch representation (compare
Proposition 4.2).
(iii) Cost effect (fourth line): An increase in qA increases monitoring cost. The cost effect is
non-positive.
31
1{X } denotes the indicator function that equals 1 if some proposition X is true and 0 if X is false.
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Therefore, an increase in qA is beneficial for national welfare in country A not only because
the fraction of monitored MNBs increases but also because the choice of the representative
form by MNBs with home country B is adjusted in a beneficial way. Nevertheless, there is a
trade-off because an increase in qA also increases monitoring cost.
Note that the adjustment effect is equal to zero if qA <
1
L − 1. In this case all MNBs with
home country B choose the subsidiary representation and a small change in qA has no effect
on this choice. Therefore, in the following we assume 1L − 1< 1, i.e., L > 12 .
For simplicity, from now on we assume that p is distributed according to a uniform
distribution on the interval [0,1]. The first interesting result is that monitoring is always
beneficial, i.e., qA = 0 is not a welfare-maximizing solution.







While the monitoring effect is positive, the cost effect and the adjustment effect equal
zero if there is no monitoring in country A. Therefore, a small increase in qA increases
national welfare in country A because projects with too low chances of success are then
liquidated beneficially (from a welfare point of view) with positive probability.
The next step is to determine and analyze the national regulator’s best response. For the
national regulator in country A the best-response function is given by
qBA (qB) := arg maxqA
WA (qA, qB) .
Proposition 4.4. The best-response function qBA fulfills the following three properties:
(a) qBA is increasing in qB;
(b) qBA (qB) is decreasing in c for all qB ∈ [0,1];























is either empty or
contains exactly one element.
Proof. See appendix.
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The most important part of the Proposition is part (a) which shows that the level of
monitoring in country A is increasing in the level of monitoring in country B. The intuition
is the following. If the national regulator in country B increases the level of monitoring, this
has a negative effect on national welfare in country A for two reasons (see Proposition 4.3).
First, expected profit from subsidiary MNBs with home country A decreases, and second the
burden on the national deposit insurance in country A increases because more MNBs with
home country A choose a branch representation. The national regulator in country A cannot
counteract the first effect, however, he can counteract the second effect. By increasing
qA, more MNBs with home country B choose the branch representation instead of the
subsidiary representation which decreases the burden on country A’s deposit insurance.
Hence, an increase in qB increases the welfare-maximizing monitoring level in country A.
Note that vice versa an increase in the level of monitoring in country A also increases the
level of monitoring in country B. This can be considered a “race to the top” in monitoring
standards.
Part (b) shows that the outcome of the regulatory race depends on monitoring cost c. If
monitoring cost are sufficiently low, the regulatory race reduces the amount of subsidiary
MNBs to its minimum and increases the amount of branch MNBs to its maximum, i.e.,
SA = SB =
3
2 − L and BA = BB = L − 12 (compare (4.14) and (4.15)).
Part (c) shows the values that the best response function can take. For small qB and large
c the best response is lower than 1− 1L which implies that the adjustment effect is equal
to zero and all MNBs with home country B choose the subsidiary representation. More
precisely, the best response equals qˆA =
ϕL,R(qB)
c . For intermediate values of qB and c the
regulatory race is more intense which implies that the best response is between 1− 1L and 1.
More precisely, the best response equals q¯A ∈QA. This implies a positive adjustment effect,
i.e., some MNBs with home country B choose the branch representation because of strict
national regulation in country A. If qB is sufficiently large and c sufficiently small, then the
best response is equal to 1. In this case the number of branch MNBs with home country B
reaches its maximum value.
The Proposition is illustrated in Figure 4.3. Both panels show national welfare in country
A as a function of the monitoring level qA in country A for different parameter values. The
welfare function has a kink for qA =
1
L − 1. To the left of the kink, the adjustment effect is
constantly equal to zero. To the right of the kink the adjustment effect is positive and thus
affects the slope of the welfare function (compare (4.20)) The left-hand panel shows how
national welfare in country A and the optimal monitoring level qBA for different values of






B. An increase in qB shifts the national-
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ch > cm > c l
Figure 4.3: Choice of monitoring effort
welfare function downwards and the maximizing argument to the right. Consequently,
national welfare decreases and the monitoring level increases. The right-hand panel shows
national welfare in country A and the optimal monitoring level for different values of the
cost parameter c, ch > cm > c l . An increase in monitoring cost shifts the national-welfare
function downwards and the maximizing argument to the left. Consequently, both national
welfare and the monitoring level decrease.
To underline the strength of the obtained result, we determine the efficient solution for
comparison. As we will see, national regulations are too strict from a total welfare point of
view.
4.5. The eicient solution
The efficient solution describes liquidation decisions and the strictness of national regulation
if national regulators maximize total welfare of both countries A and B instead of national
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welfare. Total welfare is defined as the sum of national welfare in countries A and B
W = WA +WB.
So far, we have considered the case that national regulators choose monitoring levels and
make liquidation decisions in order to maximize national welfare. In the following we refer
to this situation and the related results as the baseline scenario. In the case that national
regulators maximize national welfare, total welfare cannot be larger than total welfare
reached by the efficient solution. Deriving the efficient solution helps to analyze whether
there are regulatory inefficiencies in the baseline scenario, and if so, for which reasons.
4.5.1. Eicient liquidation decisions
We start with liquidation decisions at t = 2. Remember that MNBs have no incentive to
liquidate their assets. Hence, assets are only liquidated if the national regulator intervenes.
A branch MNB only affects national welfare in the home country. Therefore, the liquidation
decision that maximizes national welfare in the home country coincides with the liquidation
decision that maximizes total welfare. Accordingly, the following liquidation decision is
efficient: there is no intervention if p ≥ LR holds, while assets of both units are liquidated
otherwise.
A subsidiary MNB affects national welfare in both countries. More precisely, the home
unit affects national welfare only in the home country, the foreign unit’s profits affect
national welfare in the home country, and the foreign unit’s losses affect national welfare
in the foreign country. Hence, total welfare that results from the subsidiary MNB’s activity
without intervention is given by
pR− 1+ p (R− 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
welfare in the home country
− (1− p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
welfare in the foreign country
= 2 (pR− 1) .
In case of partial intervention we have (pR− 1) + (L − 1) independent of the unit that is
liquidated. In case of full intervention total welfare that results from the MNB’s activity
is given by 2 (L − 1). Therefore, the efficient liquidation decision for a subsidiary MNB
coincides with the (efficient) liquidation decision for a branch MNB. Consequently, in
the baseline scenario the national regulator of the home unit behaves efficiently, while
the national regulator of the foreign unit is too strict. Too see this, remember that the
intervention threshold of the foreign unit’s national regulator in the baseline scenario is
given by L > LR (compare Lemma 4.1). Hence, foreign units with L > p ≥ LR are liquidated
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inefficiently because the national regulator in the foreign country considers only the foreign
unit’s losses that affect national welfare in the foreign country but not the foreign unit’s
profits that affect national welfare in the home country. To sum up, we obtain
Lemma 4.3. In the baseline scenario liquidation decisions by national regulators
• regarding branch MNBs and regarding home units of subsidiary MNBs are efficient,
• regarding foreign units of subsidiary MNBs are more strict than efficient liquidation
decisions.
Proof. See text.
Assume that national regulators liquidate efficiently. Then, this may have an effect on
the MNB’s choice of the representative form at t = 1. More precisely, a softer regulation of
subsidiary MNBs’ foreign units should yield a higher number of subsidiary MNBs. A short
analysis can confirm this.
Lemma 4.4. If national regulators liquidate efficiently, then

















The equalities SeA = SA and B
e
A = BA hold if and only if
1
1+qB
≥ L. A symmetric result holds for
country B.
Proof. See appendix.
The condition L < 11+qB assures that in the baseline scenario some MNBs with home
country A prefer the branch representation if national regulators maximize national welfare.
Efficient liquidation decisions regarding subsidiary MNBs are less strict than liquidation
decisions chosen by national regulators in the baseline scenario. Therefore, if L < 11+qB holds,
a change to efficient regulation increases the number of subsidiary MNBs and decreases
the number of branch MNBs.
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4.5.2. Eicient monitoring levels
To assess the levels of monitoring chosen by national regulators, we assume that liquidation
decisions at t = 2 are given by Lemma 4.1 and compare the efficient levels of monitoring
with the levels chosen by national regulators in the baseline scenario. Hence, we only ana-
lyze the constrained-efficient solution. For the sake of completeness, the first-best solution,
i.e., efficient monitoring levels based on efficient liquidation decisions, are considered in
Appendix 4.B. The resulting monitoring level is then not comparable to the monitoring
level in the baseline scenario because liquidation decisions differ. For this reason, here,
we consider the efficient monitoring level based on liquidation decisions in the baseline
scenario. Then, total welfare is given by
W (qA, qB) =
∫ min¦ 11+qB , LR©
0
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∫ min¦L,max¦ 11+qB , LR©©
L
R










©© 2 (pR− 1) dp− c2q2A
+
∫ min¦ 11+qA , LR©
0









© 2qB (L − 1) + 2 (1− qB) (pR− 1) dp
+
∫ min¦L,max¦ 11+qA , LR©©
L
R










©© 2 (pR− 1) dp− c2q2B.
The first four lines capture total welfare stemming from activity of MNBs with home country
A, the last four lines capture total welfare stemming from activity of MNBs with home
country B. The expressions are symmetric. Hence, we concentrate on the first four lines
and consider MNBs with home country A. The first line describes total welfare from activity
of subsidiary MNBs whose units (home and foreign) are subject to liquidation in case of
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monitoring at t = 2. The second line represents total welfare from activity of branch MNBs
whose units (home and foreign) are subject to liquidation in case of monitoring at t = 2.
The third line captures total welfare from activity of subsidiary MNBs whose foreign unit
(but not home unit) is subject to liquidation in case of monitoring at t = 2. The fourth line
shows (i) total welfare from activity of MNBs whose assets are never subject to liquidation
and (ii) monitoring cost in country A.
The effect that results from a change in qA (or analogously qB) can again be decomposed
in a monitoring effect, an adjustment effect and a cost effect. However, compared to the
baseline scenario, these effects may differ when total welfare is considered. To see this, we
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and compare (4.22) to (4.20). In comparison with the effect of a change in qA on national
welfare we observe the following differences:
(i) Monitoring effect (first two lines): The effect on total welfare corresponds to the effect
on national welfare minus
∫ min¦ 11+qA ,L©
0
p (R− 1) dp. Hence, the monitoring effect is
smaller if total welfare is considered instead of national welfare. Total welfare takes
into account the expected profit p (R− 1) of a subsidiary MNB’s foreign unit, while
national welfare only accounts for the losses. An increase in the level of monitoring
qA is less effective for total welfare because the loss that occurs if foreign units of
subsidiary MNBs are not liquidated although they should be liquidated is smaller, i.e.,
L − pR< L − p holds.
(ii) Adjustment effect (third and fourth line): Analogously to the effect on national welfare, a
change in qA affects the choice of the representative form of MNBs with home country
B if 11+qA < L holds. In contrast to the effect on national welfare, the adjustment effect
now can be divided in two parts, the third line and the fourth line.
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The third line is negative if qA > qB and positive if qA < qB holds. Accordingly, the third
line shows that it is efficient to prevent regulatory arbitrage. If qA > qB holds, MNBs
try to avoid regulation in country A which means that, compared to the situation that
qA < qB holds, more MNBs with home country B prefer the branch representation. An
increase in qA aggravates the incentive for regulatory arbitrage and decreases total
welfare.
The fourth line is non-negative and hence shows a positive effect of an increase in
the level of monitoring in country A on total welfare. Since a higher qA implies more
branch MNBs and less subsidiary MNBs in country B, this implies a preference for
the branch representation. This is because liquidation decisions for foreign units of
subsidiary MNBs are inefficient (see Lemma 4.3). By increasing qA, the number of
subsidiary MNBs with home country B decreases which also decreases the number of
inefficient liquidation decisions.
In contrast, the adjustment effect on national welfare is non-negative because an
increase in qA decreases the number of subsidiary MNBs in country B and hence
decreases expected losses to the national deposit insurance of country A. This aspect
does not matter for total welfare because losses are just redistributed from country A
to country B.
(iii) Cost effect (fifth line): There is no difference between the effect on national welfare
and the effect on total welfare.
Taking all three effects together, the effect of a change in qA on total welfare is smaller than
the effect on national welfare. The following is implied.
Corollary 4.1. If the efficient monitoring level is smaller than 1, then the monitoring level
chosen by national regulators in the baseline scenario is larger than the efficient monitoring
level.
Proof. See appendix.
The intuition is similar to Proposition 4.3. In the baseline scenario the national regulator
of a foreign unit of a subsidiary MNB accounts for the losses of the subsidiary MNB that
occur to the national deposit insurance but not for the foreign unit’s profit that contributes
to home-country welfare. Thereby, the national regulator does not take into account that a
high level of monitoring decreases (i) expected profits of subsidiary MNBs with home unit
in the foreign country and (ii) the number of subsidiary MNBs in the foreign country which
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in turn increases expected losses to the national deposit insurance in the foreign country.
The efficient solution internalizes this negative externality. Hence, national regulators
choose a level of monitoring that is too high from the point of view of total welfare.
4.6. Regulatory decisions in a banking union
An interesting extension of our model concerns the scenario of a banking union. In the
following, we consider a centralized regulator who maximizes total welfare. It is clear
that, without any frictions, total welfare is highest if all decisions are centralized and
hence efficient from the point of view of total welfare. However, it may be too costly for a
centralized regulator to collect information. Therefore, we consider a situation similar to
Carletti et al. (2016) where national regulators are in charge of collecting information and
a centralized regulator decides whether to intervene in a bank unit or not based on this
information. As discussed earlier, related literature so far suggests that national regulators
collect too little information or withhold information (Carletti et al. 2016, Holthausen &
Rønde 2004). Since our model shows that monitoring levels may be too strict in terms of
efficiency, we ask how a central regulator affects monitoring decisions of national regulators.
In terms of our model this means that at t = 0 national regulators decide on the levels of
monitoring qA and qB, respectively. At t = 1 MNBs learn the levels of monitoring and the
success probability of their investment, choose their representative form, raise deposits,
and invest. At t = 2 a fraction qA (qB) of bank units under the regulatory responsibility of
country A (country B) is monitored, the centralized regulator learns the success probability
of investments made by monitored units and decides whether to intervene or not. At t = 3
the return of non-liquidated assets realizes and depositors are repaid.
We do not consider a common deposit insurance scheme. As before, deposits are insured
by national deposit insurances. The only aspect of a banking union that we consider is joint
resolution.
Again, we solve the model as far as possible by backward induction, where dates t = 2
and t = 1 have already been considered in subsection 4.5.1. The efficient liquidation
decision is the following: At t = 2 the centralized regulator intervenes in a monitored unit
if and only if p < LR . Anticipating this liquidation decision at t = 1 MNBs choose their




≤ p < L
R
and the subsidiary representation otherwise. This choice of representative form is not
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necessarily in accordance with regulators’ preference as the following Lemma shows.
Lemma 4.5. The centralized regulator and the national regulators prefer the following choice
of MNBs’ representative form:
(a) The national regulator in country A prefers
• all MNBs with home country A to choose the subsidiary representation;
• all MNBs with home country B to choose the branch representation.
A symmetric statement holds for the national regulator in country B.
(b) The centralized regulator
• is indifferent between MNBs’ representative forms if p ≥ LR or qA = qB;
• prefers MNBs with home country A to choose
– the branch representation if qA > qB and
– the subsidiary representation if qB > qA.
A symmetric statement holds for MNBs with home country B.
Proof. See appendix.
As in the case of national liquidation decisions, from the point of view of the national
regulator in country A, too few MNBs with home country A choose the subsidiary represen-
tation, while too few MNBs with home country B choose the branch representation. As
before, the reason is that foreign units of subsidiary MNBs impose an expected loss on the
foreign-country deposit insurance instead of the home-country deposit insurance, while
branch MNBs only affect home-country welfare.
For total welfare it does not matter in which country a loss occurs (country A or country
B). Therefore, the centralized regulator is indifferent between representative forms as long
as levels of monitoring are equal in both countries (qA = qB) or the MNB is not affected
by monitoring (p ≥ LR). However, if the MNB is affected by monitoring and monitoring
levels differ, the centralized regulator prefers the representative form that implies stricter
monitoring. This implies that regulatory arbitrage is not efficient from the point of view of
total welfare. For example, if qA > qB there are more subsidiary MNBs with home country
A than subsidiary MNBs with home country B because MNBs prefer a smaller monitoring
probability. A similar statement holds for branch MNBs. In this way the number of MNBs
which avoid the prospect of (efficient) liquidation is maximized. From the point of view
of total welfare, the number of MNBs which avoid the prospect of liquidation should be
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minimized. Hence, the centralized regulator prefers the representative form that implies
the larger monitoring probability.
All together, Lemma 4.5 suggests that the level of monitoring chosen by national regula-
tors at t = 0 is again too high from the point of view of total welfare. To confirm this, we
now turn to date t = 0 and first derive national welfare (without loss of generality) for
country A denoted by W bA :
W bA (qA, qB) =
∫ min¦ 11+qB , LR©
0













[(pR− 1) + p (R− 1)] dp
+
∫ min¦ 11+qA , LR©
0








National welfare in country A is generated from the activity of branch MNBs and subsidiary
MNBs with home country A (first and second line), subsidiary MNBs with home country B
(third line), and monitoring cost (fourth line). The effect of a change in qA is obtained by















© [L − pR] dp +
∫ min¦ 11+qA , LR©
0









qA (L − 1)− qA (1− qA)1+ qA

− cqA.
The effect of a change in qA on national welfare can again be decomposed in a monitoring
effect (first line), an adjustment effect (second line) and a cost effect (third line). Comparing
with (4.20) it can be seen that compared to the baseline scenario differences occur because
liquidation decisions differ:
• In the banking-union scenario assets of (monitored) foreign units of subsidiary MNBs
are liquidated if and only if p ≤ LR .
• In the baseline scenario assets of (monitored) foreign units of subsidiary MNBs are
liquidated if and only if p ≤ L.
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Accordingly, the monitoring effect is smaller in the banking-union scenario than in the
baseline scenario because monitoring a foreign unit of a subsidiary MNB with LR < p ≤ L
does not result in liquidation in the banking union scenario in contrast to the baseline
scenario. This is efficient but not preferable from the point of view of the national regulator
who is in charge of monitoring the unit. The adjustment effect is also smaller in the banking-
union scenario than in the baseline scenario because the efficient liquidation decision results
in a larger number of subsidiary MNBs. More precisely, MNBs with LR < p ≤ L choose the
subsidiary representation independent of the level of monitoring in the foreign country. For
those MNBs a change in qA does not change the choice of the representative form. This is
in contrast to the baseline scenario. There is no difference in the cost effect.
Altogether, the effect of a change in qA on national welfare in country A is smaller in
the banking-union scenario than in the baseline scenario which suggests that the levels of
monitoring are smaller than in the baseline scenario. We obtain:
Proposition 4.5. Monitoring levels in the banking-union scenario are smaller than in the
baseline scenario. However, monitoring levels in the banking-union scenario are not efficient
unless the efficient monitoring level is equal to 1. Total welfare can be increased by decreasing
monitoring levels further.
Proof. See appendix.
The intuition is the following. In the baseline scenario liquidation decisions are made by
national regulators, while in the banking union scenario a centralized regulator decides
on liquidation. The centralized regulator is too soft from national regulator’s point of
view because there is no intervention in foreign units of subsidiary MNBs that satisfy
L
R ≤ p < L. The assets of these units should be liquidated from national regulator’s point of
view. National regulators react with a decrease of the monitoring level because monitoring
does not necessarily result in the desired liquidation and hence is less profitable compared
with the baseline scenario. Now, a very interesting observation is that total welfare in the
banking-union scenario can still be increased by increasing monitoring levels although
monitoring levels are already smaller than in the baseline scenario. The reason is again
that national regulators ignore the negative externality that the monitoring level exerts
on national welfare in the foreign country. More precisely, an increase in the monitoring
level in country A decreases national welfare in country B because more MNBs with home
country B choose the branch representation instead of the subsidiary representation which
increases the expected loss to country B’s deposit insurance. Additionally, an increase in
qA decreases expected profits of subsidiary MNBs with home country B which is also not
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taken into account by the national regulator in country A. Total welfare can be increased
by internalizing this negative externality, i.e., by decreasing monitoring levels.
4.7. Conclusion
The present model gives new insights into regulatory races when banks are internationally
active and can choose between a branch and a subsidiary representation. Spillovers
between countries occur because a subsidiary’s profit contributes to national welfare in
the country where the home unit is active, while a subsidiary’s losses burden the national
deposit insurance in the country where the subsidiary is active. Consequently, the national
regulator who supervises a subsidiary accounts for the subsidiary’s losses but not for its
profits. From a total-welfare point of view liquidation decisions on subsidiaries are too
strict. In contrast, both profits and losses of a branch contribute to national welfare in the
country in which the home unit is active. Therefore a branch does not generate spillover
effects which implies an efficient liquidation decision.
Monitoring levels chosen by regulators shape multinational banks’ decision on their
representative form. A strict level of monitoring incentivizes multinational banks with home
country B to choose the branch representation rather than the subsidiary representation
to avoid supervision by country A. This implies a race to the top in monitoring standards.
An increase in the level of monitoring in country A decreases the number of subsidiaries
active in country A which in turn decreases the burden on the national deposit insurance in
country A. It can be shown that monitoring levels chosen by national regulators are larger
than efficient monitoring levels.
Additionally a banking-union scenario is considered where national regulators are in
charge of information collection but a centralized regulator decides on liquidation. Since the
centralized regulator’s liquidation decision differs from the liquidation decision preferred
by national regulators, the introduction of a centralized regulator decreases information
collection. However, total welfare can still be increases by decreasing monitoring levels
further.
A so far undiscussed question concerns the normative implications of the presented model.
The reason for inefficiently high monitoring levels and inefficient liquidation decisions are
spillover effects caused by subsidiary. An easy way to restrict spillover effects seems to be a
ban of bank activity in foreign countries. However, this is in general not desirable as an
economy also benefits from foreign bank activity. For example, the presence of foreign
banks may decrease the cost and increase accessibility and quality of financial services.
(Allen et al. 2011, Claessens & van Horen 2013). More promising are burden sharing
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agreements that govern the allocation of a multinational banks’ losses between all involved
countries. Currently, the country in which a subsidiary is active is responsible for resolution
of the subsidiary and bears the losses in case of a bank failure. As we have seen this causes
regulatory inefficiencies because bank profits (at least partly) flow back to the parent bank.
A burden sharing agreement that allocates losses to the involved countries in accordance
with the distribution of profits could correct distorted incentives of national regulators. Our
analysis also showed that regulatory cooperation in the form of a banking union may not
fully work as intended if no burden sharing agreement is included. In a banking union
burden sharing agreements may take the form of a joint deposit insurance which is the
case for the European Banking Union. Note that asymmetric information regarding the
distribution of bank profits and time lags concerning the adjustment of burden sharing
agreements may, however, prevent such agreements to be fully effective.
Appendix
4.A. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 4.1: First, if p > L, the subsidiary representation yields a higher
profit than the branch representation because
p (1+ p) (R− 1)≥ 2p2 (R− 1)
holds which is equivalent to
1+ p ≥ 2p.
Second, assume L > p ≥ LR , then the MNB chooses the subsidiary representation if
p (R− 1) + (1− qB) p2 (R− 1)≥ 2p2 (R− 1)




Third, assume p < LR , then again the MNB chooses the subsidiary representation if
(1− qA) p (R− 1) + (1− qA) (1− qB) p2 (R− 1)≥ (1− qA)2p2 (R− 1)






Proof of Proposition 4.2: First, consider MNBs with home country A and compare (4.16)
and (4.17). For p ≥ L the national regulator in country A prefers the MNB to choose a
subsidiary representation because p (R− 1)> pR− 1. For p < LR the national regulator also
prefers the subsidiary representation because p (R− 1)> 0> L − 1> pR− 1. If L > p ≥ LR
holds, the national regulator prefers the branch representation if and only if
(pR− 1)≥ (1− qB) p (R− 1)
holds which is equivalent to
p ≥ 1
1+ qB (R− 1) .
Second, consider MNBs with home country B. It is immediately clear that the national
regulator in country A prefers the branch representation because branch MNBs with home
country B do not affect national welfare in country A, while subsidiary MNBs with home
country B affect national welfare in country A negatively (see (4.18)).
Proof of Proposition 4.3: Assume qB 6= RL −1 and qB 6= 1L −1. In this case the derivative of





∫ min¦ 11+qB , LR©
0
p (R− 1)G (dp)−
∫ min¦L,max¦ 11+qB , LR©©
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Since WA is continuous in qB, this proves the claim. Here, 1{A} denotes the indicator function
that equals 1 if A is true and 0 if A is false.
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[L − p] dp
>0.
Proof of Proposition 4.4: In the following, (c) is proven first, followed by (a) and, finally,
(b).







= ϕL,R (qB)− cqA















© L − pR dp does not depend on qA. It is easy to





















qA (1− L) + (1− qA)qA1+ qA




















= −c + 1
(1+ qA)
4 [3− 3qA− 2L − 2LqA]
which shows that national welfare may be convex for small values of qA above
1
L − 1 but is
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L − 1 is no candidate for the welfare-maximizing argument. The remaining




















where the above set may be empty, i.e., QA = ;. This proves part (c).















Hence, qˆA as well as q¯A are increasing in qB. Second, we have to check that with increasing
qB the best response does not change form q¯A to qˆA (if
1
L − 1 < q¯A < 1 and qˆA < 1L − 1) or
from 1 to qˆA (if QA = ; or q¯A > 1, and qˆA < 1L − 1). Therefore, consider the difference
WA (qˆA, qB)−WA (q¯A, qB) .
Without loss of generality we can exclude qB =
1
L − 1 and qB = RL − 1. To check the


















































which yields that WA (qˆA, qB) −WA (q¯A, qB) is decreasing in qB. Hence, the best response
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cannot change from q¯A to qˆA with an increase in qB. The proof to show that the best response
cannot change from 1 to qˆA is the same.
The proof of part (b) is similar to the proof of part (a). First, note that qˆA and q¯A are
decreasing in c. Additionally WA (qˆA, qB)−WA (q¯A, qB) is increasing in c because the derivative
with respect to c is given by
1
2
q¯2B − 12 qˆ
2
B > 0.
The same holds for WA (qˆA, qB)−WA (1, qB). Hence, the best response qBA (qB) is decreasing
in c.
Proof of Lemma 4.4: MNBs with p ≥ LR face the following expected profit2p2 (R− 1) , for the branch representation,p (1+ p) (R− 1) , for the subsidiary representation.
Hence, the MNB chooses the subsidiary representation. MNBs with p < LR have an expected
profit of(1− qA)2p2 (R− 1) , for the branch representation,(1− qA) p (R− 1) + (1− qA) (1− qB) p2 (R− 1) , for the subsidiary representation.











and BeA = max
¦
L
R − 11+qB , 0
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i.e., if and only if LR < L ≤ 11+qB . Finally, note that SeA = 1− BeA and SA = 1− BA.












holds. Consequently, if the national regulator prefers qA = 1, the efficient level of monitoring
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< 0, i.e., the level of monitoring in the baseline scenario is larger than the
efficient monitoring level.
Proof of Lemma 4.5: Consider MNBs with home country A. Given the efficient liquidation
decision at t = 2, national welfare in country A that results from a subsidiary MNB’s activity
is given by (pR− 1) + p (R− 1) , p ≥ LRqA (L − 1) + (1− qA) (pR− 1) + (1− qB) p (R− 1) , p < LR
and for a branch MNB by2 (pR− 1) , p ≥ LRqA2 (L − 1) + (1− qA)2 (pR− 1) p < LR .
For p ≥ LR the national regulator in country A prefers the subsidiary representation because
pR− 1< p (R− 1). For p < LR the national regulator also prefers the subsidiary representa-
tion because p (R− 1)> 0> L − 1> pR− 1. Now, consider MNBs with home country B. A
subsidiary MNB with home country B has a negative effect on national welfare in country
A, − (1− p) , p ≥ LRqA (L − 1)− (1− qA) (1− p) , p < LR .
A branch MNB with home country B does not affect national welfare in country A. Hence,
the national regulator in country A prefers the branch representation for MNBs with home
country B. This proves part (a).
Again, consider MNBs with home country A. A subsidiary MNBs effect on total welfare is
given by 2 (pR− 1) , p ≥ LR(qA + qB) (L − 1) + (2− qA− qB) (pR− 1) , p < LR
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and for a branch MNB by2 (pR− 1) , p ≥ LR2qA (L − 1) + 2 (1− qA) (pR− 1) , p < LR .
Consequently, the centralized regulator is indifferent between representative forms if
p ≥ LR or qA = qB. For p < LR and qA 6= qB the centralized regulator prefers the subsidiary
representation if and only if qA < qB. This proves part (b).
Proof of Proposition 4.5: Since WA and W
b
A are continuous in qA, we can assume qA 6∈
1
L − 1, RL − 1
	























which proves the first part.
Total welfare in the banking-union scenario is given by W b = W bA +W
b















∫ min¦ 11+qA , LR©
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and proves the second part.
4.B. The first-best solution
If national regulators liquidate efficiently at t = 2, a monitored bank unit is liquidated if




• p ∈ 0, min¦ LR , 11+qB©: subsidiary MNBs whose units (home and foreign) are subject
to liquidation in case of monitoring;
• p ∈ min¦ LR , 11+qB© , LR: branch MNBs whose units (home and foreign) are subject to
liquidation in case of monitoring;
• p ∈  LR , 1: subsidiary MNBs whose assets are never subject to liquidation.
We denote (expected) total welfare at t = 0 by W e and obtain
W e (qA, qB) =
∫ min¦ LR , 11+qB ©
0



















∫ min¦ LR , 11+qA ©
0















2 (pR− 1) dp− c
2
q2B.
The first three lines capture total welfare stemming from activity of MNBs with home
country A, the last three lines capture total welfare stemming from activity of MNBs with
home country B. Since the expressions are symmetric, we concentrate on the first three
lines and consider MNBs with home country A. The first line describes total welfare from
activity of subsidiary MNBs whose units (home and foreign) are subject to liquidation in
case of monitoring at t = 2. The second line represents total welfare from activity of branch
MNBs whose units (home and foreign) are subject to liquidation in case of monitoring at
t = 2. The third line shows (i) total welfare from activity of MNBs whose assets are never
subject to liquidation and (ii) monitoring cost in country A.
To examine the effect that results from a change in qA (or analogously qB), we derive the
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Here, the first line shows the monitoring effect, the second line shows the adjustment effect,
and the third line shoes the cost effect. Compared to the baseline scenario, i.e., compared
to (4.20) there are the following differences:
• The monitoring effect observed in (4.23) equals the monitoring effect in the baseline
scenario plus
∫ min¦ LR , 11+qA ©
0
[L − pR] dp − ∫ min¦L, 11+qA ©
0
[L − p] dp < 0. Consequently,
monitoring effects differ for two reasons. First, liquidation decisions for foreign units
of subsidiary MNBs are different. It can be seen that this affects the monitoring effect
by considering the integration boundaries. Second, national welfare that results
from activity of the foreign unit of a subsidiary MNB is smaller than total welfare
because national welfare in the country where the subsidiary MNB’s foreign unit is
active does not account for profits of a subsidiary MNB’s foreign unit. It can be seen
that this affects the monitoring effect by considering the integrands, L − p > L − pR.
Consequently, the monitoring effect observed in (4.23) is smaller than the monitoring
effect observed in the baseline scenario because liquidation (and thus monitoring) of
a subsidiary MNB’s foreign unit is more beneficial in the baseline scenario.
• The adjustment effects in (4.23) and in the baseline scenario are qualitatively com-
pletely different. In the baseline scenario the adjustment effect on national welfare
is non-negative because an increase in qA decreases the number of subsidiary MNBs
in country B and hence decreases expected losses to the national deposit insurance
of country A. This aspect does not matter for total welfare because a loss that is not
incurred by country A is incurred by country B.
However, in (4.23) the adjustment effect is present because it is efficient to prevent
regulatory arbitrage. If qA > qB holds, MNBs try to avoid regulation in country A
which means that, compared to the situation that qA < qB holds, more MNBs with
home country B prefer the branch representation. An increase in qA aggravates the
incentive for regulatory arbitrage and decreases total welfare.
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Note that the adjustment effect in (4.23) equals 0 if 11+qA ≥ LR holds. In contrast, the
adjustment effect in the baseline scenario equals zero if 11+qA ≥ L holds. Here, again
the difference in liquidation decisions and the resulting difference in the number of
subsidiary and branch MNBs is demonstrated.
• There is no difference in the cost effect.
Whether the best response resulting from the maximization of W e is larger or smaller
than the best response resulting in the baseline scenario depends on the parameter values
qB, L, R, c. While the monitoring effect is larger in the baseline scenario, the sign of the





The models in this thesis analyze how banks and regulators deal with certain aspects of
liquidity and credit risk. In this final chapter we now want to compare the considered
models and discuss some open questions.
In both parts of this thesis, more precisely in chapters 2, 3, and 4, a joint regulatory
instrument is considered. There is a deposit insurance that prevents bank runs. However,
the introduction of a deposit insurance also introduces moral hazard. Since depositors are
not repaid by the bank but by the deposit insurance in case of bank failure, some banks
choose to implement investment projects that are too risky from a point of view that also
accounts for losses incurred by the deposit insurance. The desirability or design possibilities
of a deposit insurance are not discussed. For an overview of arguments in favor or against
a deposit insurance the reader is referred to Freixas & Rochet (2008). In this thesis the
existence of a deposit insurance is assumed because such a system is in place in most
countries (for a list see Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2005)).
In many countries banks are requested to pay a deposit insurance premium Demirgüç-
Kunt et al. (2005). The raised funds can be used in case a bank fails. In this way banks
themselves finance the deposit insurance. However, Chan et al. (1992) show that a fairly
priced deposit insurance is not necessarily possible if there is asymmetric information
regarding the probability of a bank default. With this result, the funds which are collected
ex ante from banks may be larger or smaller than the funds necessary in case of bank
failure. By abstracting from a positive deposit insurance premium the models in this thesis
explicitly concentrate on the case of a severe bank failure where the collected funds are not
sufficient.
The main difference between the two parts is that the first part considers how banks
deal with bank risk, while the second part considers how regulators deal with bank risk.
The models presented in the first part both describe banks’ behavior on interbank markets.
The first chapter is concerned with banks’ search for an interbank market partner and thus
the formation of interbank market networks. In contrast, the second chapter analyzes the
conditions under which interbank lending takes place when interbank market partners are
already fixed. Additionally, in the second chapter the function of the interbank markets is
the support of banks’ liquidity management, while in the first chapter the function is more
broadly the support of a beneficial allocation of funds. Therefore, in the models of chapters
1 and 2 the maturity of interbank loans differs. In chapter 1 the maturity may be short term
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or long term. This is consistent with empirical research, which finds highly similar structures
for different maturity ranges (see for example Aldasoro & Alves (2016)). In contrast, the
maturity of interbank loans in the second chapter is explicitly short term. A final difference
between the two chapters is that the second chapter considers the effect of monetary policy,
while the first chapter does not. In the first chapter, it is questionable whether monetary
policy has an influence on banks’ choice of their interbank market partner at all because
relationships between banks are observed to be highly persistent, while monetary policy is
usually aimed at the short term. In the context of the second chapter it seems natural to
consider monetary policy effects because central banks in many countries explicitly set a
target for the short term interbank market rate (Bank for International Settlements 2009).
The second part is concerned with the regulation of multinational banks. Both chapters
have in common that they consider the spillover effects and the resulting regulatory
externalities which occur due to the activity of multinational banks. Chapter 3 concentrates
on parent banks and subsidiaries. Chapter 4 additionally considers branches. The main
difference between the two chapters is that the structure of the banking sector, i.e., the
number and size of parent banks and subsidiaries, is fixed in chapter 3 and endogenous
in chapter 4. In chapter 3 this simplification keeps the analysis tractable and allows a
comparison of national welfare in case of national regulation and national welfare in case
of a banking union. Chapter 4 explicitly allows the banking sector’s structure to depend on
the strictness of regulation. This adds another dimension to the model, namely a regulatory
race. Since national welfare depends inter alia on the foreign banking sector’s structure,
and hence on regulation in the foreign country, the optimal level of regulation depends
on regulation in the foreign country. This effect is not present in chapter 3 because the




α share of a bank’s funds that is invested in risky projects
A, B countries
B private benefit of a bank from investment into a risky project
BA share of branches in country A
c cost parameter that determines a regulator’s monitoring cost
ci j cost (per bank) of a relationship between the banks i and j
c¯ fixed cost (per bank and per relationship) for a certain set of
relationships
c core bank
C exogenous stability cost per monetary unit invested by a parent bank
C set of core banks
E t=τΠ expected bank profit at time t = τ
fn total intermediation fee which is paid by the lender if there are n−1
intermediaries
f¯n intermediation fee paid to a single intermediary if there are n− 1
intermediaries
Fi loan that is granted to bank i by the central bank
g graph describing a network
g density function of the cumulative distribution function G
G cumulative distribution function that describes the distribution of
the success probability of banks’ investment projects
GA cumulative distribution function that describes the distribution of
banks’ activity levels in the home country and in the foreign country
Γ endogenous stability cost per monetary unit invested by a subsidiary
i, j, m banks
i j link between banks i and j
k, n, N integer describing a number of banks
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List of Symbols
l integer describing a number of links
L liquidation value of an investment project per monetary unit
invested
Li loan that is granted to bank i at the interbank market
L set of links
λ liquidity shock
µA activity level of the multinational bank from home country A in the
home country A
N parentA→A mass of projects realized in country A by parent banks in country A
N subsidiar yA→B mass of projects realized by parent banks in country A but active in
country B
N set of banks
N set of natural numbers
p success probability of an investment project
p¯ perception of the success probability of an investment project
p periphery bank
ψ profit share of a subsidiary that is transferred to its parent bank
P set of periphery banks
Π (expected) bank profit
qA regulator’s monitoring effort in country A
rd deposit rate
rIB interbank rate
rl marginal lending rate
r, R,R return of an investment project
R+ set of all non-negative real numbers
S expected surplus of intermediation
SA share of subsidiaries in country A
t point in time
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List of Symbols
T subset of all banks
(T P1, T P2) threat point of banks 1 and 2
U[a,b] uniform distribution on the interval [a, b]
WA national welfare in country A
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Referat:
Banks perform the essential economic task of collecting funds from net savers (such as
households) and lending funds to net borrowers (such as firms). In doing so, banks
transform assets with respect to size, maturity, and risk. As a result, banks are exposed to a
variety of risks. This thesis consists of two parts where particular aspects of bank risk are
discussed.
The first part is concerned with the question how banks themselves deal with certain
aspects of bank risk by using the interbank market. An important issue for bank risk and
financial stability is the structure of interbank markets and thus the determinants of banks’
choice of their interbank market partner. Information between banks is a crucial factor for
explaining bank behavior. More precisely, heterogeneity in information can explain the
formation of widely observed structures. Another important issue concerns the conditions
under which interbank trade takes place once a bank has found an interbank market partner.
The central bank is able to influence these conditions, for example, by adapting the policy
rates related with the standing facilities. Contrary to the current belief, it is shown that not
only a narrow but also a wide corridor between these policy rates can prevent interbank
lending.
The second part of the thesis is concerned with the question how regulators deal with cer-
tain aspects of bank risk when banks are internationally active. Regulation of multinational
banks causes regulatory externalities from the country which is responsible for the bank’s
supervision to other countries where the bank is active. An obvious way to internalize these
externalities is the setting-up of a banking union. The incentive of a single country to join a
banking union depends on the size and structure of the banking sector. This can be verified
by considering the current situation in the European Banking Union. Without a banking
union, national regulators do not internalize regulatory externalities. This may result in a
“race to the top” in regulatory standards because higher regulatory standards imply a saver
banking sector and relocate losses to the foreign country.
